...magnitude, as for example in Metaphysics, book 7, chapter 3, 1029 a 20: "By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain...other of the categories by which being is determined." 1T Simplicius was pu22led by this apparent contradiction, "If matter is body," he says, "it must be...

...who consider the question thus matter alone must seem to be substance. By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain...which each of these is predicated, so that its being is different from that of each of the predicates; for the predicates other than substance are predicated...

...of Aristotle's most atrentive definition, in Metaphysics. VIL3, of maner: By maner I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain...other of the categories by which being is determined. (1029al9-21) Matrer is thus somehow outside the determinations of being, and Aristotle goes on to say...

...who consider the question thns matter alone must seem to be substance. By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain...which each of these is predicated, so that its being is different from that of each of the predicates; for the predicates other than substance are predicated...

...form and thus of any particular individuality. As Aristotle stated this : 'By hyle I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain...assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined.'5 The concept of hyle in this primary sense is to be distinguished from hyle in a secondary...

...is. Both must therefore consider the locus communis taken from VII:3, namely, "By matter I mean what in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain...other of the categories by which being is determined". From the rationem, immo sint analogica nomina. quia potentia activa et passiva sunt alterius rationis,...