immediate objects of his bounty, not the ulterior remaindermen. The remainder was given in each instance not to the issue of each life beneficiary, but to all his surviving grandchildren at the termination of each trust.

The general rule is that the word "children" does not include grandchildren or remote descendants unless there is something in the will to show that the word was used in the broader sense. Matter of Phipard, 182 App. Div. 357; affd., 223 N. Y. 676. There is no indication in the language of testator's will of an intention to extend the word "grandchildren" used by him to his great-grandchildren or more remote descendants. A stirpital distribution is forbidden by the testator. As stated by Judge Cardozo in Matter of Buechner, supra, 443: " This is no case again for subtle distinctions between directions to pay or distribute and words of present gift. * Such tests

may help to ascertain the membership of a class not otherwise defined. There is no need to resort to them when the testator has defined the membership himself.

We need no canon of construction to justify that holding except, indeed, the primary one, to which all others are subordinate, that the intention of the testator is to be sought in all his words, and, when ascertained, is to prevail."

Decreed accordingly.

Matter of the Estate of MARY M. GRINNELL, Deceased. (Surrogate's Court, New York County, January, 1921.)

Executors and administrators · · accounting — specific legacy when legatee entitled to legacy with accrued income from the time the will takes effect.

PROCEEDING upon the accounting of an executor.

Stetson, Jennings & Russell, for executor.

James S. Darcy, for William and Harold Landon.

John J. O'Connell, special guardian.

FOLEY, S. William G. Landon and Harold M. Landon are entitled to a one-fourth part of the cash. and securities mentioned in the will on deposit in the Guaranty Trust Company with the accrued income thereon. The legacy to them was specific. Crawford v. McCarthy, 159 N. Y. 514; Matter of Matthews, 122 App. Div. 605. The death of one of the life tenants before the testator had no effect on the estate in remainder except to entitle the remaindermen to actual possession of the property as soon as the will took effect. Campbell v. Rawdon, 18 N. Y. 412, 421; Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Thompson, 87 Misc. Rep. 31. Moreover, regardless of the nature of the legacy, the plain language of the will requires an equal division of income and principal in four shares. The rule, therefore, that general legacies bear interest from a date one year after the granting of letters has no application to. this estate. Matter of Stanfield, 135 N. Y. 292, 294; Matter of Parkin, 190 App. Div. 875, 877. Artificial and technical rules cannot annul the clearly expressed intention of the testatrix. In paragraph 4 of her will she provided that upon the death of the mother of the Landon children it was her intention that "equality should be established between my four children mentioned in this will." Although in her codicil she subsequently revoked the provision for an increased share of the income to Mrs. Landon, this declaration of equality survived and was reiterated in the codicil in her declaration that "it is my intention that all cash and securities mentioned in my will as being on deposit at the Morton Trust Company (the predecessor of the Guaranty Trust Company) shall be divided equally among my children." Mr.

Surrogate Fowler, in his decision construing the will, has given effect to this declaration of equality. The proposed distribution of income set forth in the account creates inequality and is neither fair nor just. The amount of income due the Landon children will be the proportionate share of the total income earned on the entire fund, which has been averaged at five and eight one-hundredths per cent.

Decreed accordingly.

Matter of the Estate of JAMES B. KISSAM, Deceased.

(Surrogate's Court, New York County, January, 1921.)

Wills construction of when remainder must be construed as a contingent gift to a class.

PROCEEDING for the construction of a will.

Phillips & Avery (S. W. Linington, of counsel), for executors and Anne K. Hays.

Stark B. Ferriss, for John C. Knox as executor, etc., and for Cornelia B. Kissam individually and as executrix.

George O. Redington (George O. Redington and Guy Hughes Riegel, of counsel), for Coulthard Kissam et al.

Robert H. Hibbard, for Ellen Mayne Hays.

McLean & Hayward (Edward A. Freshman, of counsel), for Mary C. Holly.

Valentine & Chichester (Edwin F. Valentine, of counsel), for Tate & Hays, as assignees.

FOLEY, S. On this accounting a question of construction of the will arises. The testator died April

26, 1885, and his will was proved in this court May 22, 1885. Separate trust funds were created for the benefit of the testator's six children. The trust fund created for the testator's daughter, Lucy E. Reynolds, by paragraphs 7 and 10 of the will, is the only one involved in this proceeding. By the first part of paragraph 7 the testator created a life estate for the benefit of his daughter Lucy in a one-sixth part of all the residue and remainder of his estate, with the net income to her during her life. The will then provides: "Upon the death of both my said daughter and her said husband I give, devise and bequeath the said one equal sixth part of the said rest, residue and remainder of my estate, with all accumulations and income, interest and profits thereon, to her children living at the time of the death of my said daughter and her said husband, and to the issue of any deceased child of hers, in equal parts, said issue to take the part to which their parent would have been entitled if living." The 10th paragraph of the will provides as follows: "In case any child of my said daughter, Lucy Ella Reynolds, shall die before attaining the age of twenty-one years leaving issue I give the share of my estate to which such child would have been. entitled under this will, if living to attain the age of twenty-one years, to such issue in equal parts, and in case any child of my said daughter, Lucy Ella Reynolds, shall die before attaining the age of twentyone years, without leaving issue, I give the share of my estate to which such child would have been entitled under this will, if living to attain the age of twentyone years, to the surviving brothers and sisters (if any) of the one so dying, in equal parts. And in case there shall be no surviving brothers and sisters, then I give the same to my children and the issue of any deceased child of mine in equal parts, the issue of any deceased child of mine to take the share to which his or her parent would have been entitled if living."

David I. Reynolds, the husband of Lucy E. Reynolds, died March, 1916, before the life tenant, and the provisions of the will in his favor may therefore be disregarded. Lucy E. Reynolds, the life tenant, died January 22, 1920, so that this trust has terminated, and the remainder is now to be distributed. Lucy E. Reynolds had one child, a son, Hoffman Kissam Reynolds. He predeceased her, having died at the age of twenty-nine, intestate, unmarried and without issue. Upon the death of the life tenant there were surviving five groups of grandchildren, the issue of her deceased brothers and sisters. Three different interpretations are claimed:

1. That the gift of the remainder to Hoffman Kissam Reynolds vested in him in his lifetime and passed to his next of kin.

2. That the testator failed to provide for the present situation, and thereby died intestate as to this remainder by reason of the fact that the life tenant died without issue, or that Hoffman Kissam Reynolds died without issue after he became twenty-one years of age. Under this theory the reversion vested in testator's next of kin.

3. The remainder passed per stirpes under paragraph 10 to the grandchildren of the testator living at the death of Lucy E. Reynolds, since she died without issue.

The first construction cannot be adopted. The gift of the remainder is to the children of the life tenant or the issue of any deceased child" living at the time of the death of my said daughter." It is, therefore, clearly a gift to a class, with a direction for the distribution to the members surviving Mrs. Reynolds. Matter of Kimberly, 150 N. Y. 90; Matter of King, 200 id. 189. The remainder interests were, therefore, contingent and not vested. Matter of Buechner, 226 N. Y. 440; Schwartz v. Rehfuss, 129 App. Div. 630; affd., 198 N. Y. 585; Matter of Baer, 147 id. 348;