Richardson v. Inhabitants of Town of Danvers (Mass.) Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (N. Y.) Right Saunders v. City of Ft. Madison (Iowa) Municipal Cor- Scondale v. Sweet (Mich.) Sunday Law-Baseball- Snead v. Bonnoil (N. Y.) Arrest upon Suspicion, Ed. 1. Southern Fire Ins. Co. v. Knight (Ga.) Insurance-On Building and Stock- Premium Payable in a Gross Sum-Breach of Condition, R. D. 158. Standard Furniture Co. v. Van Alstine (Wash.) Condi tional Sale-Validity-Immoral Use of Article Sold State v. Bee Pub. Co. (Neb.) Constructive Contempt of State v. Dalton (R. I.) Validity of Statute Against State v. Garborski (Iowa) Validity of Legislative Grant of Special Privileges, Ed. 121. State v. Hill (N, Car ) Validity of City Ordinance Pro- State v. McDaniel (Miss) Principal and Surety-Lia- bility on Official Bond for Acts Done "Colore Offeil," R. D. 102. State v. Mckee (Conn.) Validity of Connecticut Stat- ute Prohibiting the Publication of Criminal News, State v. O'Donnell (Oreg.) Criminal Law-Larceny- State v. Simons (Kan.) Consent by Defendant in Pros- State v. Williams (Kan.) Perjury Before a De Facto State Trust Co. v. Turner (Iowa) Corporation-Liabil Statton v. Stone (Colo.) Bills and Notes-Bona Fide Stewart v. California Improvement Co. (Cal.) Negli. Strait v. State (Miss.) Criminal Law-Principal and Supreme Tent, etc. v. Volkert (Ind.) Beneficial Associa Thompson v. Taylor (N. J.) Conflict of Laws-Cover- Traflet v. Empire Life Ins. Co. (N. J.) Judgment-Res Trevett v. Prison Association (Va.) Charitable Cor- porations Liability for Torts Pollution of Turk v. Carnahan (Ind.) Conditional Sales-Recovery of Price-Election of Remedies, ann. case, 248. Tuscaloosa Ice Mfg. Co. v. Williams (Ala.) Contract- Restraint of Trade, R. D. 380. Ward v. Ward (Ohio) Fraudulent Conveyance in Antic- Warren v. Abbett (N. J.) Statute of Frauds-Agree- West Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Liderman (III.) a Mother in Attempting to Rescue Her Child from Wingert v. Zeigler (Md.) Validity of Instruments Re- quiring Revenue Stamps Which Have Not Been Wood v. Allen (Iowa) Evidence-Usage and Custom- Young Men's Christian Assn. of Omaha v. Douglass No. 1. Liability of Municipal Corporations for Negligence in the Exercise of Private or Mu- nicipal Powers. By Eugene McQuillin, 5. No. 2. Has the Garnishing Creditor a Specific No. 3. The Regulation of Trusts. By Darius Place of Contract. By Frederick H. No. 5. Real Estate Options. By Howard A. No. 6. The Legal Status of Foreign Corpora- tions on Failure to Comply with Restrictive Statutes. By Harry M. Silber. 104. No. 7. Municipal Liability for Breach of Public No. 8. The Acceptance of Benefits from Rail- road Employees' Relief Associations as a De- fense to Actionable Negligence Resulting in Personal Injuries or Death. By W. B. Morris, No. 9. Official Bonds of State and Municipal Officers Not Taxable by the Federal Govern- No. 10. Liability of Municipal Corporations for Damages Resulting from Defective Plans of Construction. By Eugene McQuillin, 185. No. 11. What Constitutes an Assignment or Transfer. By Nathan Newmark, 204. No. 12. Constitutional Limitations of the Police. No. 13. The Unconstitutionality of Assessment No. 14. Validity of Judgments Rendered in a Foregn State Without Personal Service or Sum- No. 15. Suits Between Husband and Wife. By No. 16. Labor Organizations-The Right to Con- No. 17. Proof of Marriage in Criminal Cases. No. 18. Life of a Judgment of a Federal Court in Favor of the United States. By Chapman No. 19. The Law of Surface Water as Applica- Central Law Journal. ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 6, 1900. It An exchange calls attention to a novel decision of the New York Supreme Court with respect to the rights of citizens, particularly with regard to their immunity from arrest by police officers, who are acting under no more definite authority or motive than that of suspicion. The case is Snead v. Bonnoil. appeared that while the plaintiff was emerging from a pawn shop with a bag filled with jewelry and silverware, two policemen, one of whom was the defendant, arrested him, saying in explanation of their conduct, that they wished to ascertain what he had in the bag. In reply he said that the property, as he could prove, belonged to him. He was, nevertheless, taken to the station-house and locked up. When a search was made of his person it was found that he had a loaded revolver. After having him remanded for twenty-four hours in order to find out whether the charge of being a "suspicious person," which is a misdemeanor, could be sustained, the officers decided to change this charge to the carrying of concealed weapons, which is a felony. Although the appellate court, to which the case was carried, thought that the circumstances might justify the belief that Mr. Snead was a suspicious person, he could not be held on a charge 'different from the one for which he had been arrested. "There can be no general right," it said, "to arrest a citizen for an undisclosed offense. The police officer cannot arrest a man for one cause, and when that is exploded, justify for another. Such a doctrine would be an incentive to the loosest practices on the part of police officers, and a dangerous extension of their sufficiently great powers." Again the court said concerning the detention of Mr. Snead without bail: "Thus the officers utilized the felony charge to detain the plaintiff for at least twenty-four hours beyond the time he was entitled to his discharge upon bail upon the misdemeanor charge. Beyond peradventure the police officer was liable for every hour he detained the plaintiff after he and his associate officer had secured the remand from the magistrate for a reason which could not have availed them had they then charged the plaintiff with the misdemeanor." The legislature of Rhode Island recently enacted a statute having for its object the suppression of what is known in commercial circles as "trading stamps," whereby it was made unlawful for any person or corporation to sell, give, or distribute any stamp, coupon, or other device which shall entitle the purchaser of property to demand or receive from any person or corporation other than the vendor, any article of merchandise other than that actually sold to said purchaser, and for any person or corporation other than the vendor, to deliver to any person any article of merchandise other than that actually sold upon presentation of any such stamp, coupon or other device; provided, however, that this act shall not affect any existing contract. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in the case of State v. Dalton, 46 Atl. Rep. 234, considered the validity of the act holding that, whatever the powers of a legislature to prohibit the "trading stamps" system in proper cases may be, the statute under consideration was so general in its terms as to amount to an infringement of constitutional liberty. The court relies to a material extent upon the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Gilson, 109 N. Y. 389. In all cases of this character the turning point is whether there is a lottery-that is, an essential element of chance-or whether the additional benefit to a purchaser is in the nature of a "chromo," or gift. The Rhode Island court cites and analyzes a large number of previous authorities bearing upon this general question. The substance of the decision may be better understood by quoting the following from the opinion of the court: "This inalienable right is trenched upon and impaired whenever the legislature prohibits a man from carrying on his business in his own way, provided, always, of course, that the business and the mode of carrying it on are not injurious to the public, and provided, also, that it is not a business which is affected with a public use or interest. Now, it was certainly within the constitutional right of the defendant in this case to sell tobacco-it be. ing presumed, of course, that he had ob. tained the necessary authority to deal in that article; and, as an inducement to people to trade with him, it was also his right to give to each purchaser of a certain quantity of tobacco, either directly or through a third person, some other designated article of value, by way of premium. The statute in question, however, steps in to prevent him from adopting such a course to procure trade, and from it to secure an income and livelihood; and he is thus restrained in the free enjoyment of his faculties to which he is constitutionally entitled, unless such restraint is necessary for the common welfare, in one of the ways heretofore mentioned, and we cannot see that it is. In other words, the statute says that A shall not sell to B a barrel of flour, and, in connection with and as a part of the contract of sale, give to B a coupon which will entitle him to receive from C a pound of tea, a pitcher, a lamp, a clock, a door mat, or some other specified article of merchandise. If the act had prohibited the giving away of any stamp or device in connection with the sale of an article, which would entitle the holder to receive, either directly from the vendor, or indirectly through another person, some indefinite and undescribed article, the nature and value of which were unknown to the purchaser, there would then be introduced into the prohibited transaction enough of the element of uncertainty and chance to condemn it as being in the nature of a lottery." NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS. - OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION VALIDITY ORDINANCE UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE WITH LIBERTY.-In Gastenan v. Commonwealth, 56 S. W. Rep. 705, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, it was held that a city ordinance declaring that it shall be unlawful for any woman to go in and out of a building where a saloon is kept for the sale of liquor, or "to frequent, loaf or stand around said building within fifty feet thereof," and providing for the punishment of any saloonkeeper who shall permit a violation of that provision of the ordinance, is void, as being an unreasonable interference with individual liberty. the books and records of the corporation; that the right to inspect does not depend upon the motive or purpose of the stockholder in demanding such inspection, and a petition which shows that the plaintiff is a stockholder, that he has requested the defendant to allow him to inspect the books and records of the corporation, and fix a reasonable time for the same, which request has been refused, states a cause of action; and that as incident to such right is the right to have such inspection by a proper agent, and to take copies from such books and records. GARNISHMENT-SITUS OF DEBT.-In National Fire Ins. Co. v. Wing, 60 Pac. Rep. 720, decided by the Supreme Court of Arizona, it appeared that plaintiff, a resident of Arizona, sued in that territory on an insurance policy; and defendant pleaded that, after receipt of plaintiff's proof of loss, plaintiff had been sued in California by creditors there,-service being had by publication,and that funds for the payment of plaintiff's claim in the hands of defendant's general agent in California were garnished, and thereafter, under the garnishment proceedings, paid by defendant to plaintiff's creditors. It was held that as defendant's debt to plaintiff would sustain an action in rem against plaintiff, and as defendant had funds in California which plaintiff could have attached in an action on his policy in that State, the situs of the debt was there, for the purpose of garnishment, and defendant's payment under the garnishment proceedings was a defense to plaintiff's action. TRADE-NAMES SURNAMES - RIGHT TO USE ONE'S OWN NAME.-Two cases have recently been decided which illustrate the general doctrine that a person has the right to use his own name in his own business; that one cannot make a trademark of his name and so debar others having the same name from using it, although it be in the same business. In Harson v. Halkyard, .46 Atl. Rep. 271, decided in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, it appeared that the principal point of resemblance between the signs, labels and advertisement of complainant and respondent was the prominence given to the name "Harson," which is the surname of complainant and one of the respondents. It further appeared that there was nothing in the respondent's advertisement, except the use of such name, which would deceive the public into buying the goods of respondents when they intended buying complainant's goods. It was held that the respondents would not be enjoined from using such advertising matter, as the respondent in question had the right to so use his own surname. In National Starch Mfg. Co. v. Duryea, 101 Fed. Rep. 117, decided by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, it appeared that one Duryea was for many years the president and a stockholder in the Glen Cove Manufacturing Company, which made and sold starch in packages having thereon the name "Duryea's Starch," in prominent letters, and also a picture of the manufacturing buildings, and the name of the company. After the starch had been sold for many years, and had become identified with the company, the latter sold its business, trade-marks, and good will to another corporation, which continued the use of the package containing the name and picture, with its own name as manufacturer; Duryea agreeing not to go into the starch business for five years. At the expiration of this time he furnished capital to his sons, who formed a partnership with others, and procured other starch to be made for them, and sold it as "Starch Prepared by Duryea & Co.," but used strikingly different labels and packages. Their starch was in fact prepared in accordance with directions given by them, or Duryea, Sr., who subsequently purchased the assets of the firm, and continued the business. It was held that this was a proper use by Duryea and his sons of their own name, and could not be enjoined. EVIDENCE-USAGE AND CUSTOM-SALE "DRY GOODS."-The Supreme Court of Iowa hold, in Wood v. Allen, 82 N. W. Rep. 451, that it is error to exclude evidence that the term "dry goods," used in a written contract, bears a meaning, according to the usage of the locality, under which notions, clothing, hats and caps are excluded, since such evidence does not contradict the terms of the contract, but merely applies them to its subject-matter; and the error is not cured by an instruction that "dry goods" means, in a commercial sense, such fabrics as are "made by weaving." The court calls attention to the fact that evidence has been admitted to explain the words "fur," Astor v. Insurance Co., 7 Cow. 202; "roots," Coit v. Insurance Co., 7 Johns. 385; "barrels," Miller v. Stevens, 100 Mass. 518; "C. 0. D., Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. 'Y. 200; "screened coal," Manufacturing Co. v. McKee's Admr., 77 Pa. St. 170; "1,000 shingles," Soutier v. Kellerman, 18 Mo. 509; "thousand feet," Brown v. Brooks, 25 Pa. St. 210; "fancy goods and Yankee notion store," Barnum v. Insurance Co., 97 N. Y. 188; "product," Stewart v. Smith, 28 Ill. 397; "outstanding accounts," McCulsky v. Klosterman, 20 Oreg. 108, 25 Pac. Rep. 366, 10 L. R. A. 785; "furniture and fixtures," Brody v. Chittenden, 106 Iowa, 524, 76 N. W. Rep. 1009; "top buggies with poles," Manufacturing Co. v. Randall, 62 Iowa, 245, 17 N. W. Rep. 507. In the recent case of Everett v. Indiana Paper Co., 57 N. E. Rep. 281, decided by the Appellate Court of Indiana, it was held that a contract for the delivery of 53,000 pounds paper, on the basis of "37x48, 53 lbs. 500 sheets," is not so plain as to the manner of weighing the paper that there could be but one conclusion. It was, therefore, held that evidence of a custom or usage in the paper business, that an order for 53,000 paper, “37x48, 53 lbs. 500 sheets," means that the weight of wrapping necessary to safely transport it is to be included in the specified weight, is admissible to show what is meant by the terms used, and does not contradict the express terms of the contract. The court said in part: "Nor can it be said that such a usage is unreasonable, contrary to law, or opposed to public policy. In Morningstar v. Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328, 11 N. E. Rep. 593, it is said: 'Parties who are engaged in a particular trade or business, or persons accustomed to deal with those engaged in a particular business, may be presumed to have knowledge of the uniform course of such business. Its usage may, therefore, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, reasonably be supposed to have entered into and formed part of their contracts and understandings in relation to such business as ordinary incidents thereto. Railway Co. v. Johnston, 75 Ala. 596, 51 Am. Rep. 489; Mooney v. Insurance Co., 138 Mass. 375, 52 Am. Rep. 277; Machine Co. v. Daggett, 135 Mass. 582; Fitzimmons v. Academy, 81 Mo. 37; Cooper v. Kane, 19 Wend. 386; Kelton v. Taylor, 11 Lea, 264, 47 Am. Rep. 284, 7 Cent. L. J. 383.*"* RECEIVER JUDGMENT AGAINST INSOLVENT. CORPORATION POWER TO REOPEN.-It is held by the Supreme Court of Illinois, two of the members of the court dissenting, viz., the case of Peabody v. New England Waterworks Co., 56 N. E. Rep. 957, that the receiver of an insolvent corporation authorized by the corporation act to sue and to do all things necessary to close up its affairs, as commanded by decree of court, occupies such a relation that, for the protection of the corporation and its creditors, he may appear and move to reopen judgments against it obtained by fraud and collusion, and be allowed to defend, if their effect would be to diminish the estate which should properly come to him for distribution. The court says in part: "The provisions of section 25 are not intended to limit the powers of a receiver appointed under the chancery practice, but to extend the powers of the court in the matter of the causes which shall be deemed sufficient to authorize the appointment of a receiver, and the causes for which the affairs of a corporation may be closed up. A receiver is to be regarded as the representative, not only of the corporation, having power of asserting its rights, taking its title and subject to its liabilities, but occupies a still broader position, for he represents not only the corporation, but also its creditors; and under his duties as the representative of the latter class he is invested with powers and may do acts that could not be done by a mere representative of the corporation. It is said in Gluck & B. Rec. p. 177: The receiver of an insolvent corporation, while, as a general rule, he is to be regarded as the representative of the corporation, asserting its rights, taking its title, and subject to its liabilities, in one respect occupies a broader position, and represents not only the corporation, but also the creditors; and when, in any proceeding, he occupies exclusively the latter status, he may do, and under some circumstances must do, many things which, if his |