in that monition required the bank to answer in regard to such a debt, and the bank made no answer. If it had been called on by that notice to answer, as it certainly would if a debt was claimed of it as being due to the Georgetown Bank, it would have been bound at its peril to have disclosed the assignment of that debt to Risley by the Georgetown Bank, and the demand and notice of Risley to the Phoenix Bank before the commencement of the confiscation proceedings. Indeed it is quite remarkable that no answer or appearance for the Phoenix Bank is made in that proceeding. If the money, the actual cash in the bank vaults, was attached, the bank must have known that the dollars were its dollars, and it should have defended. If it was the debt which was attached, its legal duty to its creditor, whether that was Risley or the Georgetown Bank, was to have stated the facts to the court. It does not appear to us that any seizure or attachment of the debt due by the Phoenix Bank to the Georgetown Bank was made, by which the District Court, if it intended to do so, obtained jurisdiction to confiscate it. On the whole case, we are of opinion 1st. That the specific money in the Phoenix Bank, against which the confiscation proceedings seem to have been directed, and which was condemned, was the money of that Bank, and not of the Georgetown Bank, and the loss, if any, is the loss of the Phoenix Bank. 2d. That no such seizure or attachment was made of the debt due by the Phoenix Bank to the Georgetown Bank, if any such debt existed, when the proceedings were commenced, as would give the District Court jurisdiction of that debt, and no actual condemnation of that debt, or order on the Phoenix Bank to pay it, was made, which can constitute a defense to the present action. 3d. That the right of Risley to recover the debt as assignee of the Georgetown Bank remains unaffected by those proceedings. The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York is therefore HAYES V. RAILROAD COMPANY. Where a municipal ordinance, granting to a railroad the The ordinance requiring such sufficient walls and ences to be a fence was the cause of the mishap. It is not necessary, in order to charge the company with the responsibility, that its negligence should be the efficient cause of the injury; if the injury would not have occurred but for such negligence, that is enough. error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. The opinion states the case. A. D. Rich, for plaintiff in error. Ashley Pond, for defendant in error. MATTHEWS, J. This action was brought by the plaintiff in error to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in error. After the evidence in the cause had been closed, the court directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. A bill of exceptions to that ruling embodies all the circumstances material to the case, and presents the question, upon this writ of error, whether there was sufficient evidence to entitle the plaintiff below to have the issues submitted to the determination of the jury. The defendant, in running its trains into Chicago, used the tracks of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, under an arrangement between them; and no question is made but that the defendant is to be treated, for the purposes of this case, as the owner as as well as occupier of the tracks. The tracks in question are situated for a considerable distance in Chicago, including the place where the injury complained of was received, on the lake shore. They were built in fact, at first, in the water on piles; a breakwater, constructed in the lake, protecting them from winds and waves, and on the west or land side, the space being filled in with earth, a width of about 280 feet, to Michigan avenue, running parallel with the railroad. This space between Michigan avenue and the railroad tracks is public ground, called Lake Park, on the south end of which is Park Row, a street perpendicular to Michigan avenue and leading to and across the railroad tracks to the water's edge. Numerous streets, from 12th street north to Randolph street, intersect Michigan avenue at right angles, about 400 feet apart, and open upon the park, but do not cross it. Nothing divides Michigan avenue from the park, and the two together form one open space to the railroad. The right of way for these tracks was granted to the company by the city of Chicago over public grounds by an ordinance of the common council, dated June 14, 1852, the 6th section of which is as follows: 'Section 6. The said company shall erect and maintain on the western or inner line of the ground pointed out for its main track on the lake shore, as the same is hereinbefore defined, such suitable walls, fences, or other sufficient works as will prevent animals from straying upon or obstructing its tracks and secure persons and property from danger, said structure to be of suitable materials and sightly appearance, and of such height as the common council may direct, and no change therein shall be made except by mutual consent; provided however that the company shall construct such suitable gates at proper places, at the ends of the streets which are now or may hereafter be laid out, as may be required by the common council, to afford safe access to the lake; and provided also that in case of the construction of an outside harbor, streets may be laid out to approach the same, in the manner provided by law, in which case the common council may regulate the speed of locomotives and trains across them." It was also provided in the ordinance, that it should be accepted by the railroad company within ninety days from its passage, and that thereupon a contract under seal should be formally executed on both parts, embodying the provisions of the ordinance and stipulating that the permission, rights, and privileges thereby conferred upon the company should depend upon their performance of its requirements. This contract was duly executed and delivered March 28, 1853. The work of filling in the open space between the railroad tracks and the natural shore line was done gradually, more rapidly after the great fire of October 9th, 1871, when the space was used for the deposit of the debris and ruins of buildings, and the work was completed substantially in the winter of 1877--8. In the meantime several railroad tracks had been constructed by the railroad company on its right of way, used by itself and four other companies for five years prior to the time of the injury complained of, and trains and locomotives were passing very frequently, almost constantly. The railroad company had also partially filled with stones and earth the space east of its tracks, to the breakwater, sufficiently so in some places to enable people to get out to it. This they were accustomed to do, for the purpose of fishing and other amusements, crossing the tracks for that purpose. At one point there was a roadway across the park and the tracks, used by wagons for hauling materials for filling up the space, and a flagman was stationed there. At this point great numbers of people crossed to the breakwater; from two streets, the public were also accustomed to cross over the tracks from the park to ferryboats. From Park Row, at the south end of the park, running north a short distance, the railroad company, in 1872, bad erected on the west line of its right of way a five-board fence, the north end of which at the time of the injury to the plaintiff was broken down. The rest of it was in good order. The park was public ground, free to all, and frequented by children and others as a place of resort for recreation, especially on Sundays. Not far from the south end, and about opposite the end of the fence, was a band-house for free open-air con certs. The plaintiff was a boy between eight and nine years of age, bright and well-grown, but deaf and dumb. His parents were laboring people, living, at the time of the accident, about four blocks west of Lake Park. Across the street from where they lived was a vacant lot where children in the neighborhood frequently played. On Sunday afternoon, March 17, 1878, St. Patrick's day, the plaintiff, in charge of a brother about two years older, went to this vacant lot, with the permission of his father, to play; while playing there a procession celebrating the day passed by, and the plaintiff, with other boys, but without the observation of his brother, followed the procession to Michigan avenue at 12th street, just south of Lake Park; he and his companions then returned north to the park, in which they stopped to play: a witness, going north along and on the west side of the tracks, when at a point a considerable distance north of the end of the broken fence, saw a freight train of the defendant coming north; turning round toward it he saw the plaintiff on the tracks south of him, but north of the end of the fence; he also saw a colored boy on the ladder on the side of one of the cars of the train motioning as if he wanted the plaintiff to come along; the plaintiff started to run north beside the train, and as he did so,turned and fell, one or more wheels of the car passing over his arm. There were four tracks at this point, and the train was on the third track from the park. The plaintiff had his hands reached out toward the car, as he ran, as if he was reaching after it, and seemed to the witness to be drawn around by the draft of the train, and fall on his back. Amputation of the left arm at the shoulder was rendered necessary, and constituted the injury for which damages were claimed in this suit. The question of contributory negligence does not appear to us to arise upon this record. It is not contended by the counsel for the defendant in error, that if there was evidence tending to prove negligence on its part, the case could properly have been withdrawn from the jury on the ground that it appeared as matter of law that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover by reason of his own contributory negligence. The single question therefore for present decision is whether there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant which should have been submitted to the jury. The particular negligence charged in the declaration and relied on in argument, is the omission of the railroad company to build a fence on the west line of its right of way, dividing it from Lake Park; a duty, it is alleged, imposed upon it by the ordinance of June 14, 1852, a breach of which, resulting in his injury, confers on the plaintiff a right of action for damages. It is not claimed on the part of the plaintiff in error that the railroad company was under an obligation, at common law, to fence its tracks generally, but that at common law the question is always whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the railroad has been constructed or operated with such reasonable precautions for the safety of others, not in fault, as is required by the maxim, sic utere tuo, ut non alienum lædas; that consequently in circumstances where the public safety requires such a precaution, as a fence, to prevent danger from the ordinary operations of the railroad, to strangers not themselves in fault, the omission of it is negligence; and that it is a question of fact for a jury, whether the circumstances exist which create such a duty. This principle has been recognized and applied in cases of collisions at crossings of railroads and public highways, when injuries have occurred to persons necessarily passing upon and across railroad tracks in the use of an ordinary highway. "These cases," said the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Eaton v. Fitchburg R. Co., 129 Mass. 364, "all rest on the commonlaw rule that when there are different public easements to be enjoyed by two parties, at the same time and in the same place, each must use his privilege with due care, so as not to injure the other. The rule applies to grade crossings, because the traveller and the railroad each has common rights in the highway at those points. The fact that the Legislature has seen fit, for the additional safety of travellers, imperatively to require the corporation to give certain warnings at such crossings, does not relieve it from the duty of doing whatever else may be reasonably necessary." It was accordingly held in that case, that the jury might properly consider, whether, under all the circumstances, the defendant was guilty of negligence in not having a gate or a flagman at the crossing, although not expressly required to do so by any statute or public authority invested with discretionary powers to establish such regulations. And the same principle has been applied in other cases, than those of the actual coincidence, at crossings, of public highways. In Barnes v. Ward, 9 C. B. 392, it was decided, after much consideration, that the proprietor and occupier of land making an excavation on his own land, but adjoining a public highway, rendering the way unsafe to those who used it with ordinary care, was guilty of a public nuisance, even though the danger consisted in the risk of accidentally deviating from the road, and liable to an action for damages to one injured by reason thereof; for the danger thus created may reasonably deter prudent persons from using the way, and thus the full enjoyment of it by the public is, in effect, as much impeded as in the case of an ordinary nuisance to a highway. This doctrine has always since been recognized in England. Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire R. Co., 4 Hurl. & Nor. 67; Hounsell v. Smyth, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 731; Dinks v. South Yorkshire R. Co., 3 B. & S. 244. It has also been generally adopted in this country. Norwich v. Breed, 30 Coun. 535; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283; 23 Am. Rep. 175: Harmar v. Stanley, 66 Penn. St. 464; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Boteler, 38 Md. 568; Strutton v. Staples, 50 Me. 94; Young v. Harvey, 16 Ind. 314; Cogswell v. Inhabitants of Lexington, 4 Cush. 307; although Howland v. Vincent, 10 Metc. 371, is an exception. The enforcement of this rule in regard to excavations made by proprietors of lots adjacent to streets and public grounds in cities and towns, in the prosecution of building enterprises, and in the construction of permanent areas for cellar ways, is universally recognized as an obvious and salutary exercise of the common police powers of municipal government; and the omission to provide barriers and signals, prescribed by ordinance in such cases for the safety of individuals in the use of thoroughfares, is a failure of duty, charged with all the consequences of negligence, including that of liability for personal injuries, of which it is the responsible cause. The true test is, as said by Hoar, J., in Alger v. City of Lowell, 5 Allen, 402, “not whether the dangerous place is outside of the way, or whether some small slip of ground not included in the way must be traversed in reaching the danger, but whether there is such a risk of a traveller, using ordinary care in passing along the street, being thrown or falling into the dangerous place, that a railing is requisite to make the way itself safe and convenient." As the ground of liability in these cases is that of a public nuisance, causing special injury, the rule of course does not apply where the structure complained of on the defendant's property, and the mode of its use are authorized by law; and consequently what has been said is not supposed to bear directly and strictly on the question in the present case, but rather as inducement, showing the ground of legislative authority implied in the ordinance, the breach of which is imputed to the defendant as negligence toward the plaintiff, and as serving to interpret the meaning and application of its provisions. The ordinance cannot, we think, be treated as a mere contract between the city, as proprietor of the land over which the right of way is granted, and the railroad company, to which no one else is privy, and under which no third person can derive immediately any private right, prescribing conditions of the grant, to be enforced only by the city itself. Although it takes the form of a contract, provides for its acceptance and contemplates a written agreement in execution of it, it is also primarily a municipal regulation, and as such, being duly authorized by the legislative power of the State, has the force of law within the limits of the city. Mason v. Shawneetown, 77 Ill. 533. Neither can the ordinance be limited by construction to the mere purpose of preventing animals from straying upon or obstructing the tracks; because in addition to that, it expressly declares that the walls, fences or other works required shall be suitable and sufficient to secure persons and property from danger. This cannot refer to persons and property in course of transportation, and already in care of the railroad company as common carrier, for the duty to carry and deliver them safely was already and otherwise pro vided for by law; nor can it be supposed from the nature of the case that the stipulation was intended as security for any corporate interest of the city. The proviso in the 6th section that the company shall construct such suitable gates at crossings as thereafter might be required by the common council to afford safe access to the lake, clearly designates the inhabitants of the city as at least within the scope of this foresight and care, the safety of whose persons and property was in contemplation. The prevention of animals from straying upon the tracks and the security of persons and property from danger are two distinct objects, for both which the requirement is made of suitable walls, fences or other protections; and the ordinance in these two particulars is to be referred to distinct legislative grants of power to the municipal body. The general act to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages, which constitutes the charter of the city of Chicago, confers upon its city council power: Twenty-sixth. To require railroad companies to fence their respective railroads, or any portion of the same, and to construct cattle-guards, crossings of streets and puplic roads, and keep the same in repair within the limits of the corporation. In case any railroad company shall fail to comply with any such ordinance, it shall be liable for all damages the owner of any cattle or horses or domestic animal may sustain by reason of injuries thereto while on the track of such railroad, in like manner and extent as under the general laws of this State relative to the fencing of railroads." Cothran's Rev. St. Ill., 1884, 227. By the general law of the State, requiring railroads to be fenced except within the limits of municipal corporations, the company omitting performance of the duty is liable to the owner for all damages to animals, irrespective of the question of negligence. Cothran's Rev. St. Ill., 1884, 1151. Whether this provision is limited to the protection of animals, and covers only the case of damage done to them, or whether a failure to comply with the ordinance authorized thereby might be considered as evidence of negligence in case of injury to person or property, in any other case, it is not necessary for us now to decide; for in the same section of the statute there is this additional power conferred upon the city council: "Twenty-seventh. To require railroad companies to keep flagmen at railroad crossings of streets, and provide protection against injury to persons and property in the use of such railroads," etc. The latter clause of this provision is general and unrestricted. It confers plenary power over railroads within the corporate limits, in order that by such requirements as in its discretion it may prescribe, and as are within the just limits of police regulation, the municipal authority may provide protection against injury to persons and property likely to arise from the use of railroads. And as we have shown by reference to analogous cases, the erection of a barrier between the railroad tracks and the public highways and grounds, particularly such a resort as the Lake Park is shown to be, in the present case, is a reasonable provision clearly within the limits of such authority. To leave the space between the park and the breakwater, traversed by the numerous tracks of the railroad company, open and free, under the circumstances in proof, was a constant invitation to crowds of men, women and children frequenting the park to push across the tracks at all times to the breakwater for recreation and amusement, at the risk of being run down by constantly-passing trains. A fence upon the line between them might have served at least as notice and signal of danger, if not as an obstacle and prevention. For young children, for whose health and recreation the park is presumably in part intended, and as irresponsible in many cases as the dumb cattle, for whom a fence is admitted to be some protection, such an impediment to straying might prove of value and importance. The object to be attained-the security of the persons of the people of the city-was, we think, clearly within the design of the statute and the ordinance; and the means required by the latter to be adopted by the railroad company was appropriate and legitimate. Mayor, etc., of New York v. Williams, 15 N. Y. 502. It is said however that it does not follow that whenever a statutory duty is created, any person, who can show that he has sustain injuries from the non-performance of that duty, can maintain an action for damages against the person on whom the duty is imposed; and we are referred to the case of Atkinson v. New Castle Water Works Co., L. R., 2 Excheq. Div. 441; 21 Eng. R. 541, as authority for that proposition, qualifying as it does the broad doctrine stated by Lord Campbell in Couch v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402. But accepting the more limited doctrine admitted in the language of Lord Cairns in the case cited, that whether such an action can be maintained must depend on the "purview of the Legislature in the particular statute, and the language which they have there employed," we think the right to sue under the circumstances of the present case clearly within its limits. In the analogous case of fences required by the statute as a protection for animals, an action is given to the owners for the loss caused by the breach of the duty. And although in the case of injury to persons, by reason of the same default the failure to fence is not, as in the case of animals, conclusive of the liability, irrespective of negligence, yet an action will lie for the personal injury, and this breach of duty will be evidence of negligence. The duty is due, not to the city as a municipal body, but to the public, considered as composed of individual persons; and each person specially injured by the breach of the obligation is entitled to his individual compensation and to an action for its recovery. "The nature of the duty," said Cooley, J., in Taylor v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 45 Mich. 74; 40 Am. Rep. 457, "and the benefits to be accomplished through its performance, must generally determine whether it is a duty to the public in part or exclusively, or whether individuals may claim that it is a duty imposed wholly or in part for their especial benefit. See also Railroad Co. v. Terhune, 50 Ill. 151; Schmidt v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 23 Wis. 186; Siemers v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418; Galena & Chicago Union R. Co. v. Loomis, 13 Ill. 548; O. & M. R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 id. 140; St. L. V. & T. H. R. Co. v. Dunn, 78 id. 197; Massoth v. Railroad, 64 N. Y. 521; B. & O. R. v. State, 29 Md. 252; Pollock v. Eastern R., 124 Mass. 158; Cooley on Torts, 657. It is said however that in the present case the failure or omission to construct a fence or wall cannot be alleged as negligence against the company, because as the structure was to be, as described in the ordinance, of suitable materials and sightly appearance, and of such height as the common council might direct, no duty could arise until after the council had directed the character of the work to be constructed, of which no proof was offered. But the obligation of the company was not conditioned on any previous directions to be given by the city council. It was absolute to build a suitable wall, fence or other sufficient work as would prevent auimals from straying upon the tracks and secure persons and property from danger. The right of the council was to give specific directions if it saw proper, and to supervise the work when done, if necessary; but it was matter of discretion, and they were not required to act in the first instance, nor at all, if they were satisfied with the work as executed by the railroad company. It is further argued that the direction of the court The evidence of the circumstances showing negligence on the part of the defendant, which may have been the legal cause of the injury to the plaintiff, according to the rule established in Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall.657, and Randall v. B. & O. R. Co., 109 U.S. 478; should have been submitted to the jury; and for the error of the Circuit Court in directing a verdict for the defendant, the judgment is reversed and a new trial awarded. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. MASTER AND SERVANT-KILLING BRAKEMAN-UNSAFE APPLIANCES PROXIMATE CAUSE-SUBMISSION TO JURY.-Action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate, a brakeman employed by the defendant, who, seeing the imminence of a collision between the freight train on which he was employed and one approaching it from the rear, went out of the front door of the caboose attached to the end of his train and attempted to escape, but was caught between the caboose and the next car and received fatal injuries. It is claimed that the result was due to the fact that the "buffer on the caboose was so much lower than that of the preceding car that the caboose was driven under the bumper block of the car ahead, and thus the theory of the action was that the cars and appliances furnished the deceased by the defendant were unsafe and unsuitable, and that this act constituted negligence that would authorize recovery. Held, that it was the duty of the defendant to provide a car properly fitted, not only with running apparatus-as wheels, stopping apparatus, as a brake-but with buffers of some kind, to protect the car and its servants, necessarily or lawfully thereon, from the effect of a collision. Ordinary and usual care in the equipment and running of a road requires this last appliance or some equivalent contrivance as much as it does either of the others. There was in effect no buffer nor any thing to take its place on the car upon which the intestate was employed. Upon the evidence it may be said that its absence was the proximate cause of injury; it was literally the causa causans. The death of the decedent was therefore caused by the omission of the defendant to place buffers where they belonged. For any useful or usual purpose the ones in question might as well have been placed on the top or at the sides of the car as where they were. If we assume with the defendant that the persons in charge of the second train were negligent, or wrong-doers, still the primary or essential cause of the injury was the negligence of the defendant itself, and it is not competent for it to say that it is absolved from the consequences of its wrongful act by what those persons did. It is enough however if its fault or omission merely contributed to produce the injury complained of, or if it failed to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent person in supplying cars reasonably safe for the purpose for which they were required. In any aspect of the case there was evidence upon these questions which should have been submitted to the jury. Canfield v. B. & O. R. Co., 93 N. Y. 532; 45 Am. Rep. 268; Dana v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 92 N. Y. 639; Sheehan v. Same, 91 id. 332; Darkin v. Shoup, 88 id. 225; Booth v. B. & A. R. Co., 73 id. 38; 29 Am. Rep. 97; Plank v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Co., 60 N. Y. 607; Flike v. B. &. A. R. Co., 53 id. 550; 13 Am. Rep. 545. Ellis v. New York, Lake Erie, etc. Opinion by Danforth, J. [Decided April 15, 1884.] WILL-UNDUE INFLUENCE-QUESTION OF FACT-NOT REVIEWABLE HERE.-The deceased was seventy-two years of age at the time of his death, and had been a man of great bodily vigor and sound mind. Two days before its execution he had been attacked with inflammation of the bowels, and expressed his belief that "it was his last call." He lived five days after the will was executed. The chief grounds urged against the probate of the will was the relation existing between the deceased and John Foley, who for a long time had been his legal counsellor and adviser, and who was made a donee of nearly half of the estate, which amounted to nearly $70,000 or $80,000. Foley did not draw the will, but gave instructions to the person who did draw it. It does not appear what these instructions were. The deceased left him surviving a widow, married some two years before his death, to whom he left a legacy of $8,000, and brothers and sisters, and children of deceased brothers and sisters, to some of whom he left small legacies, and to others none at all. Foley was not present when the will was executed, and so far as appears he did not see the instrument before his death, and never conversed with the deceased on the subject, and that it does not appear that the deceased was in any respect under his influence. Held, that the facts might lead to contradictory inferences and point to hostile conclusions. Upon them the surrogate decides in favor of the will. The General Term, which might have sent the case to a jury if doubtful about it, has affirmed the decision. The question is wholly one of fact, beyond our reach. Matter of Ross, 87 N. Y. 514; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 id. 357. Matter of Darrow's Will. Opinion by Finch, J. [Decided April 15, 1884.] NEGLIGENCE-DRIVING OF TEAM-RUNNING OVER CHILD QUESTION FOR JURY.-Whoever drives horses along the streets of a city is bound to anticipate that travellers on foot may be at the crossing, and must take reasonable care not to injure them. He is negligent whenever he fails to look out for them, or when he sees and does not so far as in his power avoid them. The evidence is sufficient to show that if the driver had looked he would have seen the child in season to avoid him, His own testimony is that he nei ther saw the child nor heard the call of the by-standers, nor knew of the accident until he was stopped by the officer. His conduct was sufficient to justify the conclusion of the jury that he failed in both particulars, because he was unobservant, and the learned trial judge committed no error in charging them, to say whether, under all the circumstances surrounding the transaction, he was negligent in not discovering the child in time to prevent the injury. Barker v. Savage, 45 N. Y. 194. Murphy v. Orr. Opinion by Danforth, J. [Decided April 29, 1884.] NEGLIGENCE-INJURY TO CONVICT-STATE NOT LIABLE-RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR.-The claimant Lewis, an inmate of the Elmira Reformatory, and while engaged in carrying molten iron in a ladle discovered a crack in the shank which connected the bowl with the bandle. He called the overseer's attention to the defect, but no attention was paid to his complaint, and when next used by him the bowl separated from the shank, and the melted iron coming in contact with iron on the floor exploded with such effect as to cause him serious injury. After his discharge he presented a claim to the board of audit, and his claim was transferred to the board of claims (Laws of 1883, ch. 205, § 12), and there dismissed, on the ground that the facts were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the State. On appeal to the court, held, that upon no principle of law, nor of any adjudged case can the doctrine of respondeat superior be made applicable to the State, except when it has through its Legislature voluntarily assumed it. The contrary is well settled upon grounds of public policy, and the doctrine is so uniformly asserted by writers of approved authority and the courts, that fresh discussion would be superfluous. Story on Agency, § 329, 7th ed. The claimant was not a voluntary servant for hire and reward, nor was the State his master in any ordinary sense. The decision of the board of claims is affirmed. Lewis v. State. Opinion by Danforth, J. [Decided May 6, 1883.] UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. DAMAGES BREACH OF CONTRACT-FRAUD AND DECEIT-EXCEPTION TO CHARGE.-A manufacturer having contracted to limit his sales within a certain number of tous in order to maintain the high price of steel is not responsible for a reduction in the market price occasioned by causes other than his selling more than what he had agreed to sell. Where a person is induced by false representations to buy an article, at an agreed price, to be delivered on his future order, he can recover as damages for the deceit the diminution caused thereby in the market price at the time of delivery. Where a charge embraces several distinct propositions a general exception is of no effect if any one of them is correct. Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. 132, 139. Cooper v Schlesinger. Opinion by Blatchford, J. [Decided March 31, 1884.] LIMITATIONS-UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL-TRUST.-If a cause of action against an agent whose principal is undisclosed is barred by the statute of limitations, and the principal be afterward discovered, au action caunot be maintained against him. Certain shares of stock were placed in the hands of a debtor as a fund for the payment of his debt, but it was shown that the intention was that they were merely intended as indemnity to him. Held, that no trust was created in favor of the creditor. Ware v. Galveston City Co. Opinion by Matthews, J. [Decided March 31, 1884.] |
