...clarification is available for 'true' in 3-valued systems. The obvious reply is that the famous biconditional: 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white - is perfectly acceptable even if one uses 3-valued logic. Tarski's criterion has as a consequence...

...makes them red. Some of the trouble traces back to Tarski's unfortunate suggestion that the formula " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" commits us to a correspondence theory of truth. Actually, it leaves us free to adopt any theory (correspondence,...

...clarification is available for 'true' in 3-valued systems. The obvious reply is that the famous biconditional: 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white - is perfectly acceptable even if one uses 3-valued logic. Tarski's criterion has as a consequence...

...is available for 'true' in three-valued systems. The obvious reply is that the famous biconditional 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white is perfectly acceptable even if one uses three-valued logic. Tarski's criterion has as a consequence...

...and raise one question about it. Choosing 'Snow is white' for p we get the following: The sentence 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. The quotation marks around the first 'Snow is white' in the equivalence is said by Tarski to convert...

...truth-notion just discussed (pp. 120 ff.). "First, and of least importance," he says, "the familiar dictum " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" must be revised to something like 'Snow is white' is true in a given world if and only if snow is white...

...coherence, or ideal assertability, but simply by coming to accept all sentences ('T-sentences') of the form: "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. The schema thus provides the deflationist's interpretation of the harmony thesis; yet it does so neither...

..."if and only if" — states the literal truth conditions of the sentence of the left-hand side. (3) "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. In this case, the truth conditions are that snow is white. (1999, p. 7) I have detected three other...

...which 'p' is replaced by that sentence, and 'S' by a name of it (Tarski 1936 [1952: 1 6]). For example: 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. It seems moreover that all T-sentences must be true. But the T-sentence for 'This sentence is false'...

...English. Davidson thinks that he can expose this idea as incoherent. We recognize sentences like ' "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white' to be trivially true. Yet the totality of such English sentences uniquely determines the extension...