38 L. ed. 385, 388, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499, | within its jurisdiction does not import," 501." Referring to the limitations placed this court has recently said, "an absolute by the state upon the hours of workmen, right in each person to be at all times and the court in the same case said (p. 395, L. in all circumstances wholly freed from reed. p. 792, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 389): "These straint. There are manifold restraints to employments, when too long pursued, the which every person is necessarily subject legislature has judged to be detrimental to for the common good." Jacobson v. Massathe health of the employees, and, so long as chusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, there are reasonable grounds for believing 49 L. ed. ———. that this is so, its decision upon this subject cannot be reviewed by the Federal courts."

Granting, then, that there is a liberty of contract which cannot be violated even under the sanction of direct legislative enSubsequently, in Gundling v. Chicago, actment, but assuming, as according to 177 U. S. 183, 188, 44 L. ed. 725, 728, 20 settled law we may assume, that such Sup. Ct. Rep. 633, 635, this court said: liberty of contract is subject to such regu"Regulations respecting the pursuit of a lations as the state may reasonably prelawful trade or business are of very frequent scribe for the common good and the welloccurrence in the various cities of the coun- being of society, what are the conditions try, and what such regulations shall be and under which the judiciary may declare such to what particular trade, business, or oc- regulations to be in excess of legislative cupation they shall apply, are questions for authority and void? Upon this point there the state to determine, and their determina- is no room for dispute; for the rule is unition comes within the proper exercise of versal that a legislative enactment, Federal the police power by the state, and, unless or state, is never to be disregarded or held the regulations are so utterly unreasonable invalid unless it be, beyond question, plainand extravagant in their nature and ly and palpably nature and ly and palpably in excess of legislative purpose that the property and personal | power. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 rights of the citizen are unnecessarily, and U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, 49 L. ed. — in a manner wholly arbitrary, interfered we said that the power of the courts to rewith or destroyed without due process of view legislative action in respect of a matter law, they do not extend beyond the power affecting the general welfare exists only of the state to pass, and they form no sub- "when that which the legislature has done ject for Federal interference. As stated in comes within the rule that, if a statute purCrowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 34 L. porting to have been enacted to protect the ed. 620, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13, 'the possession public health, the public morals, or the and enjoyment of all rights are subject to public safety has no real or substantial resuch reasonable conditions as may be lation to those objects, or is, beyond all deemed by the governing authority of the question, a plain, a plain, palpable invasion of country essential to the safety, health, rights secured by the fundamental law," peace, good order, and morals of the com- citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661, munity.'' 31 L. ed. 205, 210, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; In St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 320, 34 173 U. S. 404, 409, 43 L. ed. 746, 748, 19 L. ed. 455, 458, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 185, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419, and in Knoxville Iron Co. Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; Atkin v. Kansas, 191 v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 21, 22, 46 L. ed. U. S. 207, 223, 48 L. ed. 148, 158, 24 Sup. 55, 61, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, it was distinctly Ct. Rep. 124. If there be doubt as to the adjudged that the right of contract was not validity of the statute, that doubt must "absolute, but may be subjected to the re- therefore be resolved in favor of its validity, straints demanded by the safety and wel- and the courts must keep their hands off, fare of the state." Those cases illustrate leaving the legislature to meet the responsithe extent to which the state may restrict | bility for unwise legislation. If the end or interfere with the exercise of the right which the legislature seeks to accomplish of contracting. be one to which its power extends, and if The authorities on the same line are so the means employed to that end, although numerous that further citations are necessary.

I take it to be firmly established that what is called the liberty of contract may, within certain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to promote the general welfare, or to guard the public health, the public morals, or the public safety. "The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person

not the wisest or best, are yet not plainly and palpably unauthorized by law, then the court cannot interfere. In other words, when the validity of a statute is questioned, the burden of proof, so to speak, is upon those who assert it to be unconstitutional. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421, 4 L. ed. 579, 605.

Let these principles be applied to the present case. By the statute in question it

is provided that "no employee shall be re- | yond question, a plain, palpable invasion quired, or permitted, to work in a biscuit, of rights secured by the fundamental law. bread, or cake bakery, or confectionery es- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 196 U. S. 11, tablishment, more than sixty hours in any ante, p. 358, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358. Thereone week, or more than ten hours in any fore I submit that this court will transcend one day, unless for the purpose of making its functions if it assumes to annul the stata shorter work day on the last day of the ute of New York. It must be remembered week; nor more hours in any one week than that this statute does not apply to all kinds will make an average of ten hours per day of business. It applies only to work in for the number of days during such week bakery and confectionery establishments, in in which such employee shall work." which, as all know, the air constantly breathed by workmen is not as pure and healthful as that to be found in some other establishments or out of doors.

Professor Hirt in his treatise on the "Diseases of the Workers" has said: "The labor of the bakers is among the hardest and most laborious imaginable, because it has to be performed under conditions injurious to the health of those engaged in it. It is hard, very hard, work, not only because it requires a great deal of physical exertion in an overheated workshop and during unreasonably long hours, but more so because of the erratic demands of the public, compelling the baker to perform the greater part of his work at night, thus depriving him of an opportunity to enjoy the necessary rest and sleep,-a fact which is highly injurious to his health." Another writer says: constant inhaling of flour dust causes in

It is plain that this statute was enacted in order to protect the physical well-being of those who work in bakery and confectionery establishments. It may be that the statute had its origin, in part, in the belief that employers and employees in such establishments were not upon an equal footing, and that the necessities of the latter often compelled them to submit to such exactions as unduly taxed their strength. Be this as it may, the statute must be taken as expressing the belief of the people of New York that, as a general rule, and in the case of the average man, labor in excess of sixty hours during a week in such establishments may endanger the health of those who thus labor. Whether or not this be wise legislation it is not the province of the court to inquire. Under our systems of government the courts are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation. So that, inflammation of the lungs and of the bronchial determining the question of power to interfere with liberty of contract, the court may inquire whether the means devised by the state are germane to an end which may be lawfully accomplished and have a real or substantial relation to the protection of health, as involved in the daily work of the persons, male and female, engaged in bakery and confectionery establishments. But when this inquiry is entered upon I find it impossible, in view of common experience, to say

that there is here no real or substantial

"The

tubes. The eyes also suffer through this dust, which is responsible for the many cases of running eyes among the bakers. The long hours of toil to which all bakers are subjected produce rheumatism, cramps, and swollen legs. The intense heat in the workshops induces the workers to resort to cooling drinks, which, together with their bodies to the change in the atmosphere, is habit of exposing the greater part of their another source of a number of diseases of relation between the means employed by the various organs. Nearly all bakers are palestate and the end sought to be accomplished faced and of more delicate health than the workers of other crafts, which is chiefly by its legislation. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661, 31 L. ed. 205, 210, 8 Sup. Ct. due to their hard work and their irregular Rep. 273. Nor can I say that the statute and unnatural mode of living, whereby the has no appropriate or direct connection with power of resistance against disease is greatly that protection to health which each state diminished. The average age of a baker is owes to her citizens (Patterson v. Ken- below that of other workmen; they seldom tucky, 97 U. S. 501, 24 L. ed. 1115); or live over their fiftieth year, most of them that it is not promotive of the health of dying between the ages of forty and fifty. the employees in question (Holden v. Hardy, During periods of epidemic diseases the 169 U. S. 366, 391, 42 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 bakers are generally the first to succumb to Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Lawton v. Steele, 152 the disease, and the number swept away U. S. 133, 139, 38 L. ed. 385, 389, 14 Sup. during such periods far exceeds the number Ct. Rep. 499); or that the regulation pre- of other crafts in comparison to the men emscribed by the state is utterly unreasona-ployed in the respective industries. When, ble and extravagant or wholly arbitrary in 1720, the plague visited the city of Mar(Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 188, seilles, France, every baker in the city suc44 L. ed. 725, 728, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633). cumbed to the epidemic, which caused con Still less can I say that the statute is, be-siderable excitement in the neighboring

cities and resulted in measures for the sani- | hours as the proper basis of a day's labor. tary protection of the bakers."

which "embraces everything within the ter- | void under the 14th Amendment. But it ritory of a state, not surrendered to the took occasion to say what may well be here general government; all which can be most repeated: "The responsibility therefor rests advantageously exercised by the states them- upon legislators, not upon the courts. No selves." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, evils arising from such legislation could be 6 L. ed. 23, 71. A decision that the New more far reaching than those that might York statute is void under the 14th Amend- come to our system of government if the ment will, in my opinion, involve conse-judiciary, abandoning the sphere assigned quences of a far-reaching and mischievous to it by the fundamental law, should enter character; for such a decision would seri- the domain of legislation, and upon grounds ously cripple the inherent power of the merely of justice or reason or wisdom annul states to care for the lives, health, and well- statutes that had received the sanction of being of their citizens. Those are matters the people's representatives. We are rewhich can be best controlled by the states. minded by counsel that it is the solemn The preservation of the just powers of the duty of the courts in cases before them to states is quite as vital as the preservation guard the constitutional rights of the citiof the powers of the general government. zen against merely arbitrary power. That is unquestionably true. But it is equally true-indeed, the public interests imperatively demand-that legislative enactments should be recognized and enforced by the courts as embodying the will of the people, unless they are plainly and palpably beyond all question in violation of the fundamental law of the Constitution." Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 223, 48 L. ed. 148, 158, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124, 128.

When this court had before it the question of the constitutionality of a statute of Kansas making it a criminal offense for a contractor for public work to permit or require his employees to perform labor upon such work in excess of eight hours each day, it was contended that the statute was in derogation of the liberty both of employees and employer. It was further contended that the Kansas statute was mischievous in its tendencies. This court, while disposing of the question only as it affected public work, held that the Kansas statute was not

The judgment, in my opinion, should be affirmed.

(198 U. S. 17)
PABST BREWING COMPANY, Appt.,

บ.

G. Y. CRENSHAW et al.

Commerce in intoxicating liquors-validity of state inspection law-interstate com

merce.

1. A state statute imposing an inspection fee upon beer or other malt liquors shipped from other states into that state, and held there

was alleged the law of Missouri imposed upon beer or other malt liquors when shipped from other states into Missouri, after its delivery within that state to the consignee, and when held for sale for consumption in Missouri or for shipment to other states. The general ground upon which the law was assailed was that the exactions complained of were regulations of commerce repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. It was, in addition, specially averred that, so far as the law imposed a charge on beer shipped from Wisconsin into Missouri, and held there by the consignee for sale and shipment for consumption in other states, the Missouri law was repugnant to the commerce clause, because in this particular it discriminated in favor of beer manufactured in Missouri and held for sale or shipment for consumption in other states.

for sale and consumption therein, must, although producing a revenue, and not providing for an adequate inspection, be deemed enacted by the state "in the exercise of its police powers," within the meaning of the Wilson act of August 8, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 313, chap. 728, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3177), subjecting to laws so enacted all intoxicating liquors arriving in the state, where the highest state court has upheld as a valid police regulation so much of the statute as imposes the same fee on beer of domestic manufacture over the objection that it is a revenue measure, and not an inspection law. 2. An inspection law enacted by a state "in the exercise of its police powers," within the meaning of the Wilson act of August 8, 1890, subjecting to laws so enacted all intoxicating liquors arriving in the state, is not void as an interference with interstate commerce being discrimination as to beer shipped into cause it operates to deter shipments into the

state.

8. Interstate commerce in intoxicating liquors is not unlawfully burdened by an inspection law enacted by a state "in the exercise of its police powers," within the meaning of the Wilson act of August 8, 1890, subjecting to laws so enacted intoxicating liquors arriving in the state, because the statute does not provide for an adequate inspection, and imposes a burden beyond the cost of inspection.

[No. 85.]

The bill was amended and demurred to. Whilst the court considered the law not to be in conflict with the commerce clause on the general grounds alleged, it nevertheless concluded, because of the averment concern

Missouri for reshipment to other states, that the demurrer could not be sustained. 120 Fed. 144. An answer was thereupon filed, as also a replication, and subsequently the cause was submitted upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts. The supreme court of Missouri having decided that the law in question did not provide for any charge or burden upon beer or other malt liquors shipped into Missouri and held there for reshipment to points outside of the state, the court below, adhering to its

Argued December 8, 1904. Decided April previous opinion as to the general aver

A

17, 1905.

PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri to review a decree dismissing a bill to enjoin the collection of an inspection fee upon beer shipped from another state into Missouri and held there for sale and consumption therein. Affirmed.

See same case below, 120 Fed. 144.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Clifford Histed, James H. Hark-
less, Charles S. Crysler, and Francis C.
Downey for appellant.

Messrs. Edward C. Crow and William
M. Williams for appellees.

ments of the bill, and applying the constructo the statute, held that it did not distion given by the supreme court of the state criminate, and dismissed the suit.

The law of Missouri in question is entitled "An Act Creating the Office of Inspector of Beer and Malt Liquors of the State, and Providing for the Inspection of Beer and Malt Liquors Manufactured and Sold in This State." The provisions of the act essential to be considered may be summarized as follows:

It creates the office of beer inspector, to be appointed by the governor, who shall be an expert beer brewer, and who is required to furnish a bond, and is given power to ap

Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion point the necessary deputies to execute the

of the court:

The Pabst Brewing Company, a Wisconsin corporation, filed its bill in the court below to enjoin the beer inspector of the state of Missouri and his assistant from collecting, or attempting to collect, an inspection charge, fee, license, or burden, which it

provisions of the act. The act forbids every person or corporation engaged in brewing within the state from using any material or chemical in the manufacture of beer or other malt liquors other than pure hops or pure extract of hops, or barley, malt, or wholesome yeast or rice. It is provided