for ages continued to harrass the earth and inflame mankind against each other.

♦ Plutarch has said of the Egyptians, that they had inserted nothing into their worship without a reason, nothing merely fabulous, nothing superstitious (as many suppose): but their institutions have either a reference to morals, or to something useful in life; and many of them bear a beautiful resemblance of some facts in history, or some appearance in nature; perhaps in the commencement to lead mankind into superstition was not intended nor foreseen; it is a weed that springs up naturally when religion is blended with mystery and burdened with perplexing ceremonials. The mass of mankind lost sight of morality in the multiplicity of rites, and as it is easier to practise ceremonies, than to subdue the passions, ceremo nies gradually become substitutes for real religion, and usurp the place of morality and virtue.'

Mr. P. supposes that the religions of Hindustan and Egypt were identical; and concluding Brahma to be synonymous with Osiris, and Osiris with Bacchus, he endeavours to account for the strange representations which Grecian writers afford of this mythological personage:

BACCHUS, or OSIRIS, was represented by an equilateral triangle; Siva has the same hieroglyphic: the worship of BAC HUS was the same as that which is paid to Si'va; it had the same obscenities, the same bloody rites, and the same emblem of the generative power.

In BACCHUS may be traced the characteristicks of each of the personages in the Indian triad; and this may be accounted for by supposing the Greeks to have been deceived by the title OSIRIS: they considering it as the name of an individual, mingled the characters and adventures of all the three in one personage. BACCHUS may possibly be derived from a title of VR.HASPATI, VA'G I's'a, the lord of speech, which might be applied to BRAHMA' as the husband of SARASWATI the goddess of speech. The Greeks called him BagMIOS, as Sir William Jones says without knowing why; and he was styled by the Romans BRUMA: his feasts were celebrated for several days at the winter solstice; from him they were called Brumalia, and the winter solstice itself Bruma.

The crescent of Siva may have suggested the horns of BACCHUS; and his army of satyrs, and victories in India, shew the resemblance of this part of his character to VISHNU as RAMA, who, with his army of monkies, overran the peninsula of India.

It was a common practice with the Greeks to disguise their own ignorance of the purport of a foreign word, by supplying a word of a similar sound, but different meaning, in their own language, and inventing a story to agree with it: thus Méru or the north pole, the supposed abode of the Dévaiás, being considered as the birth place of the God, gave rise to the fable of BACCHU's second birth' from the thigh of JUPITER, because Meros, a Greek word approaching Méru in sound, signifies the thigh in that language.'

The immoralities of idolatry are a proper subject of reproba tion: but it cannot be fairly imagined that those symbols which occasioned

occasioned them were originally intended to produce this ef fect. Mr. P.'s explanation of the most objectionable emblem of paganism is at least ingenious:

Two sects sprang up. The one personified the whole universe, and the dispensations of providence in the regulation thereof, into a Goddess; this sect retained the female symbol only, and denominated themselves Sácta, as worshippers of the Sacti, or female power, exclusively; which they called Pracriti; and which, we, from the Latin, term nature.

The other sect insisted, that there was but one, eternal, first cause; that every thing, existing, derived its existence, from the sole energy of that first cause (Niranjen).

In order, therefore, to express their ideas of the absolute independence of this supreme power upon any extra co-operation, they took for their symbol the male emblem, unconnected with that of the female; a third sect likewise arose, which intended to reconcile the idea of the unity of godhead, with that of the existence of matter and spirit; they, therefore, contended, that the union of those two principles was so mysteriously intimate, as to form but one being, which they represented, by a figure half male, and half female, and denominated HARA-GAURI', and ARDHANA'RI' IS'WARA. It is probable, that the idea of obscenity was not originally attached to these symbols and it is likely, that the inventors themselves might not have foreseen the disorders, which this worship would occasion amongst mankind. Profligacy eagerly embraces what flatters its propensities, and ignorance follows blindly, wherever example excites: it is therefore no wonder, that a general corruption of manners should ensue, increasing, in proportion as the distance of time involv ed the original meaning of the symbol in darkness and oblivion. Obscene mirth became the principal feature of the popular superstition, and was, even in after times, extended to, and intermingled with, gloomy rites and bloody sacrifices:-an heterogeneous mixture, which appears totally irreconcileable, unless by tracing the steps, which led to it. It will appear, that the engrafting of a new symbol, upon the old superstition, occasioned this strange medley. The sect of VISHNU was not wholly free from the propensity of the times to obscene rites; it had been united in interest with that of Siva, in their league against the sect of BRAHMA; as was expressed by an image, called HAR-HER1, half Si'va, and half VISHNU. This union seems to have continued till the time, when an emblem of an abstract idea, having been erected into an object of worship, introduced a revolution in religion, which had a violent and extended effect upon the manners and opinions of mankind.'

In the prosecution of Mr. P.'s undertaking, he sufficiently shews in what way superstitious rites grew out of mistaken symbolical representations: but we cannot follow him through all his details. Mr. H. T. Colebrooke has subjoined to this essay some farther explanatory remarks.

Extracts from the Tehzeebul Mantik, or "Essence of Logic," proposed as a small, Supplement to Arabic and Persian Grammar:

with a View to elucidate certain Points connected with Oriental Literature. By FRANCIS BALFOUR, Esq.-These extracts are literary curiosities, and will be perused with interest by others than mere oriental scholars. The close coincidence here displayed, in every point, with the system referred to Aristotle, places it beyond a doubt, (says Mr. B.) that the system of logic generally ascribed to this wonderful genius, and which was translated into Arabic many centuries ago, constitutes the ba -sis of the logic of the nations of Asia; though hitherto this fact has not been directly confirmed by translations from oriental languages. Mr. B. moreover endeavours to vindicate the Stagyrite against the charge of Lord Kaimes, and assigns to him that merit which has been attributed to the great Bacon:

From some of the extracts contained in this paper, it will appear, 1st. That the mode of reasoning by Induction, illustrated and improved by the great Lord VERULAM, in his Organum Novum; and generally considered as the cause of the rapid progress of science in later times, was perfectly known to ARISTOTLE, and was distinctly delineated by him as a method of investigation that leads to certainty or truth; and 2dly, That ARISTOTLE was likewise perfectly acquainted, not merely with the form of induction, but with the pro. per materials to be employed in carrying it on-Facts and Experi

ments.

"We are therefore led to infer, that all the blame of confining the human mind for so long a time in chains by the forms of syllogism, cannot be fairly imputed to ARISTOTLE; nor all the merit of enlarging it and setting it free, ascribed to Lord VERULAM. The vast extent of ARISTOTLE'S learning and knowledge, and the sin gular strength and penetration of his mind having, naturally, encouraged him to undertake a complete analysis of all its powers, the doctrine of syllogism became of course, a constituent and necessary part of his comprehensive system. And if succeeding philosophers, attracted by its ingenuity and beauty, have deserted the substance in pursuit of the shadow, the pernicious consequences of this delusion cannot, justly, be referred to him.'

In the preface to this Arabic treatise, we have a definition of its subject:

In the language of logicians, examination or inspection is the contemplation of the thing known to obtain a knowledge of the thing unknown; that is to say, the contemplation of the known perceptible, and the known demonstrable, to obtain a knowledge of the unknown perceptible and unknown demonstrable; and as mistakes often happen in this investigation, there is indispensibly required some general rule to preserve the mind from falling into an error in the process of thinking. This rule is logic.

From this discussion, therefore, it appears that the Nature of logic may be defined "A general rule which guards the mind against errors in thinking,'

The

The work is divided into two parts, the first treating of Definition, and the second of Demonstration. Part I. is subdivided into four sections: 1. of Expression; 2. of Ideas formed by the Intellect; 3. of the five Universal Ideas called Predicables ; 4. of the different kinds of Definitions. Part II. is arranged in five sections: 1. of Propositions; 2. of Syllogism; 3. of Induc tion; 4. of Analogy; 5. of the division of Syllogisms according to their matter.

The section on Syllogisms being quoted by Mr. B. in the passage which we have just transcribed from his introduction, as a proof that Aristotle was acquainted with the method of pure investigation, we shall give it entire?

A Syllogism is a sentence composed of propositions, and in such a manner, that there necessarily arises from this composition another sentence. Know then that having finished our investigation of propositions on the previous knowledge of which all reasoning or de monstration depends, I shall now consider demonstration :--Demonstration or reas Ling is the process of inferring some thing from the state of one thing to prove the state of another; and this is of three kinds, viz. Syllogism, Induction, and Analogy. Syllogism is that in which an inference is drawn from a general rule or class to a suberdinate part or individual belonging to that class; which must of course partake of its general nature, or character. This species of argument affords certainty or truth. Take for example "The world is changeable, and every thing liable to change was created;" thus they obtain the conclusion that the world did not exist from eternity, this is, was created. Be it then understood that two sen. tences combined, from the nature of which there necessarily arises a third, constitute what is called Kecause or syllogism: and the third sentence thus obtained is called Neterjeh, that is, the conclusion.

The subject and predicate contained in the conclusion of the syllogism described is called the Maddeh, that is, the matter of the conclusion; and the order in which they are placed constitutes what is called Heiyet, that is, the form or figure. If the matter and figure of the conclusion appear in the premises of the syllogism, then that syllogism is called conditional, because the conditional particle Leiken must be included in it. Take for example " whenever the sun shines day must exist;" but the sun shines, which gives the conclu sion Then day exists," which is materially and formally contained in the preceding syllogism. But if the conclusion be not materially and formally expressed in the premises of the syllogism, then it is denominated Ikterauni, that is, simple or categorical; whether it

be absolute or conditional.

The subject considered in the conclusion of a simple syllogism is called Asrur, that is, the minor; and the thing predicated of the subject is called Akbar, that is, the major; and the proposition which contains the minor is called Sururi, minor proposition; and the pro. position which contains the major, is called Akburi or major proposition; and the term with which the subject and predicate of the

conclusion

conclusion are both compared is called the middle term or Huddi Osit, or Osit, &c. &c. &c.'

If European logicians can learn nothing from these extracts, they will prove that the author of the work from which they are taken knew the method of reasoning. That this treatise of logic, however, is of no high antiquity, is evident from its adducing the missions of the prophet Mahommed and Jesus Christ,' as instances of traditions which cannot be supposed to be false.

An Essay on the Sacred Isles in the West, with other Essays connected with that Work. By Captain F. WILFORD.Only a part of Captain Wilford's undertaking is presented to the public in this volume, and that part is very little satisfactory. When he informs us in his Introduction that his object is to prove that the Sacred Isles of the Hindus, if not the British Isles, are at least some remote country to the North-west of the old continent, for he cannot conceive that they are altogether Utopian or imaginary,'-we were prepared to expect an actual display of the antient geography of the Asiatics: but, instead of any real knowlege and science, we find an account of idle legends, the substance of which is not worth transcription, and imaginary charts which are illustrative only of the wild fancies of the Hindus. Captain Wilford comments with energy on the attempts which were made by his Pundit to impose on him the fictions of his own brain instead of real extracts from the Puràn'as, and from other books relative to his inquiries; and though he tells us that these forgeries were detected, we cannot banish the suspicion that some of the learned among the Hindus, who have obtained by intercourse with us a little knowlege of our history and geography, have succeeded in persuading this Asiatic student that, from the most remote times, they were acquainted with the British Isles under the name of the Sacred Isles. As a portion only of the labours of Captain W. is before us, we cannot absolutely pronounce on this subject: but the contents of this paper will serve to stamp probability on our suspicion.

It is proposed by the author to publish six essays; of which the one now printed relates merely to the Geographical Systems of the Hindus, (if such extravagant fictions as those which are here enumerated be intitled to such an appellation,) and is subdivided into three sections: 1. General ideas of these Systems. 2. List of Mountains, Rivers, and Countries, from the Puran'as and other Books. 3. Geographical Extracts from the Puràn'as. Of the nature of these extracts, the account given by Captain W. of the books from which they are taken will sufficiently inform us:

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