charters with reference to taxation were vested rights and, although they consented to the legislation of 1886 and became subject to the provisions of the act of 1856 still as the charter privilege as to taxation was a vested right, therefore it was saved to them by the provision which preserves "other rights previously vested." The purpose of the act of 1856 was to reserve in the Legislature the power to destroy the privileges and franchises granted in the charters.

If it does not have this effect it would be entirely inoperative, and the effort to retain control of corporations would be abortive. The claim that the privileges granted by article 2 can be repealed, but without the right to terminate the contract with the banks, is not founded in reason.

The only privilege which the banks enjoyed was to pay the seventy-five cents on each share in lieu of all other taxes.

To say that the law granting the privilege can be repealed because the right to do so was reserved as is admitted by the court and still leave the bank in its enjoyment (as is the effect of the opinion of the court) is to employ logic that has never been in common use by this or any other court.

the Constitution enacted the law for levying and collecting tax from the banks of the State, the validity of which is in question in these cases.

For the reason already given I conclude that the obligations of no contracts were impaired by the action of the Constitutional Convention or the succeeding Legislature.

Some of the best lawyers in the State were members of the convention which framed our Constitution, who gave an earnest consideration to the questions involved in those cases, and the conclusions which they reached were chrystalized into section 174 of the Constitution. I believe that their conclusions are correct.

The opinion of the court denies the power is in the Legislature to say what taxes the banks of the State shall pay for State purposes during the existence of their several charters. It denies the right of the Legislature to compel them to bear any of the burdens of county and municipal government.

I cannot believe the Legislature did or intended by article 2, of the act of 1886 to reverse its policy so earnestly pursued for a generation and surrender to sixty odd banks of the State its right previously reserved to control them in the matter of taxation

The preserved rights then are not privileges and franchises granted by the repeal charter, but "other rights" which had rested previous to the act amending or repealing the charter.

Other rights are such as the beneficiaries under the charter may have acquired in property, choses in action, real and personal property or interests of every character which they could acquire in operating under the charter and also such rights or interests as other persons may have previously acquired by contract, mortgage, judgment or otherwise in the property belonging to the corporation. My construction has been recognized as correct in all the decisions of this court in passing upon the act of 1856. The Supreme Court of the United States has so construed the act. It was said in Griffin v. Kentucky Insurance Company, 3 Bush, 594, "the proviso was intended to secure the right

of beneficiaries and others vested under the charter before its amendment or repeal, and does not affect the mere power to repeal the franchise."

To the same effect is Cumberland and Ohio Railroad Company v. Barren County Court, 10 Bush, 609. Section 174 of the Constitution recognized a just principle when it declared that all property whether owned by persons or corporations should be taxed in proportion to its value unless exempted thereby and that all corporate property should pay the same rate of taxation paid by individual property. The Legislature in obedience to that provision of

Emergencies may arise requiring the levying and collecting of vast sums to meet the public demand, yet however great the emergency may be or imperative the demand for money to meet such wants, the Legislature is powerless to compel the banks to contribute more than they are now paying at any time during their corporative existence.

The counties and municipalities are annually compelled to raise large sums of money by taxation. The counties of the State are compelled to incur large expense to support the county governments, to pay for bridges and public highways and support their unfortunate citizens. The municipalities must incur great expense in making all necessary improvements for the comfort, safety and health of their citizens, to supply water and lights and to give police protection to their citizens and to the banks, yet the court concludes that the Legislature has no power to compel the banks to contribute their fair share of such expenses.

In this view I cannot concur.

Whether or not an indictment sufficiently charged the crime of murder in the first degree was for the State court to determine, and the decision will not be reviewed on habeas corpus in the Federal court. (Bergemann v. Backer [U. S. S. C.], 15 S. C. Rep. 726.)

New Books and New Editions.

CODE AMENDMENTS OF 1895.

This book is one of the most practical that has been published this year, giving as it does two days after the governor signed the last law of 1895 all the important changes made in the procedure law of the State of New York, many of which were made necessary by the revised and amended Constitution of 1895. There were over 270 amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure alone, many to the Penal Code and over 115 to the Code of Criminal Procedure. In some cases, of course, the only change was that rendered necessary by the changed nomenclature of the courts, but in many cases the amendments, though apparently slight, in reality affect greatly the law of the State. As already stated the governor signed chapter 1045, which was the last law of this year, on Saturday, June 15, and the book appeared with over 160 printed pages on the following Monday. In other years when the amendments were few in number this would not have been a very difficult task, but with the enormous amount of matter which had to be printed this year it was almost miraculous that the book appeared at such an early date. The work is arranged on the Mayer's plan, with perforations around each amendment so that they can easily be detached and pasted in the code in their proper places. This system is not only unique but of material advantage to the practicing lawyer, giving him a handy and speedy way of arranging his code so that the existing law is apparent. Nearly all the amendments which were enacted to the Civil Code by chapter 946, and which was to make the Code of Civil Procedure conform to the amended Constitution, do not go into effect until the first day of January, 1896. The book shows at page 117 that chapter 96 of the laws of 1854, chapter 57 of the laws of 1874, chapter 242 of the laws of 1888, chapter 219 of the laws of 1883, chapter 243 of the laws of 1888, were repealed by chapter 946 of 1895. Under this the general law, which is section 3 of the last named chapter, and which relates to pending proceedings in certain courts, is given and following this it is shown that sections 94, 232, 262, 793, 1836 and 2342 were amended not only by chapter 946, but also respectively by chapters 724, 376, 580, 410, 595 and 746 of 1895. The Penal Code is not materially changed this year; it might be noted, however, that the work shows that seventyone sections of the Civil Code were repealed by chapter 946 of 1895, and that sections 39 and 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were amended by chapter 580 and also respectively by chapters 889 and 119 of 1895. The work is printed on one side of the paper so that the pages can be detached and pasted in the Civil Code as already suggested

issue as to whether a conveyance of personal property was fraudulent as against creditors, evidence that after the alleged sale the purchaser went to another State, and that the seller remained in possession and apparent control of the property, is admissible to show fraudulent intent on the part of the seller. (Ashcroft v. Simmons [Mass. ], 40 N. E. Rep. 171.)

LANDLORD'S LIEN RATIFICATION. Where perlien for rent, the latter's failure to repudiate their sons converted property on which a landlord had a action, or to reply to their letter proposing to pay for what they had appropriated, was not a ratification of their act. (McCarthy v. Roswald [Ala.], 17 South. Rep. 120.)

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONTROL OF STREETS. -Where part of a county road is taken into a municipal corporation by the annexation of contiguous territory, it is subject to the control and supervision of the municipal authorities, who may improve it, by grading or otherwise, at the expense of the corporation. (Wabash R. Co. v. City of Defiance [Ohio], 40 N. E. Rep. 89.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, JUNE 29, 1895.

Current Topics.

[All communications intended for the Editor should be ad

dressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.]

MAN

ANY requests have been received asking that the opinion in the matter of The Argus Company v. John Palmer, as Secretary of State, et al., in relation to the legislative printing, be published in this journal, deciding, as it does, the question as to whether a concurrent resolution is a statute, and being a matter which is of great importance in many States as well as New York. The history of the manner in which legislative enactments have been made would be, perhaps, superfluous, though it may be remarked in passing that even in the very early history of this country the executive power was necessary to enact a law binding on the people within the territory over which the legislative body had jurisdiction. The Constitution of the United States provides principally for two methods of enacting statutes. and though they differ in name, yet they are practically the same. Article 1, section 7, subdivision 2, provides that " every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States, etc.;" and subdivision 3 of the same section, of the same article, provides that "every order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives may be necessary, shall be presented to the President of the United States, etc." In either case, the approval of the President is necessary, or else a bill or concurrent resolution must be passed over his veto by a two-thirds vote of both houses. It is generally recognized that concurrent resolutions are more easily passed in Congress, and such a resort is taken on this account in many cases. There is nothing, however, in the United States Constitution which would give color to the proposition that a concurrent resolution, without the approval of the executive, would be equivalent to a statVOL. 51 No. 26.

ute, and it is undoubtedly true that no such force could be given to the action of the two houses without the aiding action of the President. The New York Constitution, however, is much more explicit on this subject, as it does not mention concurrent resolution in any of its various sections. In article 3, section 14, it expressly provides that "no law shall be enacted except by bill;" while section 9 of article 4 provides that "every bill which shall have passed the Senate and the Assembly shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor, etc."—a provision which is similar to the The first decision as to what a concurrent resolution is was handed down by Judge Landon in his opinion in the Argus case, above referred to, in which it is held that "a concurrent resolution of the two houses is not a statute." It would appear that a concurrent resolution is binding only on the members of the Legislature which passes such resolution, and is operative only on the members or those persons directly within their jurisdiction, or else in a case where it is expressly provided by statute that a concurrent resolution may operate in a certain way. The order of Judge Landon was affirmed by the General Term of the Supreme Court of the Third Department, and was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the opinion of Judge Landon; so that his opinion has practically the same force and effect as one from the court of last resort. The opinion in full is as follows:

one contained in the United States Constitution.

"The question presented is, whether under the statutes authorizing the defendants as the board to award the contract for certain public and legislative printing to the lowest bidder, they can adopt as a basis for computation, in order to determine who is the lowest bidder, extra copies of legislative bills, assumed by the board to be called for and ordered by the concurrent resolution of the Senate and Assembly in 1892; such extra copies being in excess of the number authorized to be printed by section 72 of the legislative act, chapter 86, Laws of 1892.

"The board advertised for proposals, received several bids, and on the 10th of May, 1895, proceeded to consider said bids with the view of awarding the contract, and thereupon, as appears from the affidavit submitted by