the dealers handling and selling the cigarettes furnished by the corporation, its general agents for the disposal of that particular commodity, and to issue to its so called agents what are designated as selling lists. The agreement entered between the company and those dealing with it provides, in substance, among other things, that cigarettes of the various brands manufactured by the company are to be sent to the dealer and received, sold and accounted for by him; that the goods are not to be sold at lower prices than those fixed by the company, the dealer to guarantee all sales made by him, all cigarettes to remain the property of the corporation until sold by the dealer. Commissions for selling and expenses of the dealer are allowed on all goods sold at not less than $2.50 per 1,000, provided the dealer shall fully comply with all the conditions herein contained and shall co-operate with the company and promote its interests and handle its cigarettes to its satisfaction. It is further stipulated that if the company becomes informed and believes that the dealer has directly or indirectly sold cigarettes at lower than the fixed prices, or has not complied with the conditions of the agreement, the company shall have the right to determine and declare that the dealer has forfeited all claims to commissions. It appears to be the fact that, with the exception of certain cheaper brands, the company has refused since March 1, 1892, to sell directly to dealers, but has disposed of this line of goods through its agents appointed in the manner and upon the terms above stated. In brief the evidence and papers submitted to me are to the effect that the wholesale dealer, jobber or whoever he may be that obtains this commodity from the company for the purpose of commerce is, with the exceptions I have before stated, at once turued into an agent of the company, and subjected to its direction and control as to the terms and manner in which he shall dispose of this particular line of goods. It is claimed upon the part of petitioner that the real object and purpose of this arrangement and method of doing business is to compel jobbers and dealers to refrain from selling any cigarettes except those manufactured by the company, and that if they handle other brands the company refuses to consign any further goods to them, and that inasmuch as much the larger part of the ci garettes manufactured and sold are produced by the factories of the company, such a withdrawal results in great injury to, if not a destruction of the business of said dealers. Various affidavits have been presented and depositions of witnesses have been read tending to establish the claim of the petitioner. In my judgment a corporation doing business in this State, and having substantial control of the market ought not to be permitted to impose as a general perquisite upon the purchasers of its commodities, whether designated as agents or not, that they shall obtain goods from no other source. The enforcement of such a condition must necessa rily operate as a restraint of trade and prevent competition. To carry out such a rule to its logical sequence would enable the wealthy corporation which has obtained a monopoly of the market to continue the monopoly and to drive out of business poorer and less fortunate competitors. The purchaser under such an arrangement and contract has been made party to a scheme which has really a tendency to give control of the market to the vendor to the exclusion of all competitors. I think such a method of transacting business under the circumstances disclosed is against public policy and would not receive the approval of the courts of the State in the case of a domestic corporation. Why then should it be permitted in a foreign corporation? I have examined this application with care, believing that corporations acting within the law are entitled to the protection of the courts, and that actions should not be commenced except for good and substantial reasons. Large interests and immense accumulations of property are represented by companies incorporated under foreign and domestic statutes. I have no sympathy with any disposition upon the part of private citizens or public officials to attack the existence of a corporation because of temporary financial embarrassment or trivial and unintentional deviation from chartered powers. Applications made for purposes of speculation, to redress private grievances or to promote the interests of rival corporations, are unworthy of consideration. I am of the opinion that sufficient evidence has been produced upon the costs of suit. On reading the opinion, it is important to notice that part in which the allegation of the petition that a monopoly exists is discussed. It is especially in relation to the words, "in my judgment a corporation doing business in this State and having substantial control of the market ought not to be permitted to impose as a general prerequisite upon the purchasers of its commodities, whether designated as agents or not, that they shall obtain goods from no other source." Applying this principle by analogy the Attorney-General declares that, as domestic corporations would not be allowed by the courts of this State to do business in a manner clearly against public policy, foreign corporations should not be allowed that right. Nevertheless, the remarks of Judge Jenkins as to the locality of the damage being conclusive of the question of admiralty jurisdiction are in point. He says: hearing to authorize the commencement of an action to determine whether the American tobacco company is not transacting its business in the State of New York in an unlawful manner, in restraint of trade and to prohibit it from In cases of tort, locality is the test of jurisfurther transaction of such business. The ap-diction in the admiralty. The ultimate judiplication is granted and an action may be com- cial authority has determined the principle that menced upon filing a bond sufficient in form the true meaning of the rule of locality is that, and amount to indemnify the people against although the origin of the wrong is on the water, yet, if the consummation and substance of the injury are on the land, a Court of ad'miralty has not jurisdiction; that the place or locality of the injury is the place or locality of the thing injured, and not of the agent causing the injury (Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co., 118 U. S., 610, 7 Sup. Ct., 25). Within this settled principle, a tort is maritime, and within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, when the injury is to a vessel afloat, although the negligence causing the injury originated on land. (The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall, 213; Leonard v. Decker, 22 Fed., 741.) In the former case it was ruled that an action in personam would lie against the owners of the bridge, because the injury was consummated upon navigable waters, being inflicted upon a movable thing engaged in navigation, but that a proceeding in rem against the bridge was not maintainable, because a maritime lien can only exist upon movable things engaged in navigation, or upon things which are the subjects of commerce on the high seas or navigable waters. And so an injury happening through default of the master, to one upon a vessel discharging cargo at a wharf to which she was securely moored, is within the admiralty jurisdiction (Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. S., 626), but otherwise if the injury occurred to one upon the wharf. (The Mary In the latter case Stewart, 10 Fed., 137.) there is an inadvertent remark to the effect that both the wrong and the injury must occur upon the water a proposition not sustained by It suffices if the damage - the authority. substantial cause of action arising out of the wrong is complete upon navigable waters. (The Plymouth, supra.)" A decision in admiralty jurisdiction recently made in the United States District Court for California in Herman v. Port Blakely Mill Co. (69 Fed. R. 646), is worthy of careful consider ation In the case in question it was held that where a tort is committed partly on land and partly on water, the question whether admiralty has jurisdiction over it is determined by the locus of the damage and not the locus of the origin of the tort. The tort complained of was that a laborer working in the hold of a vessel was struck and injured by a piece of lumber sent without warning through a chute by a person working on the pier. As the locus of the damage was on board the vessel, the court held that it was within admiralty jurisdiction. The court said, in part: In the case of the City of Milwaukee v. The Curtis, The Camden and The Welcome (37 Fed. 705) a libel in rem was filed by the City of Milwaukee against the vessels named for injuries to a bridge. The Counsel for respondent relies greatly upon libel was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Mary Stewart (supra), and particularly The proposition involved there was counter to upon the remarks criticised by Judge Jenkins that in the case at bar. It was for an injury to in the case just quoted, as indicating that the land, and not for an injury originating on land. I tort must be complete on the water before a With reference to other cases cited by counsel for respondent, they may be disposed of with the statement that, discarding scattered and isolated expressions, and reading the opin ions cited as a whole, they rather make for than against the jurisdiction of admiralty. While, as previously stated, I have been unable to find any case on "all fours" with the one at bar, yet there are many authorities upon the counter proposition- viz., where the tort has its origin on water, but is consummated, and the injury sustained, on land-which seem to me to furnish convincing authority for the jurisdiction of the court in this case. In those cases, where the facts showed that the tort originated on water, but was consummated, and the injury sustained, on land, it is held that courts of admiralty have no jurisdiction. The authorities even go further, and hold that where the tort originates on water, and results in injury to land, as wharves, piers, bridges, &c. (e. g., a vessel col Court of Admiralty will take jurisdiction. That was a case involving the proposition counter to the one at bar, viz, the tort there originated on the water, but the consummation and the injury were sustained on land. The facts of the case were, briefly, that one, an employe of the stevedore engaged in loading the vessed, was injured, while standing on the wharf, by a bale of cotton, which was being hoisted aboard the ship, which fell before it reached the ship's rail. It was contended that a Court of Admiralty could not take jurisdiction. The district judge correctly held that jurisdiction could not attach, but, in sustaining this contention, went a little further than the facts justified him. He said: "It is clear that the cause of action set out in the libel is without the jurisdiction of the admiralty. In cases of tort, the locality alone determines the admiralty jurisdiction. Only those torts are maritime which happen on navigable waters. If the injury complained of happened on land, it is not cognizable in the admi-liding what a wharf, etc.), libels for damages susralty, even though it may have originated on the water. (The Plymouth, 3 Wall., 20.) This springs from the well-known principle that there are two essential ingredients to a cause of action, viz., a wrong, and damage resulting from that wrong. Both must concur. To constitute a maritime cause of action, therefore, not only the wrong must originate on water, but the damage the other necessary ingredient-The John C. Sweeney, 55 Fed. 540; The Mary must also happen on water. Now, the injury in the case at bar happened on the land." This language must, of course, be taken subject to the facts of that case, and to the question of law which the learned judge was then considering. I do not think that he meant to lay it down as a general principle that "the wrong must originate on the water," for that would be to make the test of admiralty jurisdiction depend upon the locality where the tort originated a proposition not countenanced by a single authority or dictum. I think that the only true and rational solution of the jurisdictional question, where the tort occurs partly on land and partly on water, is to ascertain the place of the consummation and substance of the injury. This latter elemeut of the wrong is necessarily the only substantial cause of action, otherwise it would be damnum absque injuria. tained by such wharves, etc., will not be enter tained in admiralty, because the injury took place, to all intents and purposes, on land, and not on water, and the fact that the agent causing the injury was afloat made no difference. (The Plymouth, supra; The Neil Cochran, supra; The Ottawa, supra; The Arkansas, 17 Fed. 383; The Professor Morse, 23 Fed. 803; Stewart, supra; The H. S. Picklands, 42 Fed. 239; The Mary Garrett, 63 Fed. 1009; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213.) But it is held, on the other hand, that if a vessel sustain injury by colliding with wharves, piers, etc., they may maintain an action in personam against the owners thereof, the damage having been sustained on water. (Greenwood v. Town of Westport, 53 Fed. 824; id., 60 Fed. 561; Hill v. Board, 45 Fed. 260.) The central idea found running through all these cases is, so far as jurisdiction over torts is concerned, that the admiralty law books to the place where the injury was suffered, and not to the locality of the agent causing the injury. If this be the cor rect doctrine with respect to cases where the tort originates on water, but results in damage to land or on land, I see no valid reason why the same test of jurisdiction is not applicable to cases where the tort originates on land, but result in damage on water. Applying this criterion to the case at bar, it will be readily conceded to be conclusive in favor of the quesition of jurisdiction. In Hite v. Metropolitan St. Rwy. Co., decided in the Supreme Court of Missouri in July, 1895 (32 S. W. R. 33), it was held that where, in an action for injury from being thrown from a cable car while rounding a curve, the evidence clearly shows that the accident was caused by a lurch of the car on account of its speed, and that such speed was necessary to carry the car around the curve, a demurrer to the evidence should be sustained. The court said: "It is insisted by plaintiff that the evidence adduced by her made out a prima facie case, which entitled her to a verdict, unless overcome by defendant, which A was a question for the jury. This is unquestionably the law where there is any substantial t evidence introduced on the part of a plaintiff to sustain the allegations in the petition, as the authorities cited by counsel for plaintiff in their brief abundantly show, but it is not the law where the facts necessary to be proven in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover are merely inferential or conjectural. The evidence clearly showed that the only way the cars could be operated around the curve where the accident happened was by the speed of the cable, and that the lurch or lunge which precipitated plaintiff from the car was incident to its operation, and could not be avoided. These facts were undisputed. Therefore, the demurrer to the whole evidence should have been sustained. There is no evidence upon which to predicate the verdict, and it was the plain duty of the trial court to have sustained the demurrer thereto, as well, also, as to have set the verdict aside, on motion of defendant, because of the want of evidence to support it. The interposition of the demurrer at the close of the case requires us to review the evidence taken as a whole (Hiltz v. Railway Co., IOI Mo. 36, 13 S. W. 946); and, when this is done, there can be but one conclusion and that is that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. 'When the evidence is of that character that the trial judge would have a plain duty to perform in setting aside the verdict as unsupported by the evidence, it is his duty and prerogative to interfere before submission to the jury and direct a verdict for the defendant.' (Jackson v. Hardin, 83 Mo. 175; Powell v. Railroad Co., 76 Mo. 80; Reichenbach v. Ellerbe, 115 Mo. 588, 22 S. W. 573.) We have carefully considered the motion for a rehearing filed by plaintiff and all of the authorities cited in support thereof, but see no reason for departing from our original opinion. The motion for rehearing is overruled." ADDRESS OF JAMES C. CARTER, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. (CONCLUDED.) NEW YORK. The most interesting legislative experience of New York during the past year is that of its Constitutional Convention, held under the provisions of the Constitution of 1816, which requires a revising convention every twenty years. The convention appears to have wisely accepted the leadership of a number of members, which it fortunately possessed, of large abilities and temperate wisdom. The result is shown in the rejection of most of the temptations offered to it to indulge in ordinary legislation, and to make the fundamental law (which ought always to be confined to the sure results of experience) an instrumentality for the introduction of untried experiments. We find, consequently, in its work, very little in the way of radical change. Most of its new provisions are rearrangements of some of the details of governmental organization such as were called for by the special conditions of that State. Such changes as have been introduced are conceived and expressed with caution and prudence, and much benefit may reasonably be expected from them. The provision for preventing the application of public moneys to sectarian purposes under the guise of charity, without, at the same time, repressing charitable effort, deserves general attention. A precaution promising much benefit in special municipal legislation is found in the requirement that special city bills must be submitted to the mayors of the cities affected for their approval, in default of which the bill cannot become law unless re sisted of measures relative to the municipal government of New York city designed mainly to summarily remove from office incumbents supposed to be unworthy. Nothing can justify legislation of this character except a very grave emergency. It renders permanent and orderly administration impossible. Such an emergency perhaps existed in this instance; certainly the loud public voice proclaimed it, but there is great danger that such precedents will be imitated without adequate occasion. Official unfaithfulness and the public demand are easy to be alleged as a pretext under which personal and party schemes may be carried into effect. One act was passed which well illustrates what seems to be a sort of passion, which many persons with the best intentions have, of seeing their particular views enacted into law. They imagine, apparently, that when this is done the benefit with which they conceive their views to be fraught is already accomplished. This law requires that "the nature of alcoholic drinks and other narcotics and their effects on the human system shall be taught * * ** for not less than four lessons a week for ten or more weeks in each year in all grades below the second year of the High school in all schools under State control or supported in whole or in part by public money." All pupils must continue the study until they have passed satisfactory examination. All regents' examinations in physiology and hygiene "shall include a due proportion of questions on the nature of alcoholic drinks and other narcotics and their effects on the human system. All pupils who can read shall study this subject from suitable text-books, but pupils unable to read shall be instructed in it orally by teachers using text-books. For students below high school grade such text-books (presumably on physiology) shall give at least one-fifth of their space, and for students of high school grade, shall give not less than twenty pages to the nature and effects of alcoholic drinks and other narcotics. * * * No text-book on physiology not conforming to this act shall be used in the public schools." * * * * * * What the effects of an excessive use of alcoholic drinks are, is a matter of common observation and need not be taught in the schools; but what the particular physiological effect of alcohol upon the human body is, is a matter about which men of science most competent to judge inform us that there is as yet no settled knowledge. What this act would accomplish, if it were obeyed, would be to devote a vast amount of the time of the young to the study of the dogmatism, probably the error, of sciolists; and there can be no well grounded belief that the effort will ever impress the young with an aversion to an indulgence in liquors or narcotics. As to the text-books, doubtless there are some publishers who have on hand some which alone will auswer the requirements of the statute and will thus exclude all others. NEVADA. The Legislature of Nevada has contented itself with the passage of one hundred and eleven acts, mostly brief ones, occupying but one hundred and twelve pages. The discrepancy existing between opinions in this State on the subject of money and that which moulds the policy of most nations is made very manifest, not only in the enactments, but also in many concurrent resolutions of this session. The latter exhibit an almost frantic sincerity, and condemn the opponents, and applaud the supporters, of the doctrines avowed with something like delirious intensity. Among the enactments I observe one designed to promote purity in elections, containing some stringent requirements which, if enforced, would prove very beneficial. It limits the amount of money which may be expended by candidates or other persons in elections, and requires itemized statements of the expenditures. Another permits the disposition of property by holographic wills, to be proved in the same way as other private writings. NEW HAMPSHIRE. New Hampshire exhibits few marked changes in legislative policy. A considerable step is taken in favor of the policy of providing for the incorporation of private companies under general laws rather than by granting special charters as heretofore. The prohibitory policy relating to intoxicating drinks is retained and made in some respects more rigid. The day prior to Memorial Day is set apart and required to be devoted in the public schools to exercises of a patriotic character. The demands of labor are acceded to in a requirement that suitable seats shall be provided in factories for female operatives. An act drawn up with great apparent care provides for the establishment by private companies of street railroads. They are rigidly subjected to public supervision and control, and a wise provision limits the amount of capital stock to be issued to actual needs as determined by public authority. Further advances are made towards conferring upon State railroad commissioners a just authority and supervision over railroads. NORTH DAKOTA. This State exhibits a commendable parsimony in legislation. Her one hundred and twenty brief acts are comprised in one hundred and seventy-six |