stitution as to compel the plaintiff to seek redress for such wrong under and by virtue of its provisions. In addition, it may be said that, by the refusal of the local association to furnish to the plaintiff the papers and documents necessary in order that he might perfect his appeal, he was deprived of an opportunity to determine whether or not such appeal within the organization would be availing, and therefore whether or not it should be taken, and by the action of the local lodge he was deprived of his means of livelihood, by being discharged from his employment as printer, and prevented by it from obtaining other employment of that character. Assuming, as found by the trial court, that the plaintiff was expelled from the defendant's association illegally and without jurisdiction, but that he had the right to appeal to it for redress of such wrong, we think, under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence in this case, it would be unreasonable to hold that it was necessary for the plaintiff to take such appeal, and to obtain in the first instance a determination from such association. The plaintiff was denied access to the papers, records, charges, and evidence upon which he had been expelled from the local union, which were necessary to his appeal. The offense, if any, committed by him, affected the presiding officer and controlling spirit of the appellate court. He had been expelled without a hearing, and thereby his means of earning a living had been taken from him. To prosecute his appeal would have involved the expense of going to a distant city, and, as a prerequisite of taking such appeal, he was required to deposit $50, the amount of the fine imposed upon him by the local union, as found by the trial court, without jurisdiction, and without having given the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard in his defense. Under these circumstances, we think it was unreasonable to require the plaintiff to prosecute his appeal within the organization, as a prerequisite of bringing the action at bar, and that his failure to do so does not prevent his resort to this court. The con clusion is reached that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial ordered. Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur. MEEKER v. REQUA. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department. May 6, 1904.) 1. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-EVIDENCE-EFFECT. Where supplementary proceedings revealed that the judgment debtor had no property subject to execution, but the creditor agreed to accept in satisfaction of the judgment a sum less than the judgment, to be paid by the debtor in monthly installments out of a salary exempt from execution, and such sum was paid and a satisfaction piece delivered to the debtor, the creditor could not thereafter recover the balance of the judg ment. Appeal from Trial Term, New York County. Action by Lydia F. Meeker, as executrix of the estate of Alice F. Ketcham, deceased, against Leonard F. Requa. From a judgment in favor of defendant, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. and 121 New York State Reporter Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and HATCH, MCLAUGHLIN, O'BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ. James A. Allen, for appellant. P. Van Alstine, for respondent. MCLAUGHLIN, J. This action was brought upon a judgment. The answer denied the material allegations of the complaint, except as to the recovery of the judgment, and as to that alleged an accord and satisfaction. Upon the trial it appeared that the plaintiff, on the 11th of November, 1885, through her attorney, one Charles C. Leeds, recovered a judgment in the Supreme Court of this state, against the defendant in this action and one Caywood, for $3,321.67; that in October, 1891, proceedings supplementary to execution were instituted by Leeds, acting for the plaintiff, in which the defendant in this action was examined as to his property. The examination failed to disclose any property which could be applied toward the payment of the judgment, and, after the proceedings had been adjourned from time to time, an agreement was entered into between this defendant and Leeds, by the terms of which the defendant was to pay, out of the salary he was then receiving (which was exempt from execution), the sum of $400 in satisfaction of the judgment-the same to be paid in equal monthly payments of $33.33 each. The settlement and compromise as set out in the agreement was approved by an order of the Surrogate's Court of the county of New York, upon a petition duly made therefor by the plaintiff. Payments were thereafter made by the defendant, in accordance with the agreement, until the sum of $400 had been fully paid, and thereupon the plaintiff satisfied the judgment by delivering to the defendant a satisfaction piece. It is true the plaintiff denied any knowledge of the agreement between Leeds and the defendant; denied that her signatures to the complaint in the original action, to the petition upon which the order of the Surrogate's Court was based, and to the satisfaction piece were genuine; and also denied in the first instance that her signature to the complaint in the present action was genuine, but subsequently admitted that the same was her genuine signature. Leeds, her former attorney, testified that she authorized the settlement with the defendant, and that her signature to the petition to the Surrogate's Court for leave to settle on the terms stated in the agreement, as well as her signature to the satisfaction piece, was genuine. The trial court sent the case to the jury, with instructions if they found her signature on the petition and satisfaction piece were genuine, then their verdict would be for the defendant. The jury found for the defendant, and from the judgment entered on such verdict the plaintiff has appealed. The finding of the jury establishes that Leeds was authorized to settle with the defendant upon the terms stated in the agreement, and that the plaintiff's signature to the petition for leave to settle upon such terms, as well as her signature to the satisfaction piece, was genuine. We have, therefore, a case in which a judgment creditor agrees to settle with the debtor, providing a specified sum be paid-which the debtor thereafter pays-and the creditor satisfies the judgment in accordance with the agreement. Under such facts I think it must be held that the creditor is precluded from thereafter maintaining an action upon the judgment, and this irrespective of the amount paid. But the appellant insists that the payment of $400, being for a less amount than the judgment sued on, was not a satisfaction of it; that, the judgment being a liquidated claim, nothing less than its full payment could legally amount to its satisfaction; and in this connection invokes the rule, which is undoubtedly well settled, that the payment of a sum less than the amount of a liquidated debt, under an agreement of the creditor to accept the same in satisfaction of the debt, forms no bar to a recovery of the balance. This rule, however, has no application in the case of a judgment where the agreement has been acted upon and the judgment satisfied, and especially so when an additional benefit has been conferred upon the creditor. Thus, in Jaffrey v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 351, 11 L. R. A. 710, where one indebted upon an open account gave to his creditor his promissory notes for one-half of the debt, secured by a chattel mortgage, under an agreement with the creditor that he would accept the same in full satisfaction and discharge of the debt, and the debtor paid the notes. as they became due, and the creditor satisfied the mortgage, it was held that the new agreement was valid-supported by a sufficient consideration and an action could not, the agreement having been satisfied, be maintained to recover the balance of the debt. Here, an additional benefit was conferred upon the plaintiff by the agreement. The examination in the proceedings supplementary to execution had failed to disclose any property which could be reached, and it was then that the agreement was made by which, for a satisfaction of the judgment, the defendant was to pay the $400 at stated times out of his salary, which was exempt from execution. Defendant kept his part of the agreement. The plaintiff kept hers by satisfying the judgment, and the execution and delivery of the satisfaction piece precluded her from thereafter maintaining any claim upon the judgment. I know of no rule of law which prevents a judgment creditor from satisfying a judgment for less than the amount of it, and if he does he is just as effectually prevented from maintaining an action upon the judgment as he would be had the full amount been paid. Whether this be true or not, there certainly can be no question, when an additional benefit is conferred, as here, that an action cannot be maintained whether the full amount is paid or not. Other questions are raised by the appellant, but they do not seem to be of sufficient importance to require consideration. The judgment and order appealed from, therefore, must be affirmed, with costs. All concur. 87 N.Y.S.-61 and 121 New York State Reporter PEOPLE v. ROOT. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department. May 3, 1904.) 1. PERJURY-INDICTMENT-SUFFICIENCY-CODE. An indictment charging that defendant falsely, "knowingly, and corruptly did declare, testify, and give" certain evidence sufficiently alleges that he knowingly testified falsely, under Code Cr. Proc. § 291, declaring that, in an indictment for perjury, it is sufficient to set forth the substance of the controversy, with proper allegations of the falsity of the matter on which the perjury is assigned. 2. SAME-FALSE TESTIMONY-MATERIALITY. Defendant, in a prosecution for perjury as to three different assignments arising out of his testimony on the trial of a friend of his, charged with rape-defendant being the principal witness in an effort to prove an alibi-was charged with having falsely testified to having made a contract some time previous to the date of the rape for the delivery of certain property, and of its delivery on the date of the rape; also to having made a contract with another person on the date of the rape, and to having met his accused friend at a place 20 miles distant from the place of the crime, and to having been with him there at the time the crime was alleged to have been committed. Held, that each assignment was material; it appearing that, by means of the first two portions of the alleged false testimony, defendant might have established his credibility as to the third. 3. SAME-VERDICT-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY. On a prosecution for perjury, where there were three different assignments of alleged false testimony, and in the first two assignments defendant reiterated the truth of the testimony, and was corroborated by other evidence, which was not successfully controverted by the people, held, that a verdict of guilty, without a finding specifying upon which assignment the conviction was had, was contrary to and against the weight of the evidence. Williams and Stover, JJ., dissenting. Appeal from Trial Term, Cattaraugus County. Ahira I. Root was convicted of perjury. From the judgment, and an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed. * ** The defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Cattaraugus county at the September, 1903, Trial Term of the Supreme Court, held in and for said county, for the crime of perjury, for having, as alleged, at the June, 1903, Trial Term of the Cattaraugus County Court, testified falsely upon the trial of an indictment which charged one Charles S. Boyce with having committed the crime of rape and assault in the second degree upon one Mary Evans at West Salamanca, N. Y., where she and Boyce both resided, between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening of August 7, 1902. The indictment alleged, the defendant "minding and maliciously intending unlawfully and willfully and unjustly to cause the said Charles S. Boyce to be acquitted of said offense, on the trial of said issue before the said court, falsely, wickedly, maliciously, unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, and corruptly did declare. testify, and give evidence, amongst other things, in substance and to the effect following; that is to say." Then follows the evidence alleged to have been given by the defendant upon such trial, and which it is claimed was false. The indictment then charges that each and every part and item of the tes timony so given became and was material to and upon the trial of said issue. to wit, the guilt or innocence of Boyce. The indictment was duly transferred to the County Court, and upon being arraigned the defendant pleaded "Not guilty," and interposed a demurrer to the indictment, challenging its sufficiency upon the following grounds: (1) The facts stated in said indictment do not constitute a crime; (2) that more than one crime is charged in said indictment; (3) it is not alleged in the indictment that he (the defendant) willfully and knowingly testified, declared, deposed, or certified falsely in any material matter in the action mentioned in the indictment which he knew to be false. The County Court overruled the demurrer, to which ruling the defendant excepted. Thereupon the trial proceeded, and resulted in the conviction of the defendant of the crime as charged in the indictment. Argued before MCLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, HISCOCK, and STOVER, JJ. J. N. Congdon, for appellant. George W. Cole, Dist. Atty., for the People. MCLENNAN, P. J. The questions presented by this appeal are: (1) Is the indictment defective in any essential particular? (2) Were the assignments of perjury (three in number) which were submitted to the jury by the learned trial court material, and such as to be made the basis of a conviction of the crime of perjury, even if false, and known to be so by the defendant? (3) Did the evidence justify the conviction of the defendant upon each of such assignments, or was the verdict of guilty contrary to or against the weight of the evidence upon any of them? (4) Did the learned trial court, by its rulings during the progress of the trial, commit error which was prejudicial to the defendant, and such as to require the reversal of the judgment? The learned counsel for the defendant urges that the indictment is defective because, as claimed, it fails to allege that the defendant knew the testimony given by him upon the Boyce trial was false; that the word "knowingly," as used in the indictment, has reference to the words "did testify," and is not an allegation that the defendant knowingly testified falsely, but only charges him with knowing that he was giving testimony under oath upon the trial. We think such is not a fair and reasonable interpretation; that when its many allegations, which are contained in one count, are considered together, the indictment must be held to charge the defendant with having testified to that which he knew to be false. The indictment fully informed the defendant of the precise nature of the crime with which he was charged, of the acts which it was claimed constituted such crime, and the exact manner in which such acts were done or performed; and therefore, even if the indictment was faulty in its grammatical construction, such defect in no manner tended to the prejudice of any "substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits," and therefore should be disregarded. Code Cr. Proc. § 285. We think the indictment is in full. compliance with the requirements of section 291 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore conclude that the demurrer thereto was properly overruled. The learned trial court submitted to the jury three assignments of perjury viz. (1) As to whether or not the defendant testified falsely when he stated on the Boyce trial that on July 31st he contracted to sell at Fairbanks' (who conducted a meat market) some hogs and veal calves, and to deliver them on August 7th, and that on August 7th he delivered eight hogs and some calves at the meat market of Fairbanks, on East Second street, in Jamestown; (2) as to whether or not he testified falsely on the Boyce trial when he stated that he contracted on the 7th day of August some hogs to Peterson, who was also run |