No. 479-VOL. X. MARCH 14, 1846. Price 1s., with Supplement, 28. The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity: House of Lords {E. T. Ho, B, Esq. of the Inner Vice-Chancellor Wigram's [F.In, Barrister at LawLincoln's Privy Council ..... .......... Temple, Barrister TENISON EDWARDS, Esq. of the LONDON, MARCH 14, 1846. THE result of some late proceedings at law, has fully satisfied the public, and those unfortunate grown-up children who have for the last year been playing at railway companies, that the creditors of companies that have proceeded just far enough to contract debts for preliminary expenses, and have then sunk into annihilation, may fix upon and carry off their man out of a set of provisional committee-men or preliminary directors, just as a tiger is said to spring from the jungle into the midst of a circle, and to mark and carry off his man; and may obtain payment from their victim alone, if he has had the incaution to hold himself out at all as an active member of the intended company; leaving him to obtain contribution from his fellow committeemen as best he may. Court ...... Court of Queen's Bench G. J. P. SMITH, Esq. of the Inner Inn, Barrister at Law. Gray's D. POWER, Esq. of Lincoln's W. M. BEST, Esq. of Gray's Inn, [J. P.DEANE, D.C.L. of Doctors' { W. W. COOPER, Esq. of the Inner debts in full, and in the means of giving relief where execution may have been had in respect of a debt due from any such company against one or a very few members of such company, and also in the means of adjusting the rights of the members of any such company amongst themselves, and, finally, winding up the affairs of such company, it is enacted, "that it shall be lawful for the Lord Chancellor, with the advice and consent of the Master of the Rolls and the Vice-Chancellors for the time being, or any of them, from time to time, and as often as circumstances shall require, to make and prescribe such rules and Orders touching and concerning the form and mode of proceeding to be had and taken in the Court of Chancery for settling and enforcing the contribution to be paid by any member or members for the time being of any such company, or any former member or members thereof, or any real or To talk of any hope of a person so dealt with prac- personal representative, or other persons liable in that tically obtaining contribution at law would be, of behalf, and the practice to be observed by such court course, out of the question; and those among our in or relating to such proceeding, or any matters inciprofessional readers who have attended to equity prac- dent thereto, and the form and mode of proceeding to tice are well aware, that the difficulties besetting any be had and taken before any one of the Masters of the proceeding in equity for that purpose, under the pre- said court, primarily or by reference from the said sent rules of procedure, even modified and moulded court, in any measure for or relating to contribution, as as they have been to the exigences of the times by shall from time to time seem necessary and proper for some late decisions, are nearly insurmountable. So the advancement of justice in such cases, and for adthat, in most cases, a person placed in the supposed po-justing and determining the rights and equities of the sition, against whom a debt due from the deceased company is recovered, has, practically, no remedy. It is singular, that, under these circumstances, it has been so little noticed by the Profession, that the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 111, s. 22, appears to give to the Lord Chancellor and the other equity judges, ample powers to make General Orders for meeting the very case under consideration. By that section, reciting that the law is defective in the means of making the members of joint-stock companies contributaries for paying their VOL. X. I parties concerned, and for suing for and getting in the assets and for ascertaining and discharging the liabilities of such companies, and requiring the creditors. thereof to claim their debts; and, finally, winding up the affairs thereof with as little delay, expense, and uncertainty as possible: Provided always, that such rules and Orders shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within one month from the making thereof, if Parliament be then sitting, or, if Parliament be not then sitting, within one month from the com→ COPARCENER. mencement of the then next session of Parliament, ON THE CURTESY OF THE HUSBAND OF A and every rule and Order so made shall be binding and obligatory, and be of like force and effect as if the provisions contained therein had been expressly enacted by Parliament." Some doubt may exist whether the act gives power to make such General Orders in respect of that incomplete species of partnership, composed of persons who meet together as provisional committee-men, and allottees of scrip, and undertake to contribute capital by subscription, for the purpose of doing those things that are necessary to form a complete partnership. We have, in a'former paper in this journal, (Vol. 9, p. 489), laboured to prove that such an association, though not a partnership so as to constitute persons members of it ipso facto partners in relation to third persons, is yet a limited partnership of the associated inter se. But, supposing that even, for the purpose of a limited partnership inter se, such persons are partners, it would not follow that they are a "joint-stock company," which is the term used by the section above cited of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 111. Assuming, however, that such associations are intended by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 111, s. 22, that section seems to afford to the Lord Chancellor and the other judges of the courts of equity complete means of meeting the difficulty. Of course it cannot be ex'pected or desired that any General Orders should be framed, which should have the effect of diminishing the right of a creditor to a full remedy. Persons dealing with embryo companies, almost invariably do so on the credit of some particular persons whom they find acting or holding themselves out as members; and it would be grossly unjust to deprive them of their right to recover against such persons; but it may admit of doubt whether there would be any hardship upon persons dealing as creditors, with a body of provisional committee-men on behalf of a numerous body of subscribers, if they were placed by the law in the position of being subjected to the more dilatory process of recovering in equity; not being deprived of their right to recover absolutely against any particular selected members of the company, if the others do not contribute enough; but being compelled in the first instance to seek a remedy against all the members of the company rateably, and, failing in that only, to be entitled to recover the balance against the particular persons selected as principal defendants. This question, however, need not be discussed, as the act gives no power to the court to take away, by General Orders, the right of a creditor to proceed at law; but only to give to the selected debtor, after execution shall have been had against him, the means, which at present he practically has not, of making those contribute to repay him, who are justly bound to do so. It would be a great boon to the commercial classes, if the learned persons to whom the Legislature has entrusted the power of making General Orders under the 17 & 8 Vict. c. 111, s. 22, should be induced to think it expedient to act upon even the limited powers given to them, and to frame a set of General Orders, with a view to enable the members of such joint-stock companies as - we have alluded to, against whom judgment and execution have been obtained, effectively to proceed in equity against their co-members for contribution. We trust that some influential members of the Bar will take an opportunity of bringing under the notice of the Lord Chancellor, the expediency of directing his attention to the exercise of the powers vested in him by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 111. And, in the meantime, in the hope of rousing the attention of the Profession, and of those interested in dying or dead railway companies, to this subject, we shall endeavour in our next Number to collect some suggestions upon the principles which, we apprehend, would be found applicable in respect of the relief required. The consideration of the subject of descent amongst coparceners naturally leads to the question of curtesy. On the decease of a coparcener of an estate in fee simple, is her husband, having had issue by her, entitled, according to the present law, to an estate for life, by the curtesy of England, in the whole or in any part of her share? 66 66 In order to answer this question satisfactorily, it will be necessary, first, to examine into the principles of the ancient law, and then to apply those principles, when ascertained, to the law as at present existing. Unfortunately the authorities whence the principles of the old law ought to be derived do not appear to be quite consistent with one another; and the consequence is, that some uncertainty seems unavoidably to hang over the question above propounded. Let us, however, weigh carefully the opposing authorities, and endeavour to ascertain on which side the scale preponderates. Littleton, "not the name of the author only, but of the law itself," thus defines curtesy: "Tenant by the curtesie of England is where a man taketh a wife seised in fee simple or in fee tail general, or seised as heir in tail especial, and hath issue by the same wife, male or female, born alive, albeit the issue after dieth or liveth, yet, if the wife dies, the husband shall hold the land during his life by the law of England. And he is called tenant by the curtesie of England, because this is used in no other realme, but in England only." (Litt., s. 35). And, in a subsequent section, he adds, "Memorandum, that, in every case where a man taketh a wife seised of such an estate of tenements, &c., as the issue which he hath by his wife may, by possibility, inherit the same tenements of such an estate as the wife hath, as heir to the wife; in this case, after the decease of the wife, he shall have the same tenements by the curtesie of England, but otherwise not." (Litt., s. 52). Memorandum," says Lord Coke, in his Commentary, (Co. Litt. 40. a.)," this word doth ever betoken some excellent point of learning." Again, “ As heir to the wife. This doth imply a secret of law, for, except the wife be actually seised, the heir shall not (as hath been said) make himself heir to the wife; and this is the reason, that a man shall not be tenant by the cur tesie of a seisin in law." Here, we find it asserted by Littleton, that the husband shall not be tenant by the curtesy, unless he has had issue by his wife capable of inheriting the land as her heir; and this is explained by Lord Coke to be, such issue as would have traced their descent from the wife, as the stock of descent, according to the maxim, “Seisina facit stipitem." Unless an actual seisin had been obtained by the wife, she could not have been the stock of descent; for the descent of a fee simple was traced from the person actually seised; "and this is the reason," says Lord Coke, "that a man shall not be tenant by the curtesy of a mere seisin in law." The same rule, with the same reason for it, will also be found in Paine's case, (8 Rep. 36a), where it is said, " And when Littleton saith, as heir to the wife, these words are very material; for that is the true reason that a man shall not be tenant by the cur tesy of a seisin in law, for, in such case, the issue ought to make himself heir to him who was last actually seised." The same doctrine again appears in Blackstone, (2 Black. Comm. 128): " And this seems to be the principal reason why the husband cannot be tenant by the curtesy of any lands of which the wife was not actually seised; because, in order to entitle himself to such estate, he must have begotten issue that may be heir to the wife; but no one, by the standing rule of law, can be heir to the ancestor of any land, whereof the ancestor was not actually seised; and, therefore, as the husband hath never begotten any issue that can be heir last to those lands, he shall not be tenant of them by the curtesy. And hence," continues Blackstone, in his usual laudatory strain, "we may observe, with how much nicety and consideration the old rules of law were framed, and how closely they are connected and interwoven together, supporting, illustrating, and demonstrating one another." Here we have, indeed, a formidable array of authorities, all to the point, that, in order to entitle the husband to his curtesy, his wife must have been the stock from whom descent should have been traced to her issue; for the principal and true reason that there could not be any curtesy of a seisin in law is stated to be, that the issue could not, in such a case, make himself heir to the wife, because his descent was then required to be traced from the person last actually seised. Let us, then, endeavour to apply this principle to the present law. The act for the amendment of the law of inheritance (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106) enacts, (sect. 2), that, in every case, descent shall be traced from the purchaser. On the decease of a coparcener, the descent of her share is, therefore, to be now traced, not from herself, but from her ancestor, the purchaser, from whom she inherited. With respect to the persons to become entitled, as heir to the purchaser on this descent, the question arises, which has already been discussed, (ante, p. 71), whether the surviving sister equally with the issue of the deceased, or whether such issue solely, are now entitled to inherit? And the conclusion at which we arrived was, that the issue solely succeeded to their mother's share. But, whether this be so, or not, nothing is clearer than that, on the decease of a coparcener, the persons who next inherit take as heir to the purchaser, and not to the coparcener; for, from the purchaser alone can descent be now traced; and the mere circumstance of having obtained an actual seisin does not now make the parcener the stock of descent. How, then, can her husband be entitled to hold her share as tenant by the curtesy? If tenancy by the curtesy was allowed of those lands only of which the wife had obtained actual seisin, because it was a necessary condition of curtesy that the wife should be the stock of descent, and because an actual seisin alone made the wife the stock of descent, how can the husband obtain his curtesy in any case where the stock of descent is confessedly not the wife, but the wife's ancestor? Amongst all the recent alterations of the law, the doctrine of curtesy has been left untouched; there seems, therefore, to be no means of determining any question respecting it, but by applying the old principles to the new enactments, by which, indirectly, it may be affected. So far, then, as at present appears, it seems a fair and proper deduction from the authorities, that, whenever a woman has become entitled to lands by descent, her husband cannot claim his curtesy, because the descent of such lands, on her decease, is not to be traced from her. But, by carrying our investigations a little further, we may be disposed to doubt, if not to deny, that such is the law; not that the conclusion drawn is unwarranted by the authorities, but the authorities themselves may, perhaps, be found to be erroneous. Let us now compare the law of curtesy of an estate tail with the law of curtesy of an estate in fee simple. In the section of Littleton which we have already quoted, (sect. 35), it is laid down, that, if a man taketh a wife seised as heir in tail especial, and hath issue by her, born alive, he shall, on her decease, be tenant by the curtesy. And on this Lord Coke makes, the following commentary:-"And here Littleton intendeth a seisin in deed, if it may be attained unto. As if a man dieth seised of lands in fee simple or fee tail general, and these lands descend to his daughter, and she taketh a husband and hath issue, and dyeth before any entry, the husband shall not be tenant by the curtesy, and yet, in this case, she had a seisin in law; but, if she or her husband had, during her life, entered, he should have been tenant by the curtesy." (Co. Litt. 29. a.) Now, it is well known that the descent of an estate tail is always traced from the purchaser or original donee in tail. The actual seisin which might be obtained by the heir to an estate tail never made him the stock of descent. The maxim was, "Possessio fratris de feudo simplici facit sororem esse hæredem." Where, therefore, a coparcener who had been seised in tail died, leaving issue, such issue made themselves heir not to her, but to her ancestor, the purchaser or donee; and whether the mother did or did not obtain actual seisin was, in this respect, totally immaterial. When actual seisin was obtained, the issue still made themselves heir to the purchaser only, and yet the husband was entitled to his curtesy. When actual seisin was not obtained, the issue were heirs to the purchaser as before; but the husband lost his curtesy. In the case of an estate tail, therefore, it is quite clear that the question of curtesy or no curtesy depended entirely on the husband's obtaining for his wife an actual seisin, and had nothing to do with the circumstance of the wife's being, or not being, the stock of descent. The reason, therefore, before mentioned, given by Lord Coke and repeated by Blackstone, cannot apply to an estate tail. An actual seisin could not have been required in order to make the wife the stock of descent, because the descent could not, under any circumstances, be traced from her, but must have been traced from the original donee to the heir of his body per formam doni. Again, if we look to the law respecting curtesy in incorporeal hereditaments, we shall find that the reason above given is inapplicable; for the husband, on having issue born, was entitled to his curtesy out of an advowson and a rent, although no actual seisin had been obtained, in the wife's lifetime, by receipt of the rent or presentation to the advowson, (Watk. Descents, 39, 47, 4th ed.) And yet, in order to make the wife the stock of descent as to such hereditaments, it was necessary that an actual seisin should be obtained by her. (Watk. Descents, 60, 67, 4th ed.) The husband, therefore, was entitled to his curtesy where the descent to the issue was traced from the ancestor of his wife, as well as where traced from the wife herself. In this case, also, the right to curtesy was, accordingly, independent of the wife's being, or not being, the stock from which the descent was to be traced. We are driven, therefore, to search for another and more satisfactory reason why an actual seisin should have been required to be obtained by the wife, in order to entitle her husband to his curtesy out of her lands; and such a reason is furnished by Lord Coke himself, and also by Blackstone. Lord Coke says, (Co. Litt. 31. a.), "Where lands or tenements descend to the husband, before entry he hath but a seisin in law, and yet the wife shall be endowed, albeit it be not reduced to an actual possession, for it lieth not in the power of the wife to bring it to an actual seisin, as the husband may do of his wife's land, when he is to be tenant by curtesy, which is worthy the observation." It would seem from this, therefore, that the reason why an actual seisin was required to entitle the husband to his curtesy was, that his wife might not suffer by his neglect to take possession of her lands; and, in order to induce him to do so, the law allowed him curtesy of all lands of which an actual seisin had been obtained, but refused him his curtesy out of such lands as he had taken no pains to obtain possession of. This reason also is adopted by Blackstone from Coke: "A seisin in law of the husband will be as effectual as a seisin in deed, in order to render the wife dowable; for it is not in the wife's power to bring the husband's title to an actual seisin, as it is in the husband's power to do with regard to the wife's lands: which is one reason why he shall not be ter nant by the curtesy, but of such lands whereof the wife, or taketh a husband seised of such an estate in tenements, he himself in her right, was actually seised in deed." (2 &c., so as, by possibility, it may happen that the wife Black. Com. 131). The more we investigate the rules may have issue by her husband, and that the same and principles of the ancient law, the greater will ap- issue may, by possibility, inherit the same tenements pear the probability that this reason was indeed the of such an estate as the husband hath, as heir to the hustrue one. In the troublous times of old, an actual band, of such tenements she shall have her dower, and seisin was not always easily acquired. The doctrine otherwise not." (Litt., s. 53). Now, nothing is clearer of continual claim shews that peril was not unfre- than that a wife was entitled to dower out of lands of quently incurred in entering on lands for the sake which her husband had only a seisin in law; (Watk. of asserting a title; for, in order to obtain an actual Descents, 32, 42, 4th ed.); and nothing, also, is clearer seisin, any person entitled, if unable to approach the than that a seisin in law only was insufficient to make premises, was bound to come as near as he dare. (Litt., the husband the stock of descent; for, for this purpose, Ss. 419, 421). And "it is to be observed," says Lord an actual seisin was requisite, according to the rule, Coke, "that every doubt or fear is not sufficient, for it "Seisina facit stipitem." In this case, therefore, it is must concern the safety of the person of a man, and obvious that Littleton could not mean to say that the not his houses or goods; for if he fear the burning of his husband must have been made the stock of descent, by houses, or the taking away or spoiling of his goods, this virtue of having obtained an actual seisin; for that is not sufficient." (Co. Litt. 253. b.) That actual seisin would have been to contradict the plainest rules of law. should be obtained was obviously most desirable, and What, then, was his meaning? The subsequent part of nothing could be more natural or reasonable than that the same section affords an explanation: "For, if tethe husband should have no curtesy where he had failed nements be given to a man and to the heirs which he to obtain it. Perkins seems to think that this was the shall beget of the body of his wife, in this case the wife reason of the rule; for in his Profitable Book he an- hath nothing in the tenements, and the husband hath swers an objection to it, founded on an extreme case. an estate tail as donee in special tail. Yet, if the hus"But if possession in law of lands or tenements in fee band die without issue, the same wife shall be endowed descend unto a married woman, which lands are in the of the same tenements, because the issue which she, by county of York, and the husband and his wife are possibility, might have had by the same husband, might dwelling in the county of Essex, and the wife dieth have inherited the same tenements. But, if the wife within one day after the descent, so as the husband dieth living her husband, and after the husband takes could not enter during the coverture, for the shortness another wife and dieth, his second wife shall not be of the time, yet he shall not be tenant by the curtesy, endowed in this case, for the reason aforesaid." This &c.; and yet, according to common pretence, there is example shews what was Littleton's true meaning. He no default in the husband. But it may be said that was not thinking, either in this section or in the one the husband of the woman, before the death of the an- next before it, of the husband or wife being the stock cestor of the woman, might have spoken unto a man of descent, instead of some earlier ancestor. He was dwelling near unto the place where the lands lay, to laying down a general rule, applicable to dower as enter for the woman, as in her right, immediately after well as to curtesy; namely, that, if the issue that the death of her ancestor," &c. (Perk. 470). This might have been born in the one case, or that were born reason for the rule is also quite consistent with the cir- in the other, of the surviving parent, could not, by cumstance that the husband was entitled to his curtesy possibility, inherit the estate of their deceased parent, out of incorporeal hereditaments, notwithstanding his by right of representation of such parent, then the surfailure to obtain an actual seisin. For if the advowson viving parent was not entitled to dower in the one case, were not void, or the rent did not become payable or to curtesy in the other. It is plain, that, in the during the wife's life, it was obviously impossible for example just adduced, the issue of the husband by his the husband to present to the one or receive the other; second marriage could not possibly inherit his estate, and it would have been unreasonable that he should which was given to him and the heirs of his body by suffer for not doing an impossibility, the maxim being, his first wife: the second wife, therefore, was excluded "Impotentia excusat legem." This is the reason, in- from dower out of this estate. And, in the parallel case deed, usually given to explain this circumstance; and it of a gift to a woman and the heirs of her body by her will be found both in Lord Coke (Co. Litt. 29. a.) and first husband, it is indisputable, that, for a precisely siBlackstone, (2 Black. Com. 127). This reason, how-milar reason, her second husband could not claim his ever, is plainly at variance with that mentioned in the former part of this paper, and adduced by them to explain the necessity of an actual seisin, in order to entitle the husband to his curtesy out of lands in fee simple. There still remains, however, the section of Littleton to which we have before referred, (sect. 52), as an apparent authority on the other side. Littleton expressly says, that when the issue may, by possibility, inherit of such an estate as the wife hath, as heir to the wife, the husband shall have his curtesy, but otherwise not; and we have seen that, according to Lord Coke's interpretation, to inherit as heir to the wife, means, here, to inherit from the wife as the stock of descent. But the legitimate mode of interpreting an author certainly is to attend to the context, and to notice in what sense he himself uses the phrase in question on other occasions. If now we turn to the very next section of Littleton, we shall find the very same phrase made use of in a manner which clearly shews that Littleton did not mean, by inheriting as heir to a person, inheriting from that person as the stock of descent. For, after having thus laid down the law as to curtesy, Littleton continues: "And, also, in every case where a woman curtesy on having issue by her; for such issue could not possibly inherit their mother's estate. All that Littleton then intended to state with respect to curtesy was the rule laid down by the Statute de Donis, (13 Edw. 1, c. 1), which provides, that, where any person gives lands to a man and his wife and the heirs of their bodies, or where any person gives lands in frankmarriage, the second husband of any such woman shall not have anything in the land so given, after the death of his wife, by the law of England, nor shall the issue of the second husband and wife succeed in the inheritance. (See Bac. Abr., tit. "Curtesy of England," (C.), 1). When the two sections of Littleton are read consecutively, without the introduction of Lord Coke's Commentary, their meaning is apparent; and the intervening commentary not only puts the reader on the wrong clue, but hinders his recovery of the right one, by removing to a distance the explanatory context. If our construction of Littleton be the true one, it throws some light on the question discussed in our last paper, on the course of descent amongst coparceners. We there endeavoured to shew that the issue of a coparcener always stood in the place of their parent, by right of representation, even where descent was traced from some more remote ancestor as the stock. Littleton, with this view of the subject in his mind, and never suspecting that any other could be entertained, might well speak generally of issue inheriting as heir to their parent, even though the share of the parent might have descended to the issue as heir to some more remote ancestor. The authorities adduced in our former paper thus tend further to explain the language of Littleton; whilst the language of Littleton, as above explained, illustrates and confirms the authorities previously adduced. be Having, at length, arrived at the true principles of the old law, the application of them to the state of circumstances produced by the new law of inheritance will very easy. A coparcener dies leaving a husband who has had issue by her, and leaving one or more sisters surviving her. The descent of her share is now traced from their common parent, the purchaser. But, in tracing this descent, we have seen, in our former paper, that the issue of the deceased coparcener would inherit her entire share by representation of her. And the condition which will entitle her husband to curtesy out of her share appears, by our present paper, to be, that his issue might possibly inherit the estate by right of representation of their deceased mother. This condition, therefore, is obviously fulfilled, and our conclusion consequently is, that the husband of a deceased coparcener who has had issue by her is entitled to curtesy out of the whole of her share. But, in order to arrive at this conclusion, it seems that we must admit, first, that Lord Coke has endeavoured to support the law by one reason too many; and, secondly, that one laudatory flourish of Blackstone has been made without occasion. J. W. London Gazettes. TUESDAY, MARCH 10. BANKRUPTS. WILLIAM HARDING, Edward's-street, Portman-square, James-street, Manchester-square, Marylebone-lane, and Wigmore-street, Middlesex, turner, and rug, brush, and basket manufacturer, March 20 at 1, and April 21 at halfpast 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Alsager; Sol. Mordaunt, Bolton-st., Piccadilly.-Fiat dated March 4. WILLIAM JAMES HARRIS, High-street, Southwark, Surrey, tailor and woollen draper, dealer and chapman, March 21 at 12, and April 18 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Green; Sol. Wellborne, 31, Tooleystreet.-Fiat dated March 9. WILLIAM FREDERICK BREWSTER, Trumpington, Cambridgeshire, out of business, March 17 at half-past 12, and April 7 at half-past 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Graham; Sol. Wilkins, Furnival's-inn.-Fiat dated March 5. JOHN BLUNDELL, Wigan, Lancashire, pawnbroker, ANTHONY NICHOL, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, ship broker WILLIAM DALE, Liverpool, bricklayer, dealer and chap- MEETINGS. John Jas. Clark, Hounslow and Twickenham-villas, Middlesex, and Durdham-down, Westbury-upon-Trym, Gloucestershire, builder, March 17 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, last ex.-Thos. Howell, Dolly's Chop-house, Queen's Head-passage, Newgate-street, London, hotel keeper, March 20 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, last ex.-Thos. L. Evill and Thos. Dowglass, Vigo-street, Middlesex, cloth manufacturers, March 31 at half-past 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-Dav. Froeschlen and Simon Price, Doverstreet, Piccadilly, Middlesex, tailors, March 31 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.—Thomas Flaherty, Bath, Somersetshire, tailor, April 3 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol, aud. ac.-John Collins, Salford, Lancashire, common brewer, April 1 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Manchester, aud. ac.-Jas. Townsend, Honiton, and Geo. Brooke, Whimple, Devonshire, bankers, April 1 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Exeter, aud. ac.; April 2 at 1, div.-Fred. Lingard, New Elvet, Durham, teacher of music, April 3 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, aud. ac.-Anthony Atkinson and Francis JOSEPH SEWELL, Great Dunmow, Essex, grocer, March Atkinson, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, colour manufacturers, April 18 at half-past 12, and April 23 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, 2 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, London: Off. Ass. Johnson; Sols. Wade & Pennington, aud. ac.; April 3 at 12, div.—John Kent, Stowmarket, SufFrederick's-place, Old Jewry.-Fiat dated March 7. folk, beer brewer, March 20 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, LonSAMUEL PRITCHETT and JOSEPH PECKOVER don, fin. div.-Geo. Graham, Thos. Adams, and Michael B. ORIDGE, Charlbury, Oxfordshire, glove manufacturers, Macfarlane, Cheapside, London, calico printers, March 20 at drapers, grocers, dealers and chapmen, March 20 at 2, and 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London, div.-John Batchelor, April 18 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Walcot, Bath, Somersetshire, butcher, March 31 at 12, District Green; Sol. Patten, Ely-place, Holborn. Fiat dated Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol, div.-Wm. Newton, Bath, March 5. coal merchant, April 2 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, EDWARD MORGAN, Lisson-street, St. Marylebone, Mid-Bristol, div. dlesex, coach builder, dealer and chapman, March 20 at 12, CERTIFICATES. and April 18 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. To be allowed, unless Cause be shewn to the contrary on the Ass. Follett; Sols. Bicknells, Manchester-street, Manchester-square.-Fiat dated March 6. WILLIAM JOHN IDENDEN, Salmon's-lane, Limehouse, Middlesex, tailor, clothier, and general outfitter, March 17 at 1, and April 21 at half-past 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Turquand; Sol. Tayler, Church-street, Spitalfields.-Fiat dated March 7. RICHARD FOULKES, Soughton, Northop, Flintshire, cattle salesman, milkman, cowkeeper, dealer and chapman, March 20 and April 14 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Morgan; Sols. Almond, Liverpool; Bridger & Blake, London-wall, London.-Fiat dated March 4. Day of Meeting. John Warren, George-street, Hanover-square, Middlesex, surgeon, March 31 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London.Edw. Streeter, Bristol, builder, April 3 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol.-Fred. Lingard, New Elvet, Durham, teacher of music, April 3 at half-past 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.-Wm. W. Spence, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, woollen draper, April 2 at 1, District Court of Bankruptcy, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.-John Denbigh, Bradford, Yorkshire, wool merchant, April 2 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds.-John C. Platt, Sheffield and Doncaster, Yorkshire, printer, April 3 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds.-Thos. Carey W. Pierce and Gilson |