than the happiness of any other person, still less, than that of all other persons. I am to count for one, and for no more than one, in the sum of mankind, or, perhaps, of sentient beings. Utilitarianism, then, accepts the Intuitionist position, that there is something under any given circumstances which we are bound as rational beings to do, and that we can know intuitively what it is. But in place of the precept to "do our duty," which leaves us without any means whereby to determine what our duty is, it substitutes the criterion of happiness, that is, the tendency to increase the pleasures or diminish the pains of mankind at large, or perhaps of sentient creatures generally, as the test of conduct. This is indeed the test to which mankind do and must appeal for decision in the case of the divergence of any respectable section of the community from the received moral code. The first principle of Utilitarianism, that the fulfilment of my desires is not to be regarded by me as intrinsically more desirable than the equal satisfaction of any one else, is the most certain and comprehensive of intuitions, and most of the others seem to be most thoroughly understood when considered as partial and imperfect applications of it. This does not mean that the perception of rightness has always been consciously derived from perceptions of Utility, but only that the morality of Common Sense is instinctively utilitarian, and that we have in it in fact a body of utilitarian doctrine which only needs to be rectified and carried out by more strict reference to its implicit principle.

But it is one thing to admit the principle of Utility, and another thing to feel a decisive impulse to act in accordance with it. As a fact this impulse is not always sufficiently felt, and it is because of this fact that Utilitarians dwell on what they call the Sanctions of their rules; that is, the pleasures to be gained or pains to be avoided by the individual conforming to them; and that Society endeavors by the contrivance of rewards and punishments to replace or to reinforce the spontaneous impulse. But is it possible to demonstrate on empirical grounds the inseparable connection between Utilitarian Duty and the greatest happiness of the individual? It seems not, for Duty may call upon him to sacrifice his life, with all demonstrable possibilities of happiness for himself and for those whose happiness depends on his, to the general good. No doubt social virtue is in general conducive to happiness, but there is no empirical proof that they universally coincide.

If, however, we can conceive the Utilitarian Code as the Law of God, and feel convinced that he has announced his intention of rewarding those who obey his commands, and punishing the disobe

dient, - then indeed we have an inducement which is of course adequate. This hypothesis cannot be verified by experience, indeed it contradicts experience, for it declares that the moral order which we see imperfectly realized in this actual world is yet actually perfect. Yet without some such assumption we feel that a universe so constituted that Good for the Individual is not ultimately identified with Universal Good, is fundamentally irrational. This, to be sure, is only saying that unless we can obtain such a premise, Ethical Science is a failure, and the operations of Practical Reason illusory.

With this suggestion, that Ethical Science can be constructed only on a basis borrowed from Theology, Mr. Sidgwick leaves the matter, without deciding whether upon such a basis it can be constructed. This decision would require, he says, a complete discussion of the ultimate basis of philosophic certainty; the ground upon which we assent to propositions as true. Without entering upon this discussion, however, it seems clear that if, as Mr. Sidgwick seems to assume, our knowledge of Good is necessarily empirical, if the only proof that anything is desirable is that it is desired, "the existence of these however elevated desires does not furnish a proof of the existence of their object; indeed, can scarcely afford a strong presumption in favor of this conclusion, considering the large proportion of human desires that experience shows to be destined to disappointment." Indeed, we may go farther, and say that it would be a great misfortune if they were not disappointed, for Happiness is a collective name for an endless variety of objects, often incompatible with each other, which different people suppose to be desirable. It is impossible to imagine any definite state of facts, any mode of life, occupation, complex of circumstances, that would be acknowledged by everybody to be the best possible; and even if such an agreement were by chance hit upon, it could not endure, and ought not to endure, for it would mean the stagnation of thought and the cessation of all moral progress.

It is vain then to expect that mankind will ever attain to definitive unalterable opinions about what is desirable, and it would not be on the whole a blessing if they were persuaded that a divine sanction is attached to those opinions which they have attained.

But admitting the impossibility of raising our stock notions about. conduct to the height of scientific axioms, does it follow that it is impossible for each one of us to know for certain in any given case what it is right or reasonable for him to do? Is there not a confusion underlying the whole of Mr. Sidgwick's argument, between our

opinions as to what is on the whole desirable, and the intimations of Conscience as to what must be done in a case peculiar to ourselves? Those general considerations are of immense importance and well worth all the pains we can give to them, for on them the working of the social machinery depends. But they necessarily start from abstractions, from what is true in the average case, as to people in general, or in the long run, and so cannot arrive at certainty as to a particular case, but only at probability. Now it is in one sense true that we act always upon probabilities, since we are not infallible, but it does not follow that our duty is only probable to us and not certain. For the assent of Conscience is not given to an empirical fact, as to which we may be mistaken, as to whose bearings at any rate we must be mistaken, that is, imperfectly informed but to a logical necessity, namely, what we ought to do, taking our facts for granted, and this need not be doubtful or liable to change. Conscience does not command us to be infallible, but only to act for the best; this is always in our power, and so acting we need never repent what we have done. There is, then, nothing irrational or exorbitant in its categorical imperative, nothing that requires a miracle or a consensus of experts" for its support. Is the command too vague? We shall not make it more definite by putting it into a general formula which is just as applicable to one person or one state of circumstances as to another. The objection to making Utility the criterion in Morals is that in the effort to be comprehensive it ignores its fact, and explains the absolute, uncompromising tone of the oracle within the breast by assuring us that it is only one voice out of many, none of them quite agreeing, and all to be equally regarded. To explain the sense of Duty as the resultant of all the impulses of the average man or woman in their ordinary moments, is like explaining Niagara by analysis of the water at its foot. It is the fall that makes Niagara, not the chemical constituents of the drops, or their behavior in the pool below. It is the height above the level of ordinary life and its experiences that gives momentum to the act of Conscience, and the attempt to extract the notion of Obligation from the notion of Utility can issue only in mystifications like the setting up of Happiness in general, which is the happiness of nobody in particular, as the Supreme Good, and then trying to supply to this empty abstraction a content which may give it attraction.

This summary discussion of results necessarily leaves out of sight what is perhaps most admirable in Mr. Sidgwick's book, the unwearied carefulness of expression, still more the urbanity and candor, the

Aristotelian impartiality, "the pure air of scientific curiosity," most refreshing after the heat and dogmatism of much that calls itself "scientific" philosophizing. To get philosophical problems discussed in this tone is the first condition of that hearty co-operation of men of different schools which Philosophy just now stands much in need of.

6.The Map of Europe by Treaty, showing the various Political and Territorial changes since the General Peace of 1814. By EDWARD HERTSLET, C. B., Librarian and Keeper of the Papers, Foreign Office. London: Butterworth, 7 Fleet Street. 1875.

NOTHING is so thoroughly satisfactory to any one who ever uses books, nothing gives so much real and enduring comfort as a good collection of works of reference. Works of reference in their highest form are not the encyclopædias, those vast collections of which the first volume is antiquated when the last is published, but works of enduring nature, which serve the student for a lifetime. There are but comparatively few of these monuments of modern research which unite the qualities of excellence, accuracy, and endurance. "L'Art de vérifier les dates" is as valuable now as when it was published nearly a century ago; Du Cange will probably never be out of date; the "Biographie Universelle" is a source of never-failing satisfaction; and if to books such as these be added the more compendious and cheaper works which maintain the connection with the current year, the desired and precious collection is complete.

Mr. Hertslet's book is a valuable addition to our libraries of reference. It not only presents with accuracy and in excellent form the important material for one branch of history, but it covers a period of which there is practically no history for the present generation, and is therefore of double value. Mr. Hertslet's opportunities have been the best possible for the work he has undertaken, and so far as a cursory examination can be relied on, he has performed his task with care and thoroughness. All the European treaties from 1814 to 1875, inclusive, are given, and each is preceded by a head-note, to borrow the legal term, explaining the substance of the document. The work is still further enriched by the insertion of all the Declarations of War, Guaranties of Independence and Neutrality, De. crees of Annexation, and the corresponding protests. All treaties and papers referred to, of an earlier date than 1814, are also given, so that the documentary history of every treaty is complete. The vol

In

umes amount therefore to a complete diplomatic dictionary for the period. Maps are added to all such treaties as seem to require them, and there are two general maps of Europe, in 1814 and 1875. Mr. Hertslet has most sensibly reduced his maps to a scale corresponding to the size of the book, and the misery induced by maps and plans which have to be unfolded, refolded, and more or less torn in the process is thereby avoided. An exception to this rule of reduction might, however, have been made with advantage in the case of the two general maps. As they now stand, they are too small and too crowded with names to be of much practical use. It is pleasant to find an author who has a realizing sense of the value of a good index and elaborate cross-references. Many a good book has been condemned for the lack of any index, or for what is still worse, a bad one. arrangement, and regard for the convenience of the student, there is nothing wanting, with one very remarkable exception. Mr. Hertslet says in his preface that the book is especially compiled for the use of the English statesman and student. Accepting his own definition of his object, he has made a great mistake in omitting all the treaties, etc., with the United States. The only American treaty given is the treaty of Ghent, and this is not accompanied by the documents and subsidiary treaties necessary to its comprehension. This defect injures the book for Americans, and it is not easy to see why it does not injure it in almost an equal degree for Englishmen. Treaties with the United States assuredly have been one field for English diplomacy. It is not conceivable that lack of importance or of interest can have been the ground of exclusion. It is not necessary to go further back than the Treaty of Washington to find points of international difference in which Englishmen, at the time at least, professed a certain interest. Searching for reasons is idle; Mr. Hertslet offers none, and the book suffers from the neglect of one important branch. It is on this score open to the charge of incompleteness, the most grievous sin in a book of reference. This is, however, the only fault apparent at first sight, and so much has been done, and well done, that it would be captious to insist too greatly on one error.

We will not damn the book by saying, in the language of booksellers, that it should be in every gentleman's library, but we have no hesitation in saying that it is a book of great value, not only to every student but to all educated men.