are thus exhausted, furnish him with a seat in such a coach.112 But the passenger can not make the inability of the carrier to furnish him with a seat, the ground for refusing to surrender his ticket, or to pay fare. He can not insist upon standing, and retaining his ticket and refusing to pay fare until a seat becomes vacant; but if he wishes to hold the carrier liable for his breach of duty in refusing to furnish him with a seat, he must, it has been held, leave the train at the first suitable opportunity, and bring an action upon the contract of carriage.113 § 2573. Right to a Seat in a Parlor Car.-A railway company which furnishes sufficient first-class cars for those entitled to firstclass passage, and also carries a parlor car, may lawfully demand a reasonable extra compensation of passengers who ride in it, notwithstanding a statute limiting the sum to be charged for first-class passage.114 Nor does the mere fact that a passenger pays for a firstclass passage entitle him to ride in a car equipped with adjustable reclining chairs and a lavatory and served by a special porter, unless such is the advertisement or contract of the railway company.115 Nor does an advertisement by a railway company, stating generally that the free reclining chair cars will be run upon its road, and especially that they will be run to a certain point, warrant the inference that they will be free to all passengers under all circumstances, or at all, except to those taking passage to that point.116 Moreover, an advertisement by a railway company, from which an erroneous inference might be drawn that free parlor cars would be furnished for all passengers, will not warrant a recovery for the removal from a parlor car of a passenger who refuses to pay extra fare, except upon a showing that he was misled and sustained some loss by the advertisement." 117 § 2574. Right of Colored Persons to be Carried According to Contract. It is scarcely necessary to say that colored passengers have 112 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Patterson, 69 Miss. 421; s. c. 13 South. Rep. 697. 113 Davis v. Kansas &c. R. Co., 53 Mo. 317. The statute of Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, § 2587) provides that railroad companies shall not be liable for injuries to passengers received while riding on the platform of a car, in violation of the regulations posted in a conspicuous place in its passenger cars, provided the company furnishes room inside the cars for the proper accommodation of its passengers. The "proper accommodation" here spoken of means something more than standing room in the aisle: it means a seat for each passenger: Choate v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 67 Mo. App. 105. 114 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Hardy, 55 Ark. 134; s. c. 17 S. W. Rep. 711. 115 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Hardy, 55 Ark. 134; s. c. 17 S. W. Rep. 711. 116 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Hardy, 55 Ark. 134; s. c. 17 S. W. Rep. 711. 117 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Hardy, 55 Ark. 134; s. c. 17 S. W. Rep. 711. the same right to be carried, according to the contract of passage made between them and the carrier, that a white person has.118 If a colored person purchases a berth in a sleeping car, he is entitled to such first-class accommodations.119 But it does not follow that the col ored passenger is entitled to ride in the same vehicle or in the same compartment, with white persons. Statutes have been enacted in some of the Southern States, popularly known as "Jim Crow Acts," requiring railroad companies to provide colored persons with separate cars.120 These statutes are not unconstitutional; but, under them, a colored person purchasing a first-class ticket is entitled to first-class passage, although not in a car occupied by white passengers; and a colored person purchasing a berth in a sleeping car is entitled to such a berth, although not in a car occupied by white passengers; and a sleeping-car company must, if necessary, put on an extra sleeping car to fulfill its contract with such colored passenger.' 121 A railroad company which authorizes a railroad company in another State to sell tickets to a negress entitling her to first-class passage over the former company's line, thereby recognizes her as an interstate passenger, and this entitles her to the rights of such a passenger.122 A rule of a street railway company requiring colored persons to occupy front seats, and white passengers the back seats, is a reasonable regulation.123 118 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Cain, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 503; s. c. 40 S. W. Rep. 220. 119 Carey v. Spencer, 72 N. Y. St. Rep. 108; s. c. 36 N. Y. Supp. 886; 28 Chic. Leg. N. 221. 120 The Kentucky act of 1892, known as the "Separate Coach Act," declared constitutional as applied to passengers within State: Ohio &c. R. Co. v. Lander (Ky.), 47 S. W. Rep. 344; see dissenting opinion, p. 883. So held with regard to almost identical statutes in Mississippi and Louisiana: Louisville &c. R. Co. v. State, 66 Miss. 662; s. c. aff'd, 133 U. S. 587; s. c. 33 L. ed. 784; Ex parte Plessy, 45 La. An. 80; s. c. 18 L. R. A. 639; s. c. aff'd sub nom. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; s. c. 41 L. ed. 256. In Tennessee, a State statute providing for separate but equal accommodations for white and colored passengers on railway trains was declared a valid police regulation, both as regards intraand interstate travel: Smith V. State, 100 Tenn. 494; s. c. 41 L. R. A. 432. 121 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Cain, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 503; s. c. 40 S. W. Rep. 220. It has been held that a sleeping-car company which issues to a negro a ticket for a berth in a specified car between designated points for which he has procured a railroad ticket, is liable for the failure to furnish him with a berth in some other sleeping car, where he is required to leave the car specified by the trainmaster in the presence of the sleeping-car conductor before reaching the end of his journey, although the railroad employés, under an arrangement with the sleeping-car company, have charge of the sleeping car and the exclusive right to determine who should ride therein: Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Cain, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 503; s. c. 40 S. W. Rep. 220. 122 Carrey v. Spencer, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 636; s. c. 72 N. Y. St. Rep. 108; 28 Chicago Leg. News 221; 36 N. Y. Supp. 886. 123 Bowie v. Birmingham R. &c. Co., 125 Ala. 397; s. c. 50 L. R. A. 632; 27 South. Rep. 1016. § 2575. Statutory Fares and Overcharges.-This subject is hardly within the scope of the present work; but a sound decision may be noted to the effect that where a statute prescribes the maximum limit which may be charged, and a greater amount is charged by the ticket agent of the railroad company, it can not escape liability for the statutory penalty under the plea that its own agent was acting in excess of his authority; since the sale of passage tickets was within the general scope of his agency.124 Where the distance between two points was 6.48 miles, a railroad company had no authority to charge to exceed 19 cents (the fraction over 19 cents was less than one-half a cent), under Mich. Laws 1899, Act No. 202, establishing a rate of fare of three cents per mile.125 § 2576. Measure of Damages for Refusing to Carry According to the Contract. If the carrier fails to perform his contract of carriage, he will be liable in damages for what the passenger necessarily expended in completing the trip from the place where he was abandoned, together with compensation for time lost, beyond the reasonable length of time which it would have taken defendant to carry plaintiff 124 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Ryan, 56 Ark. 228; s. c. 19 S. W. Rep. 839. No violation of Mass. St. 1874, ch. 372, § 138, to sell a student over twenty years of age a season ticket at full fare: Spofford v. Boston &c. R. Co., 128 Mass. 326. Redeeming partly unused tickets, under statutes of Pennsylvania: Smith v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 1 Pa. Dist. R. 322; s. c. 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 555. 125 Chamberlain v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 122 Mich. 477; s. c. 81 N. W. Rep. 339. A city ordinance provided that the fare on any horse railway should not exceed five cents. When the ordinance was passed the defendant company was operating a single line of railway, all its cars running between the same termini. Afterwards it constructed other lines diverging from the main line, and separate cars were run over the main line and diverging lines to the several different termini. It was held that the ordinance did not give the passenger the right, upon payment of a single fare of five cents, to ride upon a car bound to one terminus, and then, at the point of divergence, get upon another car and ride to a different terminus, and a passenger refusing to pay additional fare upon the second car might law fully be ejected therefrom: Ellis v. Milwaukee R. Co., 67 Wis. 135. Under a statute of Ohio (Rev. St. Oh., § 3374), which provides that railroads shall charge no more than three cents per mile for the transportation of passengers, but that the fare may be made that multiple of five nearest reached by multiplying the rate by the distance, the railroad shall charge the nearest multiple to five, whether it is above or below the actual fare, and in case the fare is equally distant from the multiple next below and the one next above, it may charge either: Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Wells, 61 Ohio St. 268; s. c. 55 N. E. Rep. 827. The exemption of a previously chartered railroad company,-in this case the Central Pacific Railroad Company,-from a statutory provision respecting the sale and effect of tickets, is not acquired by a foreign corporation subsequently created,-in this case the Southern Pacific Company (of Kentucky),— which leases the road of the former: Robinson v. Southern Pac. Co., 105 Cal. 541; s. c. 28 L. R. A. 773; 38 Pac. Rep. 94; rehearing granted in 38 Pac. Rep. 109; aff'd on rehearing in 105 Cal. 526; s. c. 38 Pac. Rep. 722. to his destination, the value of which is to be computed by the reasonable value of plaintiff's services in his usual occupation at the place of destination.126 § 2577. Questions of Procedure in Actions for Carrying Passengers beyond their Destination.-A complaint alleged that the plaintiff took passage on a train of the defendant, and that she was negligently carried past her destination, and put off at a station beyond. After issues were joined and the trial was about to proceed, the plaintiff asked to amend her complaint by inserting that the conductor was intoxicated, that he negligently ran the train past her destination, and insulted her. It was held that, while such an amendment was admissible, it introduced a new element of damages, and should not be allowed without granting a continuance.127 But, on an issue as to whether the stopping of the particular train at a particular station was a violation of a rule of the railway company, the defendant having introduced its time-table to show that it did not stop there, the plaintiff was properly permitted in rebuttal to show that trains frequently stopped there.128 In such an action it appeared that the plaintiff, of her own volition, returned to her destination on a freight train, while, by waiting an hour, she could have returned on a passenger train. It was held that evidence as to the unpleasant condition of the freight train, and plaintiff's annoyance caused thereby, was not admissible.129 Where, in such an action, the evidence tended to show that the conductor had promised to inform the plaintiff when the train arrived at her destination, and that she had relied on this promise, an instruction that, if this was true, plaintiff was not obliged to listen for or depend on the call of the station by the brakeman, was held correct.130 In such a case an instruction to the effect that it was the company's duty to keep the depot at the place where plaintiff alighted warmed for a certain period after the arrival of trains, and if, from its failure to do so, plaintiff was injured, the company was 12 Ransberry v. North American Transportation &c. Co., 22 Wash. 476; s. c. 61 Pac. Rep. 154. If a train is signaled to stop at a station where, by statute or otherwise, it is obliged to stop when signaled, and it fails to heed the signal and to stop, a case of misconduct is presented which violates public right, and the company may become liable for it in exemplary damages: Wilson v. North &c. R. Co., 63 Miss. 352. 127 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Power, 67 Ark. 142; s. c. 53 S. W. Rep. 572. 128 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Elliott, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 31; s. c. 54 S. W. Rep. 410. 120 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Power, 67 Ark. 142; s. c. 53 S. W. Rep. 572. In such an action by a woman it was held not admissible for her to give evidence of the sad plight of her boy whom she was anxious to reach: the boy, a paralytic, had just been arrested and was in jail: St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Power, 67 Ark. 142; s. c. 53 S. W. Rep. 572. 130 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Quick, 125 Ala. 553; s. c. 28 South. Rep. 14. liable, was erroneous, in that it failed to make liability depend on the question as to whether or not the carrier was guilty of negligence in carrying plaintiff past her destination; since, in the view taken by the court, the company owed no duty to the plaintiff after her arrival at such wrong destination.131 In an action of this kind, where the plaintiff alleged that defendant's train did not stop at her destination, which defendant denied, and pleaded that she was negligent in not getting off the train, and that if plaintiff was injured, as alleged, by remaining in a damp and cold depot at the next station, at which she alighted, it was caused by her not seeking comfortable quarters that were available, such allegations presented distinct issues, which the court should have treated separately in instructing the jury.132 SECTION ARTICLE II. PASSAGE TICKETS. 2584. Interpretation of passage tickets. 2585. Passage ticket furnishes evidence to the conductor of the real contract. 2586. Effect of unstamped tickets. 2587. Mistakes and misprisions of the ticket agent. 2588. Right to rely on the apparent 2590. Tickets purchased from brok- other on the same line. way passengers. 131 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Ricketts, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 515; s. c. 54 S. W. Rep. 1090. SECTION 2596. Right to stop short of destina- 2597. Right to stop off and resume 2599. Tickets limited as to time. 2601. Statutes regulating such tickets. 2602. Tickets "good for this trip only;" "good for this day only." 2603. Application of this rule to commutation tickets. 2604. Other applications of this rule. 2608. Collecting extra fare from 132 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Ricketts, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 515; s. c. 54 S. W. Rep. 1090. |
