The ministry which was formed March 15, 1882, is composed as follows: President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tricoupis; Justice, since July 21, 1883, ad interim, Mr. Contostavlos; Finance, Mr. Kalligas; Public Worship, Mr. Lombardos; War, Mr. Karaschakis; Navy, Count-Admiral Tombazis, since July 21, 1883, ad interim; Interior, Mr. Tricoupis, ad interim.

The Consul-General of Greece, at New York, is Mr. D. N. Botassi. The United States Minister Resident and Consul-General at Athens, is Hon. E. Schuyler, and the United States Consul at Patras, Mr. E. Hancock.

Army. The law of June 21, 1882, has thoroughly reorganized the Greek army. All ablebodied men are required to serve in the army during nineteen consecutive years, of which one is in the active army if the soldier belongs to the infantry, two if belonging to a special arm, eight or seven years in the reserve, and ten in the militia. The army is composed of 29,368 officers and men.

Navy. The fleet consisted in 1881 of two steam ironclads and thirteen other vessels, besides two torpedo-boats and ten coasting craft; and there are building: two gunboats, thirty-six torpedo-boats, and two sloops with torpedo-boats.

Finances. The national indebtedness of Greece on Jan. 1, 1883, was as follows:

the loan the balances due for duties by the larger cities and the proceeds of the stamp and tobacco taxes, the latter estimated to amount to 15,000,000 francs in the future. The syndicate received as an indemnity for its expenses the sum of 230,000 francs.

Petroleum Monopoly. The Greek Government has discovered that out of 22,000,000 litres of petroleum annually consumed, only 3,500,000 litres actually pay duty, the remainder being smuggled. The extent of coast is such that control is absolutely impossible, hence the Government intends transforming the petroleumtrade into a Government monopoly.

The Latin Union.-As Greece forms one of the European states composing the so-called Latin Union, having bimetallism for its basis instead of the sole gold standard, she has been invited by France to attend a preliminary meeting of representatives in 1884, the compact expiring by limitation in 1886, and France apparently wishing to have the arrangement renewed.

Postal Service. The number of post-offices in 1880 was 143. These forwarded altogether in that year 3,828,754 letters and postal-cards, 1,206,936 newspapers, and 63,224 sample packages, together 5,098,914 items of mail matter. The postage collected was 646,654 francs, and the expenses were 390,363 francs.

Telegraphs. There were in operation in 1881 100 offices, the length of line was 5,079 kilometres, and that of wire 6,316. The number of messages forwarded was 433,547. The receipts amounted to 665,036 francs, and the outlay to 949,759 francs.

Railroads. The only lines in operation in 1883 were the 12 kilometres from Athens to the Piræus, and the 61 kilometres from Volo to Larissa.

Commerce. The foreign commerce in 1881 was as follows:

amount in drachmas or francs.

Kingdom.

Turkey..

881,631,866

The 170,000,000 Frane Loan.-By a vote of 110 against 56, the Greek Chamber of Deputies ratified, on Jan. 5, 1884, the agreement which the Government had made with a syndicate of members, who assumed a 5 per cent. loan to the amount of 170,000,000 francs. The price fixed was 68 per cent. The net proceeds of this loan the Government proposed to spend in canceling its indebtedness to the National Bank and the Ionian Bank, for the purpose of resuming specie payment; to the extent of 12,000,000 francs in subsidizing railroads to be constructed, and various other items. The Government gave as security for

oil, goat-skins, lead, figs, gall-nuts, silk, soap, The chief export articles are currants, olivetobacco, and cotton fabrics. The exportations from Greece in 1882 and 1883 were:

Merchant Marine.-There were sailing under the Greek flag, in 1881, 5,180 sea-going and 6,697 coasting vessels, together 11,877 vessels, being manned by 28,034 sailors.

GREELY RELIEF EXPEDITION, THE. In accordance with the plan of the International Geographical Congress at Hamburg, in 1879, for the establishment of a series of circumpolar stations for scientific observation, Lieut. A. W. Greely, of the Fifth Cavalry, United States Army, was sent out, under instructions from the Signal-Service Bureau, to take charge of the American station at Lady Franklin bay. The point selected for this station was the most northerly and the most difficult of access of the series, being at Discovery harbor, lat. 81° 44' north, and long. 64° 45' west. Lieut. Greely received his instructions in April, 1881, and a contract was made at St. John's, Newfoundland, with the owners of the Proteus, a vessel that had been used for Arctic navigation, to convey his party to a point on shore from which it could reach its destination by land. His assistant, Lieut. J. B. Lockwood, and other members of the party, left Baltimore about the middle of June, to join Greely at St. John's. On the 18th of August a telegram was received announcing an auspicious beginning of the work of the station. Only a month had been occupied in the passage from Newfoundland to Lady Franklin bay, and Discovery harbor was reached on August 11th. At Littleton island the party had found letters left by English explorers, and at Life-boat Cove a transit instrument of the Polaris. The station was named in honor of Senator Conger, of Michigan, who had been active in promoting its establishment. In January, 1882, letters had been received from Dr. Octave Pavy, who had gone to the Arctic regions with the Gulnare in 1880, and had joined the Greely expedition at Godhaven. These were dated in September, 1881, and contained the last news received from the station. The following is a list of the party :

First-Lieut. A. W. Greely, Fifth Cavalry; Acting Signal-Officer and Assistant-Second-Lieut. Frederick F. Kislingbury, Eleventh Infantry; Acting SignalOfficer-Second-Lieut. James B. Lockwood, Twentythird Infantry; Acting Signal-Officers-Sergts. Edward Israel, Winfield S. Jewell, George W. Rice, David C. Relator, Hampton S. Gardner, William H. Cross, David L. Brainerd, David Linn; Corporals and privates-Nicholas Salor, Joseph Eliot, Charles B. Henry, Maurice Connell, Jacob Bender, Francis Long, William Whistler, Henry Bierderbeck, Julius Fredericks, and William A. Ellis. Octave Pavy, M. D., of Disco, Greenland, was commissioned as

pedition in that capacity.

It was arranged before Lieut. Greely's departure that in the summers of 1882 and 1883 expeditions should be sent to replenish the stores of the colony, and to afford any relief of which it might stand in need. It was understood that, if they failed to reach Lady Franklin bay, provisions and documents of instruction were to be cachéd at the farthest accessible point on the east coast of Grinnell Land, and a depot of supplies established at Littleton island. Lieut. Greely was instructed, if no relief expedition previously arrived, to abandon the station not later than September, 1883, and retreat southward by boat, following closely the east coast of Grinnell Land until he met the relieving vessel or arrived at Littleton island, where it was assumed relief would be surely awaiting him. The relief expedition of 1882 was sent out in the Neptune, in charge of Lieut. Beebe, and set sail in June of that year. It proved an unfavorable season; and after contending with the ice for a month, the vessel only reached the latitude of 71° 20'. Finally, stores were cached at Littleton island and Cape Sabine, and the Neptune returned.

The second relief expedition, that of 1883, was placed in charge of Lieut. E. A. Garlington, of the Seventh Cavalry, with a party of fourteen men, including a competent ice-pilot and three experienced sailors. The Proteus was again employed to make the trip from St. John's. She was regarded as an exceptionally stanch sailer, and was specially fitted for the service. She was 150 feet long, carried 618 tons, and had compound engines of 110 registered horse - power. Her hull was of oak, sheathed three inches thick over all parts vulnerable by ice. Her equipments and supplies were regarded as complete, and she was furnished with duplicate or triplicate appliances, such as were specially liable to injury. The Proteus was commanded by Capt. Richard Pike, with a crew of twenty-two men. Yantic, of the United States Navy, under Commander Frank Wildes, was ordered to accompany the Proteus, to render all possible assistance, and to remain at Littleton island until the return of the relief expedition under Lieut. Garlington, in case it should be able to proceed to the station at Fort Conger. Lieut. Garlington received his instructions from the head of the Signal-Service Bureau at Washington. They began as follows:

The

You are aware of the necessity of reaching Lieut. A. W. Greely and party with the expedition of this year. This necessity can not be overestimated, as Lieut. Greely's supplies will be exhausted during the coming fall, and unless the relief-ship can reach him he will be forced, with bis party, to retreat southward by land before winter sets in. Such a retreat will involve hardship and the probable abandonment of much valuable public property, with the possible loss of important records and life. For these and other reasons, which will occur to you, no effort must be spared to push the vessel through to Lady Franklin bay.

In case it should be found impracticable for the Proteus to make its way up Smith's sound, Garlington was instructed to retreat from his advanced position, land his party and stores at Life-boat Cove, discharge the reliefvessel with orders to return to St. John's, and prepare to remain until relieved the following summer. He was then as speedily as possible to endeavor to communicate with Lieut. Greely by means of a sledge expedition under his own personal charge. Such stores were to be left at Cape Sabine as it was practicable to leave there, and thence a smaller party, still under Garlington's personal charge, was to push on as far as possible, or until Greely was met. With regard to the Yantic, it was stated in the instructions that it would accompany the expedition to Littleton island, rendering such aid as might become necessary and as might be "determined by the captain of that ship" and Lieut. Garlington when on the spot.

Pro

The Proteus left St. John's on the 29th of June. On the 13th of September the Secretary of the Navy received a dispatch from the same place, signed by Commander Wildes, and announcing the return there of the Yantic, bringing Capt. Pike and crew of the Proteus and Lieut. Garlington and the Greely relief party, with a brief statement of the failure of the expedition. The facts, as subsequently brought out, showed that the Proteus had arrived at Godhaven, Greenland, on the 6th of July. The Yantic did not reach the latter point until the 12th. Lieut. Garlington found that the Danish authorities there had received no instructions in regard to assistance for the expedition, and the skin-clothing and dogdrivers expected were not in readiness. curing such supplies as could be obtained on short notice, and taking on board the stores left at Godhaven the previous summer, the Proteus proceeded on the 16th to Disco Fiord, where an Esquimau driver was expected. Near that place the vessel ran aground, but was got off without serious injury. On the 19th she brought up against a solid ice-floe, beyond which one of the islands of the Belgone group was sighted. On the 20th Cape York came in view, and the day following the ship passed to leeward of D. E. Carey island and lay there while Lieut. Garlington landed and examined the depot of provisions left by the Nares expedition in 1875, which he found in fairly good condition. Taking copies of the records found there, he proceeded and rounded Cape Alexander and entered Pandora harbor on the morning of the 22d. The weather was delightful, and no ice was to be seen to the northwest. Garlington therefore decided to push on without stopping at Littleton island, and to make his first caché of provisions at Cape Prescott. Before noon, however, he encountered the edge of a pack of ice apparently extending across the sound. While waiting for an opening, he landed and examined the caché of provisions at Cape Sabine, which

he found in good condition, except that the tarpaulin covering had been torn by bears, and the boats were badly scratched. Later in the afternoon narrow lanes opened in the ice on the western side of the sound, and the Proteus worked her way slowly and with frequent ramming, until the morning of the 23d, when she was within four miles of Cape Albert. The pack had then closed, and an effort was made to work the vessel back to open water in the vicinity of Cape Sabine. At 2.45 P. M. the vessel came to a stand-still within 400 feet of open water, and the ice-pack closed heavily in upon her, smashing the starboard rail, forcing up the deck-planks, and breaking through into the starboard coal-bunkers. The stores on deck and near at hand were hastily thrown over on the ice, but the vessel filled and threatened to sink before the task of getting out her supplies was nearly completed. Two whaleboats and a dinghy were got out, the chronometers, sextants, and records were secured, and at 6.50 P. M. the vessel was abandoned, Lieut. Colwell being the last to leave her, and twenty-five minutes later she sank. A part of the stores were with great difficulty transported to Cape Sabine, and a deposit of 500 rations for Lieut. Greely was made three miles west of that point. Before the stores were all secured, the floe had moved off, so that the remainder could not be obtained.

At

Lieut. Garlington then decided that it would be impossible to proceed northward with the small boats. He did not believe the Yantic would attempt to cross Melville bay, but, in case she did so, she would find a record of the disaster at Littleton island, and know what course to take. Garlington therefore determined to cross Smith's sound and make his way down the Greenland coast to Upernavik. At Cape York he opened communication with a party of Esquimaux, and learned that nothing had been seen of the Swedish vessel Sophia, which he somewhat expected to encounter. He sent Lieut. Colwell with a lightly loaded boat directly across the bay to Upernavik, while with the rest of the party he made his way around by the trend of the coast. Browne's island he picked up a record left there in a cairn thirty-five years before by Sir John Ross, and on the 23d of August reached Cape Shackleton, where he met a party of Esquimaux sent to his relief by Commander Wildes, of the Yantic. Ten days later all the survivors of the expedition were gathered upon the Yantic at Upernavik, whence the return was made to St. John's. The Yantic had reached Littleton island on the 3d of August, and, finding Garlington's records, had proceeded southward again, searching the coast and islands until Saunders islands were reached. There the ice-pack closed about the vessel, and it was forced to retreat under the lee of Northumberland island. On August 9th the pack had loosened, and the vessel made its way through, but could not get near the coast. It therefore

proceeded to Upernavik and sent a whale-boat to Cape Shackleton. August 22d she reached Godhaven, where Lieut. Colwell arrived on the 31st, having been thirty-nine days in an open boat. Reaching Upernavik, the Yantic found the whole party, and on the 2d of September set sail for St. John's.

The failure of the expedition was the cause of wide-spread regret, and much criticism was passed upon its conduct. No authentic information had been obtained of the Greely party. An Esquimau story had been picked up by the Yantic at Danish harbor, to the effect that Dr. Pavy had died, but that the rest of the party were well. Another Esquimau report was, that the officers had been murdered by their men, but no credence was given to these stories. The worst aspect of the case was, that no substantial relief had in two years been afforded to Lieut. Greely, and there were grave doubts as to whether he could survive another winter at Lady Franklin bay, or succeed in reaching succor if he left there in pursuance of his instructions, without finding the expected supplies on his way.

Lieut. Garlington was severely criticised for not leaving his stores at Littleton island on his way northward, and Gen. Hazen, chief officer of the Signal-Service Bureau, declared that Garlington had received supplemental orders, just before sailing, to the following effect:

The naval tender is to join the Proteus at St. John's, Newfoundland, and to proceed with her to the neigh borhood of Littleton island. The Proteus is to land her stores, except supplies for more northerly stations, at Littleton island on her way north. If she succeeds in reaching Lady Franklin bay she is to pick up the stores, excepting the house and depots, if possible, on her return. The naval tender will await the return of the Proteus at the neighborhood of Littleton island, and on her return steam to the south in her company until she reaches the southern limits of the ice-pack, when the vessels may separate. Should the Proteus be crushed in the ice, her crew will retire on Littleton island, and the tender will bring to St. John's, Newfoundland, the officers and crew of the Proteus, the rest of the party to remain at Littleton island. But should the ice render it dangerous for the tender to remain in the neighborhood of Littleton island until the Proteus returns, or her crew and the expeditionary force succeed in reaching there, the tender may go to the south, leaving full particulars at Littleton island. Signals by flags, heliograph, and guns should be preconcerted, and communication by this means should be maintained between the two vessels as long as possible after they are separated by the passage north of the Proteus. Nothing in the north ward movement must be allowed to retard the progress of the Proteus. It is of the utmost importance that she take advantage of every lead to get up to Lady Franklin bay.

Lieut. Garlington, in his own report to the Signal-Service Office, reflected severely upon Capt. Pike and his crew. He said that the Proteus had run past the harbor of Godhaven in consequence of that officer's ignorance of its proximity; that the grounding of the vessel at Disco Fiord was owing to his negligence in not taking soundings; and that when the vessel was "nipped" in the ice above Cape Sabine his crew was unmanageable and stole supplies

belonging to his (Garlington's) party. "Force would have been needed," he said, "to compel the observance of the disciplinary regulations necessary to a successful retreat from our perilous position, and more force than I had at my command. I determined, therefore, to keep my men and stores separate and distinct, avoiding, if possible, any unnecessary collision." With regard to the alleged supplemental orders, and the criticism upon his course, Lieut. Garlington said:

I desire to call your attention to the manifest injury done me in the publication of certain statements immediately after the news of the disaster reached authorized from the Signal-Office, were to the effect here. These statements, purporting to have been that I had been furnished with "supplementary instructions" prior to my departure from the United States, which instructions I had positively disobeyed. The only instructions I ever received are the original instructions published at the time. An unsigned written paper was inclosed in the envelope with my instructions. This paper is simply an unauthenticated copy of a memorandum prepared by an officer in your office. I was informed that this memorandum was to form the basis of instructions to be given the comhave been furnished the Secretary of the Navy, to mander of the vessel ordered to accompany the Proteus. The paper was not addressed or signed. Indeed, it bore no official marks whatever. I have never at any time regarded it as an order, and I was surprised to find the statement published that this paper was the supplementary instructions. When I found it among the papers furnished me, I at once carried it to you and called your attention specially to that clause relating to landing supplies on Littleton island. You said, in substance, you did not know how that had gotten in there, and impressed upon me the necessity of carrying out as far as possible the instructions I had received. These instructions were based upon the letter of Lieut. Greely, and you called my attention to the fact that Lieut. Greely strongly urged that the officer commanding the relief party should have "no latitude of action." The paper was not addressed nor signed; indeed, bore no official marks whatever. I did not then, nor have I at any time since, regarded it as an order, and I was surprised to find the statement published that this paper was the "supplementary instructions."

On the 10th of October the Secretary of the Navy addressed to Commander Wildes, of the Yantic, some inquiries as to his failure to co-operate more efficiently with the Proteus. He said:

Your instructions, under the date of June 9th, were to "proceed to the northward, through Davis straits, but not to go beyond Littleton island. It appears that in company with the steamer Proteus, if practicable," the Yantic and Proteus were together at Disco island on July 15th, when the Proteus sailed northward; but that the Yantic did not finally leave that island until 26th; the Yantic not until August 2d; the Proteus July 20th; the Proteus reached Carey island July passed Littleton island July 22d, and was crushed in the ice July 23d; the Yantic did not reach Littleton island until August 3d. Between July 23d and August 3d, namely, on July 26th and 28th, Lieut. Garlington and the whole party of the Proteus had come to Littleton island and Pandora harbor, and not finding the Yantic, had continued to the south in open boats in search of her, notwithstanding the orders of the War Department, given for such a contingency, to land with their stores at or near Life-boat Cove, in Littleton island, and to prepare for remaining until next year. Had the Yantic, however, been at Littleton island July 28th, instead of being twelve days be

hind the Proteus, Lieut. Garlington's relief party would have remained at that point, with ample supplies, keeping "their telescopes on Cape Sabine and the land to the northward," and waiting for Lieut. Greely, whose orders required him to endeavor to reach that vicinity not later than September, 1888, and who would not then have found awaiting him, as is now the case, if he has successfully obeyed his orders, neither house nor provisions, but only the record of the complete failure of the mission of the Proteus and the Yantic.. Your attention is also called to another point. You had been furnished with copies of the instructions to Lieut. Garlington and were aware that he was ordered, in the event of the failure of the Proteus, to reach Lady Franklin bay, to establish the relief station at Littleton island, and that Lieut. Greely would endeavor to reach that point in September, expecting there to find a relief party, a house, food, and provisions. You were at Littleton island on August 3d, and learned that the Proteus had been crushed, and that Lieut. Garlington and his whole party had gone south, leaving nothing for Greely at Littleton island. You could have readily landed there provisions and supplies, but omitted to do so. You will please explain this omission, and will furnish the department a schedule in detail of the provisions of all kinds which you then had on board the Yantic, and a similar schedule of those you had on hand when you arrived at St. John's on September 13th. In the instructions of the War Department to Lieut. Garlington, dated June 4, 1883, is the following clause: "A ship of the United States Navy, the Yantic, will accompany you as far as Littleton island, rendering you such aid as may become necessary and as may be determined by the captain of that ship and yourself when on the spot." You will inform the department whether or not you had knowledge of this clause. Inclosed you will also find a copy of a memorandum marked" Inclosure 4," containing instructions for the guidance of the naval tender and the Proteus, and you will inform the department whether, during your voyage, these or any such instructions were seen by you, or were only communicated to you.

In his reply, dated Oct. 16th, Commander Wildes explained that the Yantic was forced, on account of the condition of her boilers, to go from St. John's to Greenland under sail, and to take an easterly course to avoid the ice of the Labrador coast, while the Proteus steamed directly for Godhaven. He said:

No time was lost, and no unnecessary delay was made at any point. The Proteus, carrying a large supply of coal, and steaming at full speed, had only to delay to obtain the stores left at Godhaven last year, and a native dog-driver from Disco Fiord. She then went north without stopping. Had I sailed from Godhaven at the same time as the Proteus, besides being unable to keep up with her, I should have arrived at Littleton island, 1,000 miles distant, with my coalsupply reduced to about 75 tons and the boilers in a leaky, precarious condition. This is without taking into account any detention from thick weather or ice, which can not be counted on, as the normal condition of this region appears to be fog.

After explaining the dangers and difficulties of Melville bay, he added:

In view of these facts I should have felt justified in delaying to a still later date the attempt to cross Melville bay, or even not making the attempt at all. But I did not delay one moment after I considered my ship prepared and the weather had cleared, but pushed across to Cape York, feeling certain from the thick, foggy weather, raw, chilly air, flumes of snow and smooth sea, that the middle pack was not far distant. Pandora harbor was reached six days after the boats had gone south. To conclude this part, I did not intend to run the vessel under my command in the hap-haz

ard, happy-go-lucky fashion which finally brought the Proteus to grief, but to make sure, so far as possible, of every step which I took. Had the Proteus been ordered to keep company with the Yantic, it would have been vastly better for all concerned.

Regarding the so-called supplemental instruction, spoken of as "Inclosure No. 4," Commander Wildes declared that he never heard of it until his arrival at St. John's on the return trip. In conclusion, he expressed his willingness to shoulder all the responsibility that belonged to him, and asked, in case there was any doubt that he had performed his full duty, that a court of inquiry be ordered to investigate his conduct.

Lient. Garlington's report not being wholly satisfactory to the Signal-Service Bureau and the War Department, a series of questions received on the 24th of October. In these he were addressed to him, replies to which were explained more fully why he failed to establish a depot of supplies at Littleton island and to remain in that region for the arrival of the Yantic, which he was convinced would not be able to make her way through the ice-pack of Melville bay. He also explained why he was obliged to leave a portion of the supplies of the Proteus on the ice-floe, and was unable to leave any boats for the use of Lieut. Greely. In answer to the question why he did not remain north of Cape York with his party, he said:

I did not remain at Cape York because I did not see then, nor do I see now, how I could possibly have been of any service to Lieut. Greely. From the best information attainable I am of the opinion that there are no more than 125 Esquimaux from Cape York to Rensselaer bay, and it is a well-known fact that they are a very improvident and shiftless race, and on the verge of starvation every winter. To have quartered people, with the chance of Lieut. Greely reaching there a party, however small, without provisions, on these with his party during the fall, would have been but to seriously endanger the lives of the whole community, without being able to accomplish any good whatever. I had not more than two weeks' supplies when I left Cape York. I left that point for the same reason I left Cape Sabine-to endeavor to help Lieut. Greely in the only way it seemed to me practicable.

In conclusion, he also asked for a court of inquiry if his explanation of his conduct was not satisfactory.

After these explanations had been made, the Secretary of War addressed a letter to the Chief Signal-Officer, in which he sharply criticised the entire management of the relief expedition. He thought that two serious omis

sions had been made which contributed to its failure. In the first place, Lieut. Garlington should have established a base of supplies at Littleton island on his way northward, and in this connection the Secretary made some pointed references to the careless manner in which the memorandum known as "Inclosure No. 4" had been dealt with. It had been inclosed in the instructions without clearly being made part of them. The other important omission was the failure of the Proteus and the Yantic to keep together, which had not been satisfac