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the company from a correction of the error cumstances testified to by plaintiff, the deby the conductor requiring the passenger fendant owed plaintiff no duty to stop its to leave the train at a suitable intermediate fast train at Elys for the purpose of letting point, there to wait for and take passage him off. It was his duty, when informed upon a train which does stop at the passen- by the conductor that the train would not ger's destination. Nor do we hold that stop at Elys, to elect to stop at some one where a passenger makes inquiry of the of the intermediate stations at which the gatekeeper, or those in charge of the train, train would stop before reaching Elys, and as to the train he should take, and, acting this he refused to do, and he has no cause under their directions, is caused to board of action against the defendant. The court the wrong car, that he cannot recover for improperly refused to instruct the jury to lost time and increased expenses necessarily find for the defendant. incurred by reason of such incorrect information. This question is not before us here. What we do hold is that, under the cir

-effect of agreement of conductor to stop train.

Regulations as to the running and stopping of trains are absolutely necessary for the transaction of the company's business and for the safety of the employees and passengers; and their violation at the will of the employee or for the convenience of the passenger ought not to be tolerated. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Ludlam, 6 C. C. A. 454, 13 U. S. App. 540, 57 Fed. 481.

So, the conductor cannot bind the company by a promise to stop a train at a place where, by the rules and regulations of the company, it is not permitted to stop. Schiffler v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 96 Wis. 141, 65 Am. St. Rep. 35, 71 N. W. 97, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 121.

And the fact that a conductor takes a passenger's ticket and agrees to let him off at his place of destination as indicated thereby will not bind the company to stop the train at that station, contrary to its rules and regulations. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Hatton, 60 Ind. 12. The court said: "It is not competent, we think, for a conductor to agree with an individual passenger to carry him to a given place, and stop at that place to allow him to leave the train, and thus bind the railroad company, unless the place at which he is to stop is a regular station of the train which he is conducting. Such a power cannot be implied as within the proper duties of a conductor; nor would it be consistent with public policy. A railroad company that holds itself out to the public as a common carrier of passengers, establishes its routes and stations, and advertises its running arrangements, thereby pledges itself to the public to run accordingly; and if it was in the power of a conductor to stop at different stations from those established for the lines, or alter the running arrangement of the road, to accommodate a particular passenger, he would thereby greatly incommode the public generally, for the sake of a single passenger. The duty of a conductor is to run the trains according to the public arrangements, and he has no power to change them; and a passenger has no right to infer that a conductor has any such power from his general duties as a conductor, and no reason to suppose

The judgment is reversed, for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

that he could bind the railroad company by any such agreement."

And especially where the passenger must have known that the conductor had no power to make such an agreement from the fact that before the train started the conductor informed the passengers that the train did not stop at that station, and could not stop there, and it was also shown that on the passenger's ticket it was stated that it was "good only on trains stopping at stations named." Ibid.

A passenger who contracts with a railroad conductor to be left at a station at which such conductor's train is not scheduled to stop, after having been notified, by being refused a ticket for passage to such station by that train, that it was against the rules for the conductor to stop there, cannot recover damages from the company if the conductor breaks the contract and carries him past the station; at least, where other trains are provided by which such station could be reached. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carmichael, 90 Ala. 19, 9 L.R.A. 388, 8 So. 87.

But where a passenger by mistake boards a train which does not stop at his destination, the conductor's agreement to put him off at such place will bind the company where there is evidence that though by the rules and regulations of the company the train was not permitted to stop there, the conductor frequently did stop the train there to let passengers off. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Elliott, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 54 S. W. 410.

-effect of taking up ticket or fare.

The taking of a ticket or fare by the conductor does not constitute a binding contract upon the company to stop the train at the point of destination mentioned in the ticket. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Rosenberry, 45 Ark. 256, 2 Am. Neg. Cas. 122; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Randolph, 53 Ill. 510, 5 Am. Rep. 60, 2 Am. Neg. Cas. 574; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Atchison, 47 Ark. 74, 14 S. W. 468, 2 Am. Neg. Cas. 136; Haskins v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 4 Ohio L. J. 951; Trotlinger v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 11 Lea, 533.

So, the fact that a passenger who has boarded a train which does not stop at his

destination succeeds in getting his ticket | not exposing him to unusual or extraordiinto the hands of the conductor, and then, nary peril. after the latter has found where he wishes to get off, refuses to take it back, adds nothing to the merits of the passenger's case in an action against the company for damages for refusal of the conductor to stop at the place of destination. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Applewhite, 52 Ind. 540.

But, on collecting fare to a station at which a train is not scheduled to stop, it becomes the duty of the conductor to notify the passenger so paying that the train will not stop at that station, or to carry him to such station and then give him sufficient time to get off in safety. McNulta v. Ensch, 134 Ill. 46, 24 N. E. 631, 2 Am. Neg. Cas.

675.

Right to eject.

A passenger who boards a train which does not stop at his destination may, when his mistake is discovered, be required to leave the train at the first regular stopping place unless, after the mistake is discovered, the railroad company's agents do something which precludes them from enforcing the privilege they had of compelling such passenger to leave the train short of his destination. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Campbell, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 35, 69 S. W. 451.

One who, without being misled in any way, boards a train which does not stop at her destination, may be required to alight at any regular stopping place where she can get a train to her destination, and the company will not be liable. Plott v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 63 Wis. 511, 23 N. W. 412.

So, one who is required to transfer at an intermediate station to an accommodation train cannot recover as for a breach by the railroad company of its duty to permit him to remain on the train until the place to which he had a ticket was reached. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Thomason, 6 Ala. App. 365, 60 So. 506.

So, also, one who is forced to leave at another place cannot recover for a wrongful ejection, in the absence of showing that needless force was used. Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Bills, 104 Ind. 13, 3 N. E. 611.

A railroad company may discontinue or suspend the right of passengers to ride on freight trains to a certain station whenever there is necessity for handling freight there, and a passenger notified either under this right or in the customary manner that the train would make no stop is in duty bound to leave the train, and if he does not he can be lawfully ejected. Wieland v. Southern P. Co. 1 Cal. App. 343, 82 Pac. 226.

A passenger who refuses to pay fare to the first place at which the train regularly stops beyond the place at which the passenger wishes to alight, and at which the train does not stop, may be lawfully ejected before his destination is reached, at the regular stopping place nearest thereto. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maxwell, Ala.,

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66 So. 669; Logan v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 77 Mo. 663; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Dice, Tex. Civ. App. 168 S. W. 478.

And there is not a denial of a complete performance of contract to carry a passenger to his destination where his ticket is given back to him with an indorsement thereon showing that he has a right to proceed to the station indicated thereby on a train which stops at such station. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maxwell, supra.

Under a statute requiring a railroad company to stop a train at a junction point to permit passengers to be transferred, the company is under no duty to stop the train at such point unless there is a passenger to be transferred; and so, where, under the rules and regulations of the railroad company, a train will not stop at a junction point unless there are passengers to be transferred to another road, one whose destination is such point cannot require the train to be stopped where there are no passengers to be transferred, and, on refusal to pay fare to the first stopping place beyond, may be lawfully ejected before such place is reached, at the nearest regular stopping place thereto. Logan v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 77 Mo. 663.

In Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Moore, 98 Tex. 302, 83 S. W. 362, 4 Ann. Cas. 770, a passenger boarded a train which, under the regulations of the railroad company, stopped One who is on a train which does not at his destination only to permit passengers stop at his destination, he knowing that fact coming from connecting lines to alight, and when he boarded the train, may be ejected was required to leave at the first regular at any reasonably safe place between stopping station of his train. In an action stations; the company is not required to to recover damages for refusal to carry him carry him to the next station, or to the next to his destination, brought on the theory highway, or the next place that would be that the regulation which allowed passenconvenient for him to get off. New York, gers coming to the defendant's line from C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Willing, 24 Ohio C. C. other roads to get off at all stations, while 474. The court stated that he has no claims denying the same privilege to those travelupon the company; he is not paying for his ing entirely on its own line, gave to the transportation; he is a trespasser upon the former an "undue and unreasonable prefertrain, and they have a right to relieve them-ence or advantage," and subjected the latter selves of him as speedily as possible, but to "undue or unreasonable prejudice or diswithout exposing him to any unusual or advantage," and denied to the latter extraordinary dangers. The mere fact of putting him off the train on the railroad track or within the right of way, in the night, if he is unlawfully on the train, is

"reasonable, proper, and equal facilities," within the meaning of the interstate commerce law, the court refused to decide whether the statute, if applicable, had that effect,

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certain place, and especially where, on the
day in question, the train conductor in-
formed such passenger that the train would
not stop at that place, and, according to
the evidence, it did not stop there. Fink
v. Albany & S. R. Co. 4 Lans. 147.
A passenger purchasing a ticket for trans-
portation to a station on the carrier's line
contracts to take his passage on a train
scheduled to stop at that point. Hancock
v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 27 Ky. L. Rep.
434, 85 S. W. 210.

The conductor is under no obligation to take the first opportunity to inform a passenger who has gotten on a train not scheduled to stop at his destination without previously informing himself, when, where, and how he can go or stop, that the train does not stop at the station to which he is destined, so that he can exercise the right So, an action does not lie against a railto leave the train at any station he chooses road company for refusal to take one to his before reaching the destination named in destination on its fast train, where he boardhis ticket. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Ludlam, 6 ed a train which did not stop at the place C. C. A. 454, 13 U. S. App. 540, 57 Fed. 481. for which he purchased a ticket, and did The court stated that the conductor on a not offer to pay a full fare to a place where train has many and various duties to per- the train did stop, although he did offer form, all under the regulations of the com- to surrender the ticket and pay the addipany which he is serving, and without proof tional amount to such stopping place, the to show that he is authorized to vary the court stating that the conductor had no rules of the company in regard to the stop-right to accept such ticket for any purpose, ping of his train at a station not permitted it being to a place at which the train did under the rules, his mere silence under such not stop. Ibid. circumstances cannot vary the obligation of the company in respect to the contract of carriage.

Where the first regular stop of the train is beyond the passenger's destination, he may be ejected upon refusing to pay fare to that place. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lightcap, 7 Ind. App. 249, 34 N. E. 243; Usher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 71 Kan. 375, 80 Pac. 956; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608, 5 Am. St. Rep. 780, 17 Pac. 54; Flood v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2135, 80 S. W. 184; Fink v. Albany & S. R. Co. 4 Lans. 147; Albin v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 43 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 95 S. W. 589.

In such case he becomes a trespasser. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608, 5 Am. St. Rep. 780, 17 Pac. 54; Flood v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2135, 80 S. W. 184.

And is none the less a trespasser although he tenders a fare, if it is one that the conductor is not authorized to receive, or offers to pay fare only to a station for which the train does not receive passengers. Flood v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. supra.

Where one boards a train which is not scheduled to stop at his destination, he may be required to pay his fare to the first regular stop, and on refusal be ejected.

And the mere fact that the train was required by law to stop and did stop at such place on account of railroad crossings, will not give the passenger a right of action for alleged wrongful demanding and receiving of fare to the first regular stop, and the resulting injury to his feelings, Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lightcap, 7 Ind. App. 249, 34 N. E. 243.

And he may be ejected between stations. Albin v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 43 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 95 S. W. 589.

And he may be lawfully ejected between stations although such train occasionally stops at the point of his destination, as to receive or let off passengers destined for a

A railroad company may eject between stations one who has boarded a train which does not stop at his destination, and who refuses to pay fare to the first regular stop, which is beyond the place of his destination, and need not wait until the distance covered by the ticket has been traveled. Caldwell v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 467. Otherwise, as the court said, a passenger can compel the company to accept one of two courses: either to stop at the place of destination, which is just what is desired, or carry him further, over a distance for which he refuses to pay fare. If one by his own wrong or by his own mistake may compel the stopping of a train at a place not a regular stopping place for that train, one or more persons may take passage on the same train, desiring to stop at each station on the road, and upon tendering tickets for the respective stations, and refusing to pay beyond them, force the company to make the train an accommodation train, to the prejudice of its rights and the comfort of the general traveling public. But an expulsion at a station before reaching the place of a passenger's destination, on the ground that the train did not stop at such place, is unlawful, although, before purchasing his ticket, the passenger knew that the railroad company had promulgated a rule prohibiting that train from stopping at such place, if, by continuous nonenforcement of the rule, the company had permitted it to become obsolete, or if the passenger was misled by the conduct of the company's ticket agent and conductor, and thereby induced to believe that the train would stop at such place. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Herring, Tex. Civ. App. - 130 S. W. 1039.

And in Pennsylvania Co. v. Wentz, 37 Ohio St. 333, where one boarded a train which did not stop at his destination, and on refusal to pay fare to a point beyond his destination, the first stopping place of the train, was ejected between stations, it was

held that, in view of a statute that required all trains to stop at all stations containing three thousand inhabitants, it was no defense to an action for ejection that, by the rules and regulations of the company, the train did not stop at the destination of such person, as such place contained over three thousand inhabitants.

And the court stated further that even laying out of view the statute, it was difficult to maintain the proposition that the ejection was justifiable where it was not at a station nor at any habitation, but in or near a woodland, and the time was 1 o'clock at night. Ibid.

One purchasing a round-trip railroad ticket good only on the day of purchase may recover damages in case he is ejected from the only train passing his station on its return trip on that day, for the reason that the ticket is not good on that train, because the train is not scheduled to stop at that station. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Harris, 81 Miss. 208, 59 L.R.A. 742, 95 Am. St. Rep. 466, 32 So. 309.

And a statement by the agent when selling the ticket that in case the only train returning that day is late, the purchaser may have difficulty in getting it to stop to let him off, has no effect upon his rights under the contract. Ibid.

Nor is the right to return upon that train affected by the statement of a flagman, when the holder of a round-trip ticket attempts to board the train, that it does not stop at his destination, and his agreement to leave the train at the last stop before his destination. Ibid.

One who boards a train which does not stop at the place of his destination, he having been prevented from ascertaining that fact because the ticket office was closed, is entitled, upon offering to pay fare to the first regular stop, to remain on the train as a passenger; and so a refusal by the conductor to receive the fare to such place, and requiring that he leave the train at night in a dangerous place, away from any dwelling, station, or stopping place, constitutes a wrongful ejection for which the railroad company is liable. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Norris, 17 Ind. App. 189, 60 Am. St. Rep. 166, 46 S. E. 554, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 579.

And one who boarded a train which did not stop at his destination was held in Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Ashby, 79 Va. 130, 52 Am. Rep. 620, to have been wrongfully ejected and entitled to recover damages therefor where the conductor refused to permit him to ride on such ticket to the first regular stopping place of the train, which was short of his destination, and stopped the train in a low swamp, late in the afternoon, when night was coming on, with no habitation near, and put him off, in the midst of a a drizzling rain, in an eastern blow or northeastern storm, though he was sick with malarial fever,

So, also, in Stevens v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 1 Mo. App. Rep. 247, it was held that under a rule of the railroad company that if a passenger got aboard a train which

did not stop at his destination, he should be put off either at the station where he got aboard, or at the first station at which the train stopped, an ejection at a point other than a station or a regular stopping place was wrongful, and the company was liable, although, as in this case, the place at which he was forced to alight was only 1 miles from the place where he boarded the train. The opinion does not disclose as to whether the conductor demanded fare to the nearest stopping place, and he attempted to justify the ejection on the ground that, under the rule mentioned, he had a right to expel such a person while near to or in the vicinity of the station, although not immediately thereat; but this was held to be untenable.

One who boards a train which he should know does not stop at a station for which he has a ticket, in the hope that it will do so, and so afford him an opportunity of reaching his destination, and who refuses to pay the additional fare to the first stopping place upon the conductor's demand, is a passenger within the meaning of a statute requiring the ejection of passengers at usual stopping places. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Harper, 69 Ark. 186, 53 L.R.A. 220, 86 Am. St. Rep. 190, 61 S. W. 911.

Although a conductor may require a passenger who boards a train which does not stop at his destination to leave the train at a regular stop prior to reaching such destination, or pay fare to a regular stop beyond, yet, if he uses language which imputes a falsehood to such passenger and also disgraceful conduct, which humiliates and distresses the passenger, damages may be recovered therefor. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. Tex. Civ. App. 138 S. W. v. Morgan,

216.

-

-where passenger is misdirected by employee of carrier.

In cases where the passenger relied upon a misdirection by a ticket agent or other employee of the carrier, the first question in logical order is whether the passenger had a right to rely upon such misdirection; or, in another form, whether the carrier is responsible for the misdirection. That question, so far as misdirection by ticket agents is concerned, is discussed in the note to Hayes v. Wabash R. Co. 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 232.

As shown in that note, the general rule seems to be that a carrier will be bound by representations made by its ticket agent as to the stoppage of a train at the passenger's station; and most of the cases cited under the present heading, whether involving misrepresentations by ticket agents or other employees, seem to proceed upon that assumption.

But in Wells v. Alabama G. S. R. Co. 67 Miss. 24, 6 So. 737, it was held in effect that a passenger, in taking a train that did not stop at her destination, acted at her own peril, it appearing that before embarking she twice applied to the ticket agent to purchase a ticket to such destination, but was refused because the train did not stop there, not

withstanding that she was directed by the station policeman to board the train, and the conductor collected a fare which was the proper amount for transportation to her destination, but was also proper for the nearest stopping place.

That an action for wrongful ejection will lie where one boards train in reliance on the information of the ticket agent that the train will stop at his destination, and is required to leave before such point is reached, was held in Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Little, 66 Kan. 378, 61 L.R.A. 122, 97 Am. St. Rep. 376, 71 Pac. 820, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 524; Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Roberts, 91 Ga. 513, 18 S. E. 317, Atkinson v. Southern R. Co. 114 Ga. 146, 55 L.R.A. 223, 39 S. E. 888, 11 Am. Neg. Rep. 32; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 55 Ohio St. 370, 60 Am. St. Rep. 706, 45 Atl. 712.

Unless he knew or had reason to believe that the information given him by the ticket agent was incorrect, or that there was a rule or regulation of the company making the agent incompetent to give the information, or prohibiting the conductor from stopping the train at that station. Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Roberts, 91 Ga. 513, 18 S. E. 317; Atkinson v. Southern R. Co. 114 Ga. 146, 55 L.R.A. 223, 39 S. E. 888.

Assuming, however, that the passenger was entitled to rely upon the misrepresentation by the ticket agent or other employee, it is clear that he has some right or remedy against the carrier in the event of its failure to discharge him at his destination, but there is a conflict of opinion as to the character and extent of that right or remedy. Some of the cases-and considering only those within the scope of the present note, they are perhaps in the majority-take the view that even when the passenger has been misdirected by an employee for whose act the carrier is responsible, nevertheless it is the passenger's duty, at the request of the conductor, to leave the train at the first station before reaching his destination, or to pay his fare to the first station beyond such destination, and that in the event of his refusal to do so, he may be ejected, without unnecessary force, and if so ejected, will have no right of action as for a wrongful ejection, his remedy in such event being confined to an action for breach of the contract, or at least an action based upon the misdi-a rection rather than upon a wrongful ejection. Other cases, however, as subsequently shown, take the view that while the company would have no right to complain of the conductor's act in ejecting the passenger in such circumstances, the ejection is nevertheless wrongful as between the carrier and the passenger, and the latter may complain of it as such. It may be noted here that a similar conflict of authority exists as to the right and duty of a passenger when, through the fault of other employees of the carrier, he is unable to present to the conductor the proper token of his right to transportation. See notes in 43 L.R.A. 706; 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 695; and 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 779.

As to the duty of passenger to pay fare wrongfully demanded, in order to avoid expulsion and lessen damages, see notes to Sprenger v. Tacoma Traction Co. 43 L.R.A. 706, and Light v. Detroit & M. R. Co. 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 282.

So, also, one who, before purchasing a ticket, is told by the ticket agent that a specified train stops at a given place, and is given a time-table showing that such train is scheduled to stop, has by the contract right to have the train stop at such place, and his ejection at the last preceding station is wrongful. McDonald v. Central R Co. 72 N. J. L. 280, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 505, 111 Am. St. Rep. 672, 62 Atl. 405, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 378.

And if a passenger is informed by a ticket agent at the time he purchases his ticket that he will reach his destination that night, and he boards the only train which passes his destination that night, is rightfully on board that train as a passenger for his destination, and his ejection before reaching his destination, upon refusal to pay fare to the first stop beyond, is unlawful, the rule of the company not to stop that particular train at his destination, whether reasonable or not, being subordinate to the rights of the passenger on board under a contract made under circumstances implying that the train would stop there. Richardson & Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 71 S. C. 444, 51 S. E. 261.

The case of a passenger on a wrong train And in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Scott, through misdirection by an employee for 141 Ky. 538, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 206, 133 S. W. whose act the carrier is responsible may per- 800, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 547, it was held that haps be distinguished so far as the question if a ticket agent agreed with an excursion under discussion is concerned, from the case party that a through train would make an of a passenger who, through the fault of an unscheduled stop, and in reliance on such employee of the carrier, has not the proper agreement the party boarded such train exticket or token of the right to transporta-pecting that it would stop at such station, tion. In the former case, compliance with the passenger's demand that he be discharged at his destination would necessitate an interruption of the regular train schedule and involve perhaps risks of accident or delay that the carrier ought not to assume; whereas in the latter case, compliance with the passenger's demand would at most merely involve the risk of a loss of fare in the event that the passenger's claim is false or mistaken.

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they are entitled to compensatory damages at least for wrongful ejection where the conductor refused to stop the train at their destination, and required them to leave at the first regular stop preceding.

In Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 55 Ohio St. 370, 60 Am. St. Rep. 706, 45 Atl. 712, in denying the contention of the railroad company that the action should be for breach of contract, the court said: "There are some cases which seem to

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